¹ Escape from Freedom (New York, 1941), p. 132Google Scholar.

² (New Haven, 1950), p. v. James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason explore the implications of this fact for politics in Chapter 3 of their bold and refreshing book, Government by the People (New York, 1952)Google Scholar.

³ For a study of the corrosive effects of the unsatisfied craving for status, see Adorno, T. et al. , The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁴ Quoted in Dumbauld, Edward, The Declaration of Independence and What It Means Today (Norman, Okla., 1951), p. 55Google Scholar.

⁵ Madison, James, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” April, 1787, in The Writings of James Madison (Hunt, ed., New York, 1901), Vol. 2, p. 366Google Scholar.

⁶ First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, in Richardson, J. D. (ed.), Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1917), Vol. 1, p. 323Google Scholar.

⁷ The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, ed., New York, 1861), Vol. 8, p. 361Google Scholar.

⁸ The Federalist (Modern Library ed., New York, 1941), No. 9, p. 46Google Scholar.

⁹ Niles, H., Principles and Acts of the Revolution (Baltimore, 1822), p. 226Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Writings, Vol. 2, p. 366Google Scholar.

¹¹ Beard, C. A., An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York, 1921), p. 58Google Scholar.

¹² Ibid., p. 59.

¹³ Federalist, No. 10, p. 58.

¹⁴ P. 337.

¹⁵ Farrand, Max (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention (New Haven, 1921), Aug. 7, Vol. 2, pp. 203–4Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., June 4, Vol. 1, p. 101.

¹⁷ Ibid., Aug. 7, Vol. 2, p. 204.

¹⁸ Adams, Charles Francis (ed.), The Works of John Adams (Boston, 1851), Vol. 9, p. 376Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–30 (Richmond, 1830), p. 319Google Scholar.

²⁰ Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New York (Albany, 1821), p. 221Google Scholar.

²¹ Ibid., p. 222.

²² Ibid., p. 224.

²³ Ibid., 243. “It is supposed by the gentleman before me [Kent],” the delegate observed, “that landed property will become insecure under the proposed extension of the right of suffrage…. The gentleman has drawn a picture from the existing state of society in European kingdoms, which would be indeed appalling, if we could suppose such a state of society could exist here. But are arguments, drawn from the state of society in Europe, applicable to our situation? … The supposition that, at some future day, when the poor shall become numerous, they may imitate the radicals of England, or the jacobins of France; that they may rise, in the majesty of their strength, and usurp the property of landholders, is so unlikely to be realized, that we may dismiss all fear arising from that source. Before that can happen, wealth must lose all its influence; public morals must be destroyed; and the nature of our government changed” (pp. 242–43).

²⁴ Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1946)Google Scholar, Ch. 22.

²⁵ Journal of Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates Chosen to Revise the Constitution of Massachusetts (The Daily Advertiser, Boston, 1821), p. 244Google Scholar.

²⁶ de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America, trans. Reeve, Henry (Boston, 1882), Vol. 1, p. 1Google Scholar.

²⁷ Journal of Debates and Proceedings … to Revise the Constitution of Massachusetts, p. 245.

²⁸ Quoted in Mills, C. Wright, White Collar: The American Middle Class (New York, 1951), p. xxiGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ De Tocqueville, Vol. 2, p. 197.

³⁰ North American Review, Vol. 112, pp. 241–2 (April, 1871)Google Scholar.

³¹ “Limits of State Control of Private Business,” Princeton Review, p. 236 (March, 1878)Google Scholar.

³² The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York, 1904), p. 274Google Scholar.

³³ Quoted in C. Wright Mills, p. xiv.

³⁴ Language of Spencer, Herbert in Man versus the State (London, 1910), p. 67Google Scholar.

³⁵ This thesis is developed in my article, “The Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 32, pp. 443–77 (June, 1938)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ Words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), at p. 561.

³⁷ New York Times, Aug. 12, 1928.

³⁸ See Niebuhr's, Reinhold suggestive article, “American Conservatism in The World Crisis,” Yale Review, Vol. 40, pp. 385–99 (Spring, 1951)Google Scholar.

