This Article explores the antitrust and other implications of private credentialing and accrediting programs in the health care industry. Although such programs are usually sponsored by powerful competitor groups, they serve the procompetitive purpose of providing useful information and authoritative advice to independent decision makers. Part One examines the risk that credentialing will sometimes be unfair to competitors and deceive consumers. Its survey of common-law, antitrust, and regulatory interventions to correct such unfairness and deception seeks to determine the degree of oversight to which credentialing and similar activities have been and should be subjected. In recommending that judicial or regulatory scrutiny should be limited to discovering whether standards and practices have a rational relation to a procompetitive purpose, the Article argues that greater intrusion into credentialing schemes would be inconsistent with market theory and first amendment values and would discourage line-drawing efforts that stimulate competition and facilitate consumer choice. By emphasizing throughout that personnel certification and institutional accreditation embody ideology and opinion as well as factual information, Part One sets the stage for the argument in Part Two that antitrust law can and should be used to contest the dominance of a single ideology of health care and to facilitate the development of alternative sources of consumer information. The Article’s overall thesis is that, whereas the quality of advice given to the public about health care personnel and similar matters should not be closely regulated, neither should the supply of competing information and opinion be artificially curtailed.

Having argued in Part One against extensive judicial or regulatory interference with private personnel credentialing in the health care field, this Article now shifts its focus to emphasize the anticompetitive hazards inherent in credentialing as practiced by professional interests. Competitor-sponsored credentialing is shown to be a vital part of a larger cartel strategy to curb competition by standardizing personnel and services and controlling the flow of information to health care consumers. Instead of altering the conclusions reached in Part One, however, Part Two sets forth a new and hitherto unexplored agenda for antitrust enforcement, one that the authors believe will increase the quantity and quality of information available to consumers and offer a fairer competitive environment to individuals and groups disadvantaged by the denial of desirable credentials. The specific targets singled out for antitrust scrutiny are (1) the practice of "grandfathering," by which new candidates for credentials are required to meet tougher requirements than were met by existing credential holders; (2) agreements to standardize educational programs if they go beyond setting and applying accrediting standards and impair the freedom of institutions to decide independently whether to offer unaccredited training; (3) agreements by which independent certifying or accrediting bodies limit the nature or scope of competition among themselves; and (4) mergers and joint ventures in credentialing and accrediting. The legal theory supporting antitrust attacks in the latter two categories is strengthened by the apparently original insight that commercial information and opinion are themselves articles of commerce such that agreements and combinations restricting their nature and output can be characterized as restraints of trade. Among the many self-regulatory institutions in the health care field whose operation or sponsorship is called into question by the analysis herein are the leading medical specialty boards, the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, various accrediting and certifying bodies in the allied health occupations, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

The industrial workplace contains many potential health hazards that not only can cause great harm to workers, but also can destroy the employers’ economic stability. Often these hazards are documented and dealt with, but frequently they are unknown. When health-conscious employers monitor the physical well-being of their employees in an effort to avoid the terrible personal and economic costs these hazards can produce, they may be supplying their employees with the documentation necessary to recover financially for their industrial illnesses.

This Article analyzes this dilemma confronting employers. It describes the many factors employers must consider when deciding whether to institute a monitoring process that takes full advantage of technological developments in medical care. The Article suggests an approach employers may take until some of the disincentives surrounding the implementation of monitoring are removed.

Dramatic scientific breakthroughs in medical technology have revolutionized the physician’s diagnostic prowess in the art of obstetrics. Scientific procedures now reveal previously undetectable secrets about the womb’s tiny inhabitants. In the last few years, perinatologists have not only demonstrated the ability to discern fetal abnormalities of an extraordinary variety, but also have become increasingly successful in correcting many of these defects in utero. This article identifies the potential medicolegal conflicts that may arise as fetal surgery becomes an accepted medical practice. It begins by surveying the legal rights of unborn persons with a particular emphasis on the role of viability in determining those rights. The article will then examine the concept of viability as developed by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and later abortion decisions and concludes that the current judicial deference to the medical community in determining viability is adequate for balancing rights in the abortion context. However, conflicts among physicians and between the mother and her unborn child that may arise in the fetal surgery context suggest that viability may be an inadequate benchmark for resolving such conflicts. The article concludes with a recommendation to reform the current method of resolving the critical question of when a fetus becomes viable.

While state medical licensure laws ostensibly are intended to promote worthwhile goals, such as the maintenance of high standards in health care delivery, this Article argues that these laws in practice are detrimental to consumers. The Article takes the position that licensure contributes to high medical care costs and stifles competition, innovation and consumer autonomy. It concludes that delicensure would expand the range of health services available to consumers and reduce patient dependency, and that these developments would tend to make medical practice more satisfying to consumers and providers of health care services.

