1 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540-41 (2014) (holding that a Massachusetts law creating a buffer zone in front of abortion-providing centers violated the First Amendment); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2013) (addressing the constitutionality of a crisis pregnancy center regulation).

2 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540-41.

3 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 721 F.3d at 271; Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748 (D. Md. 2014).

4 Amanda Marcotte, How Crisis Pregnancy Centers Trick Women, Slate Blog (Sept. 18, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/09/18/vice_news_exposes_how_crisis_pregnancy_centers_lie_to_women_to_stop_abortion.html [http://perma.cc/JD39-8EFJ].

5 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 721 F.3d at 272; Tepeyac, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 751.

6 See, e.g., Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014) (noting that “the fundamental right to speak secured by the First Amendment does not leave people at liberty to publicize their views ‘whenever and however and wherever they please’”) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983)).

7 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (holding that the government is not obligated to fund necessary abortions under Medicaid).

8 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (holding that the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as applied to certain private corporations, because it “substantially burdens” religious freedom).

9 Adam Liptak & John Schwartz, Court Rejects Zone to Buffer Abortion Clinic, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/us/supreme-court-abortion-clinic-protests.html.

10 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E½(b) (2008) (invalidated by McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540-41 (2014)). Notably, the legislature changed the law after McCullen. See Mass Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E½(b) (Supp. 2014).

11 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 (2015); see also McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2525 (“The statute was modeled on a similar Colorado law that this Court had upheld in Hill v. Colorado.”) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 730 (2000)).

12 Portland, Me., Code ch. 17, art. VII, §§ 17-108 to 17-112 (2013) (repealed July 7, 2014).

13 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 132:37 to 132:40 (2014).

14 See Marcotte, supra note 4.

15 Id.

16 E.g., Pregnancy resource centers counter Planned Parenthood claims, Christian Examiner (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.christianexaminer.com/article/pregnancy.resource.centers.counter.planned.parenthood.claims/44033.htm [http://perma.cc/G8CS-NKV2] (explaining that CPCs are “working to serve women and babies”).

17 Balt., MD, Code §§ 3-501 to 3-506 (2013). The Baltimore Ordinance applies to limited-service pregnancy centers, which are defined as “‘any person’: (1) whose primary purpose is to provide pregnancy-related services; and (2) who: (i) for a fee or as a free service, provides information about pregnancy-related services; but (ii) does not provide or refer for: (A) abortions; or (B) nondirective and comprehensive birth-control services.” Id. at § 3-501. Under the ordinance, any such centers “must provide its clients and potential clients with a disclaimer substantially to the effect that the center does not provide or make referral for abortion or birth-control services” Id. at § 3-502(a). Furthermore, such disclaimer must be “written in English and Spanish … easily readable … [and] conspicuously posted in the center's waiting room or other area where individuals await service.” Id. at §3-502(b).

18 Elizabeth A. Harris, City Council Favors Pregnancy Center Disclosures, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/nyregion/03pregnancy.html (internal quotation marks omitted). In 2011, “[t]he [New York] City Council passed a bill … seeking more transparency from crisis pregnancy centers that present themselves as medical clinics but that critics say offer little more than pregnancy tests and counseling intended to steer women away from abortions.” Id.

19 See The Univ. of Chi. Med., Understanding Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCS) 2 (2013).

20 Dave Andrusko, A federal judge magnificently debunks NARAL's justification for attacking women-helping centers, Nat'l Right to Life News Today (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2014/03/a-federal-judge-magnificently-debunks-narals-justification-for-attacking-women-helping-centers/#.VEWSLYvF_Pa [http://perma.cc/2S9W-P3ZV].

21 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2014).

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 2526.

25 See discussion supra Part II.A.1.

26 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2528.

27 Id.

28 Id.

Id. (citations omitted).

29 Id. at 2534 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989)).

30 Id. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).

31 Id. at 2537. The Court explained that “the buffer zones impose serious burdens on petitioners' speech …. [and] ma[k]e it substantially more difficult for petitioners to distribute literature to arriving patients.” Id. at 2535-36. Further, the Massachusetts Law interferes with “one-on-one communication.” Id. at 2536 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424) (1988)).