³⁹ “One-half of the Capitalists are occupied in preaching laissez-faire as regards railroad control, the other half in resisting it in railroad rate matters, in order to have their goods carried more cheaply and in tariff matters, in order to protect industries threatened with foreign competition” (The American Commonwealth [New York, 1921], Vol. 2, p. 304Google Scholar). See also Niebuhr, Reinhold, “Halfway to What?” Nation, Vol. 170, p. 27 (Jan. 14, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See, in this connection, Potter, D. M., “Democracy and Abundance,” Yale Review, Vol. 40, pp. 421–440 (Spring, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The American Democracy: A Commentary and an Interpretation (New York, 1948), p. 69Google Scholar.

⁴² Appearances (London and Toronto, 1914), p. 153Google Scholar. Brooks Adams applies much the same thought to the capitalist, saying: “The capitalist seems incapable of feeling his responsibility as a member of the governing class … he regards the law that restrains him as a despotic invasion of his constitutional rights, because with his specialized mind, he cannot grasp the relation of a sovereign function to the nation as a whole” (The Theory of Revolutions [New York, 1913], pp. 203–29Google Scholar).

⁴³ Campaign Address, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Sept. 23, 1932, in Public Papers and Addresses (New York, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 742Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Dickinson, p. 150.

⁴⁵ “It is not understood to be now pretended,” Thomas M. Cooley commented in 1878, “that any general right to fix the price of commodities or to limit the charges for services can exist as a part of any system of free government.” Continuing, Cooley said: “Does … the mere fact that one owns the whole supply of anything, whether it be of a certain kind of property or of a certain kind of services, confer upon the state the authority to interfere and limit the price he may set upon his wares or his services? … Suppose in some state a single individual should own the only mine in the country of some metal important for use in mechanical arts; would it be competent for the state, on the ground that competition with him was impossible, to restrict at discretion the price he should be able to charge for it? … Whoever shall undertake to answer these questions in the affirmative should be expected to show how the power may be harmonized with the general principles of free government” (“Limits of State Control of Private Business,” pp. 243, 267–68).

⁴⁶ For an excellent interpretation of the theoretical significance of the New Deal, see Jenkin, Thomas Paul, The Reactions of Major Groups to Positive Government in the United States, 1980–1940, University of California Publications in Political Science, Vol. 1, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 243–408Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Oceana (3rd ed., London, 1747), p. 48Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Corwin, E. S., “Our Constitutional Revolution and How to Round it Out,” Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, Vol. 19, pp. 261–284 (April, 1948)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Hamilton, Walton, “The Smouldering Constitutional Crisis,” New Republic, Vol. 108, p. 74 (Jan. 18, 1943)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ New York Times, Sept. 24, 1937.

⁵¹ Rousseau, J. J., The Social Contract and Discourses (New York, 1947), Bk. 2, Ch. 3, p. 25Google Scholar.

⁵² Federalist, No. 7, p. 42.

⁵³ Rousseau, Bk. 1, Ch. 4, p. 9.

⁵⁴ Majority Opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1948), at p. 4.

⁵⁵ “Notes on Virginia,” The Writings of Jefferson, Vol. 8, p. 370Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ “If civilization has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilization. A civilization that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit the better” (Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government [Everyman, ed.], p. 149Google Scholar).

⁵⁷ Untimely Papers (New York, 1918), p. 142Google Scholar. See also Douglas, William O., “The Black Silence of Fear,” New York Times Magazine, Jan. 13, 1952Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Op. cit., p. 170. DeTocqueville made the same appraisal: “Democracy does not give the people the most skilful government, but it produces what the ablest governments are frequently unable to locate; namely, an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force, and an energy which is inseparable from it, and which may, however infavorable circumstances may be, produce wonders” (Vol. 1, p. 321).

⁵⁹ Speech in Springfield, Ill., on June 26, 1857, in Nicolay, John H. and Hay, John (eds.), Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works (New York, 1920), Vol. 2, p. 331Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York, 1944), p. 118Google Scholar. Edmund Burke emphasized the complex, endless nature of the venture on which we are embarked: “To make a government requires no great prudence. Settle the seat of power and the work is done. To give freedom is still more easy. It is not necessary to guide; it only requires to let go the rein. But to form a free government; that is, to temper together these opposite elements of liberty and restraint in one consistent whole, requires much thought; deep reflection; a sagacious, powerful and combining mind” (Reflections on the French Revolution [New York, 1895], p. 121Google Scholar).

⁶¹ Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 2, p. 331Google Scholar.