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Crisis Learning Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Russell J. Leng
Russell J. Leng
Affiliation:
Middlebury College
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Abstract

Findings from a data-based study of bargaining in recurrent crises between evenly matched states provide the foundation for the construction of four crisis-learning games. Symmetrical and asymmetrical nuclear and nonnuclear sequential three-by-three games assuming complete information and nonmyopic play are presented and analyzed. The empirical study indicated that states that were unsuccessful in one crisis were likely to move to more coercive bargaining strategies in the next crisis. The four sequential games offer insights as to why this is likely to produce unwanted consequences, while demonstrating the importance of the participants' initial strategy choices. With the realpolitik lessons suggested by the earlier study removed, the dynamics of the games present a case for beginning with a cooperative strategy and moving to reciprocating, or tit-for-tat, bargaining.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 82 , Issue 1 , March 1988 , pp. 179 - 194
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988

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