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Contending Models of Cabinet Stability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Kaare Strom ,
Eric C. Browne ,
John P. Frendreis  and
Dennis W. Glieber
Kaare Strom
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Eric C. Browne
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
John P. Frendreis
Affiliation:
Loyola University of Chicago
Dennis W. Glieber
Affiliation:
University of New Orleans
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Abstract

A spirited debate has arisen over the best approach to the analysis of the durability of governing coalitions in parliamentary democracies. In this controversy, Kaare Strom enters a number of criticisms of the stochastic modeling approach offered by Eric C. Browne, John P. Frendreis, and Dennis W. Gleiber, and by Claudio Cioffi-Revilla. In turn, Browne and his colleagues join the issue.

Type
Controversies
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 82 , Issue 3 , September 1988 , pp. 923 - 941
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988 

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