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Distribution of Powers between an International Government and the Governments of National States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Arnold Brecht
Affiliation:
Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

Extract

Universal feeling seems to converge upon the postulate that after this war an International Government shall be formed to control war and peace of the world, and that the United States shall take full share in it. This dual demand is considered a fundamental platform on which all men of good-will can meet. There is a far-spread tendency, however, to postpone inquiries into its exact meaning and implications. This vagueness may have merits for winning popular support. It has none in preparing for final action. It may even defeat the movement's purpose, because little may come from the longing for International Government, unless details are well prepared in advance. Or, built with a marble façade on shaky foundations, International Government may lead to disaster rather than avert it.

None of the United Nations—at least none of the “Big Four”—has thus far given up its sovereignty. For this very reason, no insurmountable difficulty may lie in the way of continuing their alliance to some good purpose after the war, and gradually extending it to other nations. That is still a far cry, however, from the establishment of an International Government which, distinct from the governments of its constituent members, should have the power to take consequential steps independently. If we stake our hopes on this latter type, we must answer the question of how shall the powers be divided between the International Government and the governments of the national states? In passing through the immense flood of discussions on International Government, it is amazing to see how scant are the contributions to this question.

Type
International Affairs—Problems of Post-War Reconstruction
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1943

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References

1 “There are bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral organizations among several of the United Nations, but there is no organization of the United Nations as a whole. It cannot be said that any action, military or political, has been in any genuine sense an action of the United Nations. In the final sense … the United Nations is not yet a reality. No permanent institution has been established which can be designated by this name.” Wright, Quincy, “United Nations—Phrase or Reality?,” Annals of Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Soc. Sci., Vol. 228 (July, 1943), p. 1.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

2 This article rests on the negative assumption that a complete monopoly in armaments for the International Government will not be obtainable at the outset. ProfessorMacIver, R. M. (Towards an Abiding Peace, New York, 1943)Google Scholar rightly emphasizes that until it is achieved the danger of wars among nations will persist. He urges, therefore, that the monopoly should be brought about, if only by gradual steps. Strong as his argument is, it shows implicitly that until the millennium is reached nations and federations must be on their guard. I plan to review this important book, which came out after this article was written, in the November issue of Social Research.

3 See my article on “Limited-Purpose Federations” in Social Research, Vol. 10 (May, 1943), p. 135.

4 A catalogue of such minimum standards as may be adopted and automatically controlled in Europe may be found in my article on “European Federation; The Democratic Alternative,” in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 55 (Feb., 1942), pp. 561 ff. Such minimum standards should not be confused with a bill of rights, as they include far less than does such a bill in its traditional meaning. The reasons are discussed in the article.

5 See New York Times, June 5, 1943, p. 18.

6 The Pan-European Conference has no mandate to speak for Europe, except the mandate of reason. It actually consists of a self-appointed board of three members, who make their statements according to their own judgment, with or without previous discussion with the members of the Conference or its committees, who—although equally handpicked—have no vote.

7 Temporary discriminations resulting from defeat in the present war are a matter of armistice conditions and peace treaties rather than the affair of the Federation, which is bound to observe them as long as they are in effect.

8 The above suggestions paraphrase more moderate ones made in “European Federation,” cited above. See that article as to details and also regarding the composition of the Legislative Body and the distribution of votes. The result of the latter proposals was that decisions for which two-thirds majority was required could be blocked by any two or three major countries or any ten minor ones.

9 See “Limited-Purpose Federations” (cited above), p. 144, especially the reference to the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations of 1926.

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