Opposition to abortion is based in part on the assumption that personhood is achieved at or shortly after fertilization of the egg. This interpretation of personhood arises from a contemporary application of the ancient doctrine of preformationism, a doctrine which holds that there is a preformed individual, in an ontological sense, within the developing entity. The assumption that the fertilized egg is unique in its capacity to develop into a human being is at least in part responsible for the opinions of those opposed to abortion. Yet, the uniqueness of the zygote in its capacity to develop into an adult organism is qualified by the discovery that development may be possible in a number of other ways. Consideration of the phenomena of cloning, parthenogenesis and chimerism can relieve moral ambiguity about abortion and may reduce opposition to that practice.

The debate concerning the legal and ethical bases of guardian refusal of medical treatment on behalf of incompetent patients often ignores critical distinctions among types of patients and guardians. For example, patients who have expressed preferences regarding treatment while competent are distinguishable from patients who have always lacked the competency requisite to expressing a treatment preference. “Bonded guardians,” whose relationship with the patient preexisted guardianship, should have a different role in the decision-making process than “nonbonded guardians,” who were strangers to the patient prior to the guardian-ward relationship.

This Article proposes criteria for guardian treatment refusal on behalf of incompetent patients. Under the model for guardian decision making presented here, bonded guardians should be preferred over nonbonded guardians, and bonded guardians should be allowed discretion to make treatment choices, limited only by a standard of reasonableness policed by the courts. The Author presents legal and ethical justifications for the bonded guardian's heightened role. Finally, he considers the proper roles of health professionals, hospital ethics committees, and judges in the decision-making process.

For almost forty years, legislators have advocated comprehensive measures designed to assure Americans quality health care. Instead of implementing an integrated health care plan, Congress has intermittently enacted statutes which address specific health care delivery problems. At times the judiciary has stretched the ambit of existing health legislation in response to particular plaintiffs’ urgent claims. This Case Comment examines the dilemma of piecemeal legislation and judicial policymaking as exemplified by Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas v. Harris, a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals health care financing decision whose outcome Congress has flatly rejected.

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.

City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital presented the United States Supreme Court with its first opportunity to consider whether a state or municipality has a constitutional duty to pay for medical treatment received by an individual in police custody. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that the city had an eighth amendment duty to pay for an arrestee's treatment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that eighth amendment rights and duties are not implicated prior to conviction and that fourteenth amendment due process concerns were met once the arrestee received adequate medical care. No obligation to pay arises, the Court held, absent a specific state law provision requiring such payment. Because arrestees are subject to physical restraints similar to those imposed on convicted prisoners, this Case Comment argues that courts undertaking to determine the scope of a state's duty to provide treatment to arrestees should apply a due process standard which draws upon eighth amendment analysis. The Comment concludes that under such an eighth amendment equivalence approach, no duty to pay arises because the state's failure to pay the health care provider does not reflect "deliberate indifference" towards the recipient of the treatment.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services denies Medicare reimbursement for certain indirect costs associated with health care delivery. This Note reviews arguments supporting and opposing reimbursement of costs that providers incur in three common financial transactions: the use of equity capital, acquisition of providers, and loan financing. The Note considers the Secretary’s regulations in light of the congressional mandate to encourage efficient delivery of health care and concludes that current reimbursement policy promotes inefficiency.

Although cocaine is pharmacologically not a narcotic, federal and state drug control laws have classified it as one from 1922 through the present. In many states and under federal law, the classification is part of a statutory scheme that imposes substantially more severe penalties for offenses involving cocaine than for offenses involving other nonnarcotic drugs.

This Note examines the circumstances surrounding the adoption and maintenance of the legal classification of cocaine as a narcotic. It then reviews two of the many cases that have rejected claims that the classification is unconstitutional. The Note concludes that, despite its constitutionality, the inaccurate classification is not only illogical and unnecessary to a legislative goal of strictly penalizing cocaine offenses, but is counterproductive as well.

The Social Security Administration promulgated the medical-vocational guidelines (the grid) in 1978 in order to improve consistency and efficiency in disability claim adjudications. The grid takes administrative notice of the availability of jobs suited to claimants’ capabilities, eliminating the need to make such a determination on a case-by-case basis.

In Heckler v. Campbell, the Supreme Court held that the grid is valid and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services cannot be required to give specific examples of jobs available in the national economy. In so doing, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, which had required the Secretary to give claimants examples of jobs suited to their individual characteristics to assure them adequate notice of the issues involved in their hearings.

This Case Comment contends that the Supreme Court misperceived the Second Circuit's purpose in requiring the Secretary to provide specific examples of available jobs. Nonetheless, the Comment argues that the Supreme Court decision does not foreclose requiring such examples to assure adequate notice and to aid in resolving adjudicative factual issues. This Comment concludes that such a requirement would improve the efficiency, accuracy and consistency of Social Security disability determinations.

In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a lower court order requiring a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarian section and other medical procedures necessary to save her unborn child’s life. The court found that the state’s interest in protecting the viable fetus outweighed the pregnant mother’s right to religious practice, right to refuse medical treatment, and parental autonomy. Jefferson appears to stand for the proposition that fetuses have rights that attach at viability and that mothers have a corresponding duty to ensure live births. The decision foreshadows substantial conflict between fetal and maternal rights.