32 Id. at 2529, 2541.

33 Id. at 2537. The Court suggested that Massachusetts “consider an ordinance such as the one adopted in New York City that not only prohibits obstructing access to a clinic, but also makes it a crime ‘to follow and harass another person within [fifteen] feet of the premises of a reproductive health care facility.’” Id. at 2538.

34 Buffer Zone Ordinance Repealed, Portlandmaine.gov (July 8, 2014), http://www.portlandmaine.gov/civicalerts.aspx?aid=238 [http://perma.cc/CUY7-UG7H].

35 Laura Bassett, Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Crumble Around The Country, Huffington Post (July 9, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/09/abortion-clinic-buffer-zo_n_5571516.html [http://perma.cc/7H4T-XAPT].

36 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000).

37 Compare id. at 719 with McCullen, 134 S. Ct at 2531-32.

38 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

39 Hill, 530 U.S. at 725. After finding that “alternative channels remain open” to petitioners, the Court noted that “when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.” Id. at 726.

40 Id. at 728 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994)).

41 Id. at 729.

42 Id. at 727.

43 Id. at 730.

44 Kevin Russell, What is left of Hill v. Colorado? SCOTUSblog (June 26, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/what-is-left-of-hill-v-colorado/ [http://perma.cc/AD78-9NL5].

45 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3) (2015).

46 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120E½(b) (2008) (invalidated by McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540-41 (2014)).

47 Balt., MD, Code §§ 3-501 to 3-506 (2013).

48 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2013).

49 Id. at 279 (quoting O'Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817 (D. Md. 2011)).

50 Id. at 271.

51 Dissenting Judge Wilkinson explained:

Id. at 292 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson further explained that he “recognize[s] that the Center's views on the issues surrounding abortion rights are controversial.” Id. at 296 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).

52 Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 769-70 (D. Md. 2014).

53 Id. at 769.

54 Id. at 763, 769.

55 See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.

56 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.

57 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.

58 See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (addressing the issue of “whether the Hyde Amendment, by denying public funding for certain medically necessary abortions, contravenes the liberty or equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or either of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment”).

59 See, e.g., Redish, Martin H., The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 591-92 (1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (introducing a “new approach” to valuing free speech); Brett LoGiurato, Here's The Ultimate Irony Of The Supreme Court Banning ‘Buffer Zones’ At Abortion Clinics, Business Insider (June 27, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/supreme-court-abortion-buffer-zones-decision-2014-6 [http://perma.cc/UPE6-QBCT] (recognizing the irony of the Court's decision in McCullen because the Supreme Court has its own “buffer zone”).

60 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540 (2014) (describing “the … First Amendment interests at stake” as “vital”).

61 Schauer, Frederick, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 82 (2011)Google Scholar.

62 See id.

63 Redish, supra note 59, at 591 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Thomas I. Emerson, The Systems of Freedom of Expression 6 (1970)); see also Brudney, Victor, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1153, 1163 (2012)Google Scholar (“[One] purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech that enables, or enhances, the ‘self-fulfillment’ of the individual.”); Meiklejohn, Alexander, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255 (1961)Google Scholar (emphasizing “the dignity of the individual”).

64 Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014).

65 See, e.g., Curfman, Gregory D. et al., Editorial, Prescriptions, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 2053, 2054 (2011)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

66 See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”).

67 Curfman et al., supra note 65.

68 See Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 7-8 (1995)).

69 E.g., Brudney, supra note 63, at 1163 (“[I]n terms of society's concern with protecting communal interests, the function of the First Amendment is to protect speech that enables or facilitates the operation, and enriches the quality, of a democratic, open society, and the role of its members in the collective process of creating and maintaining it.”); Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ….”).

70 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980) (quoting Police Dep't of Chi., 408 U.S. at 96) (“If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues are worth discussing or debating ….’”).

71 Brudney, supra note 63, at 1163.

72 Id.

73 Compare U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”), with U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). “The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).

74 U.S. Const. amend. I.

75 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

76 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)).

77 Eskridge, William N. Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1483 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 65 (1992).

79 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“[Canons of statutory interpretation] are designed to help judges determine the Legislature's intent as embodied in particular statutory language. And other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force.”).

80 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act violated the Fifth Amendment, and was therefore unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy…. just as heterosexual persons do.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citation omitted) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education…. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

81 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

82 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

83 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.

