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Congressional Redistricting in Missouri

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Lloyd M. Short*
Affiliation:
University of Missouri

Abstract

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Type
Legislative Notes and Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1931

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References

1 46 Stat. L., 21, 26. Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 3 sess. (19301931), Vol. 73, pt. 1, pp. 234235Google Scholar.

2 Missouri Laws, 1901, p. 87; 31 Stat. L., 733.

3 Congressional Record, 61 Cong., 3 sess. (19101911), Vol. 46, pt. 3, pp. 2228–30Google Scholar. The reapportionment act of 1901 had expressly provided that additional representatives in each state, and all the representatives in case the number was decreased, should be elected at large “until the legislature of such state in the manner herein described shall redistrict such state.” 31 Stat. L., 733, 734.

4 Congressional Record, 62 Cong., 1 sess. (1911), Vol. 47, pt. 1, pp. 673, 701704Google Scholar.

5 Ibid., pt. 4, pp. 3436, 3556, 3604. 37 Stat. L., 13, 14. The apparent contradiction in the position taken by Senator Reed probably was due to a suspicion, real or fancied, entertained by the Missouri Democrats in Congress that the Republicans had no expectation of using the initiative and referendum to secure congressional redistricting, but rather contemplated taking advantage of the presence of a member of their party, Herbert S. Hadley, in the governor's office to test the dubious authority of the chief executive to proclaim new congressional districts under Sections 10730 and 10731, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, which provide that electoral districts shall be the same as the congressional districts and empower the governor to form new electoral districts when a congressional reapportionment act increases or diminishes the number of electors to which Missouri is entitled. Republican members of the House denied any such intention, asserting that the above statutory provisions were clearly inapplicable. Congressional Record, 62 Cong., 1 sess. (1911), Vol. 47, pt. 1, pp. 701703Google Scholar.

6 State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689.

7 Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 3 sess. (19201921), Vol. 60, pt. 2, pp. 1679, 1682, 1693Google Scholar.

8 Missouri Constitution (1875), Art. IV, sec. 7. The Missouri supreme court in 1921 held that the initiative and referendum amendment adopted in 1908 (Art. IV, sec. 57), in vesting all legislative power in the General Assembly and the people, had the effect of repealing Section 7, which conferred conditional power upon these three executive officers in the matter of state senatorial reapportionment. The fact that the court divided on a strictly partisan basis in reaching a four-to-three decision, the tenor of the majority and dissenting opinions, and the failure of the court in 1910, and again in 1912, in cases involving the provisions of Section 7, to question its continued operation, despite the amendment of 1908, give support to the contention that this decision is of doubtful validity. State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker, 290 Mo. 560, 235 S. W. 1017. For the earlier decisions, see State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W. 689, and State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock et al, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S. W. 40.

9 Congressional Record, 67 Cong., 1 sess. (1921), Vol. 61, pt. 6, pp. 6308–10, 6340–45, 6348Google Scholar.

10 Missouri Laws, Second Extra Session, 1921, p. 17Google Scholar.

11 Congressional Record, 70 Cong., 1 sess. (19271928), Vol. 69, pt. 8, pp. 9009–18, 9094Google Scholar; 70 Cong., 2 sess. (1928-29), Vol. 70, pt. 2, p. 1501 ff; 71 Cong., 1 sess. (1929), Vol. 71, pt. 2, pp. 1861, 1863, 2065, 2078, 2159; pt. 3, 2457-58.

12 The United States Supreme Court held in 1916 that congressional redistricting in Ohio through the initiative and referendum was in keeping with the provisions of the reapportionment act of 1911, and was not contrary to Art. I, sec. 4, of the federal constitution. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565.

13 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 15, 1930.

14 An unusual amount of scratch-ticket voting in Missouri in 1928 gave the Republican candidate for supreme court judge a majority vote in two of the proposed districts which normally would yield substantial Democratic majorities. On the contrary, similar party irregularity in St. Louis resulted in a Democratic majority in one of the proposed districts in that city and a very close vote in another.

15 St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 28, 1931. The Missouri constitution makes no express provision for the formation of congressional districts. Art. V, sec. 14, requires that “every resolution to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, except on questions of adjournment, of going into joint session, and of amending this constitution, shall be presented to the governor and before the same shall take effect shall be proceeded upon in the same manner as in the case of a bill.” The attorney-general held that to redistrict the state by a concurrent resolution without the approval of the governor would be violative of this section and of Art. IV, sec. 57, which reserves to the people through the initiative and referendum authority to approve or reject any act of the General Assembly. Press notices indicate that similar situations have developed in Minnesota and New York, and that the authority of the legislatures in those states to act in the matter of congressional redistricting will be tested in the courts. In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the governors are said to be considering vetoes of redistricting bills. In this connection, it is of interest to note that sections similar to those appearing in earlier reapportionment acts relative to the manner of redistricting by the states were stricken out of the census and reapportionment bill of 1929, upon motion of the chairman of the House census committee. Subsequently, Representative Reed of New York offered an amendment to permit the legislature in each state, subject to the initiative and referendum, to formulate new congressional districts by concurrent resolution. He cited authorities, including Hawke v. Smith (253 U. S. 221), to support his view that the term “legislature” as used in Art. I, sec. 4, of the federal constitution was not intended to include the governor. Since the act of 1929 makes no provision for the manner or method of redistricting, and does not repeal such provisions in earlier acts, presumably Sec. 4 of the act of 1911, which authorizes redistricting “in the manner provided by the laws of each state,” is still in effect. The latter statute, however, made no provision for redistricting in the event of a decrease in the representation of any state. The act of 1901 authorized redistricting in such cases by state legislatures, though no state suffered a loss in representation by that act. The representation of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont was reduced by the act of 1882, and provision was made in that act for redistricting in such cases by the state legislatures. Congressional Record, 70 Cong., 2 sess. (19281929), Vol. 70, pt. 2, p. 1604Google Scholar; 71 Cong., 1 sess. (1929), Vol. 71, pt. 3, pp. 2443-48; 46 Stat. L., 21, 26; U. S. Code, Title II, chap. 1, sec. 3; 37 Stat. L., 13, 14; 31 Stat. L., 733, 734; 22 Stat. L., 5, 6.

16 Some of the difficulties suggested were based upon the doubtful assumption that the failure of the legislature to pass a redistricting act before the congressional elections of 1932 would automatically repeal the state statute creating congressional districts in 1901.

17 The General Assembly failed also to take final action on the equally important question of state senatorial redistricting. A committee bill was reported to the Senate on March 25 which, it was estimated, would give the Democrats 19 and the Republicans 15 of the 34 districts. A difference in population of approximately 34,000 between the proposed districts, while excessive, would be a vast improvement over the existing districts with a difference of 55,000 in 1901 when they were formed and 205,000 in 1930. The bill allotted a total of 15 senatorial districts to the four urban counties—St. Louis, Jackson, Buchanan, and Greene—and to the city of St. Louis. The latter, a Republican stronghold, was given only seven of the eight senators to which her population entitles her. The bill was ordered engrossed on April 10, and was passed by the Senate on April 14 by a vote of 21 to 9, with four Republican senators voting “yes” and two Democratic senators voting “no.” Dissatisfaction with the proposed districts among many Democratic members, a reluctance on the part of rural representatives to increase urban strength in the upper house, the pressure of other legislation, and the unusual length of the session combined to prevent action in the House.

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