Congress granted qualified immunity from liability for peer review participation to physicians, osteopaths and dentists, created a national practitioner data bank to track inept, incompetent or unprofessional physicians, and enacted procedural rules for due process, privilege restrictions, and reporting and disbursement of information. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 is now in full force, and peer review participants are anxious to cloak themselves with immunity from actions brought by health care professionals. Although its goals are worthy, HCQIA's effects remain to be seen. Serious loopholes appear to exist, warranting close monitoring and possibly early amendment of the Act. Cautious judicial assessment is needed, in order to prevent not only circumvention of the Act's requirements by artful litigants, but also use of the national data bank by health care entities as a pretext for denying privileges and escaping antitrust liability.

The techniques used to distribute medical products are designed to maximize the manufacturers’ profits by charging a relatively low price to hospitals and a relatively high price to other purchasers, such as doctors and nursing homes. This pricing scheme raises complex antitrust problems, including vertical price fixing between the manufacturer and its distributors, price discrimination by the manufacturer, and agreements between the manufacturer and the hospitals restricting the hospitals’ ability to resell. This Article examines these antitrust issues.

Medical technology is easing the plight of many infertile couples by offering such reproductive alternatives as in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination and surrogacy. In response to the changes in our society's definition of family, wrought by scientific advances, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws promulgated the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act. The purpose of this Act is to protect the interests of children born through extraordinary medical procedures. This Note analyzes the Act's provisions regarding surrogacy and focuses on how the Commission's regulatory scheme fails to protect the child's interests. The Act's alternative of voiding the surrogacy contract also does not protect the child's interests. A more complete regulatory scheme which protects the adult parties’ interests, as well as the child's, should be devised, as the adequacy of the adult parties’ protection ultimately affects the child's well-being.

Over the last twenty years, state legislatures have enacted statutes incorporating medically and legally established criteria to be utilized in the determination of death. Similarly consistent criteria for determining the onset of life have yet to be established. As a result, unacceptably conflicting statutory language defining life and the state's interest in that life exists. This conflict can be resolved by a functional approach that consistently applies criteria used to define the end of life to the beginning of life.