84 Id. at 562.

85 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

86 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (“There are broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause ….”).

87 Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to an abortion as a “fundamental right”), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (“[T]he Medicaid program is not obligated … to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is [otherwise] unavailable ….”).

88 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (protecting an adult's freedom to engage in consensual sexual relations); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (recognizing an individual's right to make personal decisions regarding contraception).

89 See generally Chemerinsky, Erwin, Substantive Due Process, 15 Touro L. Rev. 1501 (1999)Google Scholar (listing several cases that would have been decided differently but for the notion of substantive due process).

90 Id.

91 Building Regulations, Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/buildingregulations.aspx#Reg7 [http://perma.cc/7PLT-53QC].

92 40 U.S.C. § 6135 (2012) (“It is unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice a party, organization, or movement.”).

93 Hodge v. Talkin, 949 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2013), rev'd, 799 F.3d 1145 (2015).

94 Id. at 198.

95 Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

96 Id. at 1158, 1164-65.

97 See, e.g., Steve Annear, The Supreme Court Technically Has Its Own 252-Foot Buffer Zone, Boston Daily (June 26, 2014, 5:10 pm), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2014/06/26/supreme-court-buffer-zone-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/3LUH-5DTP]; LoGiurato, supra note 59; R. R., Supreme Court Reacts Swiftly Regarding Protests at its Plaza, Const. L. Prof Blog (June 13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/06/supreme-court-reacts-swiftly-regarding-protests-at-its-plaza.html [http://perma.cc/5XGY-U3LA].

98 LoGiurato, supra note 59.

99 Hodge, 799 F.3d at 1150.

100 Id.

101 See id.; supra Part II.B.1.

102 Building Regulations, supra note 91 (indicating that “[p]ursuant to the authority and responsibilities set forth in 40 U.S.C. §6102 [sic], the [building] regulations governing the Supreme Court Building and grounds were prescribed by the Marshal and approved by the Chief Justice of the United States”).

103 Id.

104 See supra Part II.A.1.

105 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000).

106 Id. at 727-28 (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994)).

107 See Sullivan, supra note 78, at 58-59 (“Standards … giv[e] the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand in the next case less than does a rule—the more facts one may take into account, the more likely that some of them will be different the next time.”).

108 Id. at 66.

109 Id. at 59 (footnote omitted) (“The recurring distinction in constitutional law between ‘categorization’ and ‘balancing’ is a version of the rules/standards distinction. Categorization corresponds to rules, balancing to standards.”).

110 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (holding that the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as applied to certain private corporations, because it “substantial[ly] burden[s]” religious freedom); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014) (“[T]he fundamental right to speak secured by the First Amendment does not leave people at liberty to publicize their views ‘whenever and however and wherever they please.’”) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983)); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318 (1980) (holding that the government is not obligated to fund necessary abortions under Medicaid).

111 Sullivan, supra note 78, at 59.

112 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-16 (2000).

113 Id. at 729.

114 Id.

115 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540-41 (2014) (holding that the Massachusetts Law violates the First Amendment).

116 See, e.g., Cozzarelli, Catherine & Major, Brenda, The Effects of Anti-Abortion Demonstrators and Pro-Choice Escorts on Women's Psychological Responses to Abortions, 13 J. Soc. & Clinical Psychol. 404, 415 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (examining women's “post-abortion responses” to protestors outside of abortion-providing centers); Foster, Diana Greene et al., Effect of Abortion Protesters on Women's Emotional Response to Abortion, 87 Contraception 81, 81 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (exploring how women respond to protestors outside of abortion-providing centers).

117 Foster et al., supra note 116, at 81 (citation omitted).

118 Id. at 85.

119 Id.

120 Id. at 86-87.

121 See id.

122 See, e.g., id.

123 Kahane, Leo H., Anti-Abortion Activities and the Market for Abortion Services: Protest as a Disincentive, 59 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 463, 464 (2000).Google Scholar

124 Id. at 465, 468-69.

125 Id. at 470-71.

126 Id. at 471.

127 Id. at 475.

128 Id. at 477.

129 Id. at 473.

130 Id. at 477.

131 Aaron Blake, States that are more opposed to abortion rights have fewer abortions – but not fewer unintended pregnancies, Wash. Post (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/01/29/states-that-are-more-opposed-to-abortion-have-fewer-abortions-but-not-fewer-unintended-pregnancies/ [http://perma.cc/UE6C-U6VF].

