1 White House Press Release, Statement by the President on the Death of Taliban Leader Mansur (May 23, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/23/statement-president-death-taliban-leader-mansur [hereinafter Death of Taliban Leader].

2 White House Press Release, Remarks by PresidentObamaand President Quang of Vietnam in Joint Press Conference (May 23, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/23/remarks-president-obama-and-president-quang-vietnam-joint-press [hereinafter Joint Press Conference].

3 Death of Taliban Leader, supra note 1.

4 U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefings (May 23, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/05/257633.htm [hereinafter May 23 Press Briefing]. See also U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Joint Press Availability with Burmese Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (May 22, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/05/257583.htm [hereinafter Joint Press Availability].

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan Press Release, Pakistan Expressed Concern over Drone Strike (May 23, 2016), at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mzc0OA [hereinafter Pakistan Concern over Drone Strike].

6 Tim Craig & Greg Miller, U.S. Airstrike Against Taliban Leader Crossed a Pakistani “Red Line, ” Wash. Post (May 23, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/Pakistan-expresses-concern-over-us-airstrike-against-taliban-leader/2016/05/23/14eff94a-20e6-11e6-b944-52f7b1793dae_story.html. See also Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 2, 2011), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/02/136397.htm (stating that “[t]he U.S. has a close collaboration with Pakistan on our struggle in combating extremism that exists in the tribal areas and through other parts of Pakistan”). For more on the role of Pakistani consent to at least certain aspects of the drone program, see John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 103 AJIL 364, 364 (2009) (“Press reporting suggests that, while the government of Pakistan publicly criticizes the attacks, it has privately sanctioned them and allowed U.S. drones to operate from bases in Pakistan.”).

7 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §1541 (2006)).

8 See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 587, 589 (2016); 109 AJIL 199, 210 (2015); 104 AJIL 276, 276 (2010).

9 See Joint Press Conference, supra note 2.

10 Marty Lederman, Moves Toward Greater Transparency on the Use of Lethal Force, Just Security (May 24, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/31218/moves-greater-transparency-lethal-force (citing an anonymous senior American official). Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the leaders of Pakistan were notified of the strike but did not discuss the timing of the notifications. See Lesley Wroughton & Robert Birsel, Kerry Says Taliban Leader Mansour Posed a “Continuing Imminent Threat, ” Reuters (May 23, 2016), at http://in.reuters.com/article/usa-afghanistan-taliban-kerry-idINKCN0YD07D.

11 Pakistan Concern over Drone Strike, supra note 5. A senator and vice president of the Pakistan People's Party described the strike as “illegal and expansionary in its geographical theater of targeted operation,” and a parliamentary representative from Baluchistan said: “[N]o doubt it was the crossing of the red line by the United States… . It's a clear message that the U.S. can do such strikes wherever they feel is required.” See Craig & Miller, supra note 6.

12 May 23 Press Briefing, supra note 4.

13 Id. (“We have had longstanding conversations with Pakistan and Afghanistan about this objective with respect to Mullah Mansour, and both countries’ leaders were notified of the airstrike… . And this is a decision that was … done appropriately and in conversation with both parties.”).

14 Joint Press Conference, supra note 2.

15 Death of Taliban Leader, supra note 1.

16 UN Charter Art. 51. See also UN Charter Art. 2(4) (requiring all members to refrain, as a baseline rule, from the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity” of any state).

17 Joint Press Conference, supra note 2.

18 May 23 Press Briefing, supra note 4.

19 Letter dated October 7, 2001, from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001).

20 Stephen Preston, Policy Address: “Legal Framework for the U.S. Use of Military Force Since 9/11, ” in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 337 (2015) (“As a matter of international law, the United States remains in a state of armed conflict against the Taliban, al-Qa’ida and associated forces.”).

21 Brian Egan, State Dept. Legal Advisor, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm.

22 Id. Egan explained that the asserted “unable or unwilling” standard is an application of the requirement under international law that states resort to force in self-defense only if it is “necessary.”

23 See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 814 (2016).

24 Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (2013).

25 Id. at 11.