132 Id.

133 Finer, Lawrence B. & Zoina, Mia R., Shifts in Intended and Unintended Pregnancies in the United States, 2001–2008, 104 Am. J. Pub. Health (Supp. 1) S43, S44, S46 tbl. 2 (2014)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

134 Id. at S45.

135 Id. at S46

136 Id. at S47 (endnotes omitted).

137 Nancy Felipe Russo & Henry P. David, When Pregnancies Are Unwanted, Psychol. & Reprod. Choice (Mar. 5, 2002), http://www.prochoiceforum.org.uk/psy_ocr2.php [http://perma.cc/3TQ4-Y5TC] (“Access to abortion continues to play a major role in the prevention of unwanted births around the world.”).

138 See id.

139 Here, I am referring to a woman's decision to keep a baby as opposed to giving the baby up for adoption.

140 Santelli, John et al., The Measurement and Meaning of Unintended Pregnancy, 35 Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 94, 95 (2003)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

141 Alcohol and tobacco exposure are dangerous in utero. See Tobacco, Alcohol, Drugs, and Pregnancy: Frequently Asked Questions, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, http://www.acog.org/-/media/For-Patients/faq170.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20150301T2326436330 [http://perma.cc/GQN3-QKGF].

142 Isabel V. Sawhill & Quentin Karpilow, Reducing Unplanned Pregnancy, Brookings (Nov. 1, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2013/11/01-reducing-unplanned-pregnancy-sawhill-karpilow [http://perma.cc/K92H-4LLB].

143 Russo & David, supra note 137.

144 See, e.g., id.

145 Id.

146 Donna M. Burgess & Ann P. Streissguth, Educating Students With Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Fetal Alcohol Effects, Penn. Rep. (Nov. 1990), http://www.faslink.org/n.htm [http://perma.cc/4QB8-6F6G]; see also Flak, Audrey L. et al., The Association of Mild, Moderate, and Binge Prenatal Alcohol Exposure and Child Neuropsychological Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis, 38 Alcoholism: Clinical & Experimental Res. 214, 222 (2014)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed (“Our systematic review and meta-analyses … provide[] further evidence for a strong association between binge prenatal alcohol use and cognition [in children] ….”).

147 Solnit, Albert J., Child-Rearing and Child Advocacy, 1976 BYU L. Rev. 723, 723Google Scholar.

148 Id. at 730.

149 See id.

150 Adam Thomas & Emily Monea, Brookings Ctr. on Children & Families, The High Cost of Unintended Pregnancy 2 (2011).

151 Id.

152 Myhrman, Antero et al., Does the Wantedness of a Pregnancy Predict a Child's Educational Attainment?, 27 Fam. Plan. Persp. 116, 116 (1995)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

153 See id. at 117-18.

154 See id.

155 See id.

156 Rob Valletta & Jaclyn Hodges, Age and Education Effects on the Unemployment Rate, Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. Econ. Letter, July 15, 2005, at 3.

157 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., How Does Education Affect Employment Rates?, in Education at a Glance 2011 Highlights 40, 40 (2011).

158 Press Release, All. for Excellent Educ., Crime Rates Linked to Educational Attainment, New Alliance Report Finds (Sept. 12, 2013), http://all4ed.org/press/crime-rates-linked-to-educational-attainment-new-alliance-report-finds/ [http://perma.cc/MKM4-LE32].

159 Id. (“Dropping out of school does not automatically result in a life of crime, but high school dropouts are far more likely than high school graduates to be arrested or incarcerated ….”).

160 Id.

161 Enrico Moretti, Does Education Reduce Participation in Criminal Activities?, 1, 2, 4 (2005) (citations omitted), http://devweb.tc.columbia.edu/manager/symposium/Files/74_Moretti_Symp.pdf [http://perma.cc/93CP-QP4W].

162 Id. at 5 (“Specifically, Lochner and Moretti use changes over time in the number of years of compulsory education that states mandate as an instrumental variable for education.”).

163 Adam Thomas, Brookings Ctr. on Children & Families, Policy Solutions for Preventing Unplanned Pregnancy 2 (2012).

164 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728 (2000) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994)).