¹ The relationship between U.S. Congressional voting behavior and constituency variables (attitudinal or socioeconomic) has been explored with positive findings by Miller, Warren and Stokes, Donald, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” this Review, (03 1963), 45–56 Google Scholar, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., “Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior,” Ibid., 57–61. These studies cite the earlier literature.

² Lerner, Daniel and Aron, Raymond (eds.), France Defeats E.D.C. (New York: Praeger, 1958)Google Scholar. The work was originally published in French as La Querelle de la C.D.E. (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Colin, Paris, 1956)Google Scholar.

³ MacRae, Duncan Jr., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946–58 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 8–9, 67, 176–77, 214, 329 Google Scholar.

⁴ Ibid., p. 299.

⁵ Ibid., p. 214.

⁶ See, for example, Leites, Nathan, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959)Google Scholar.

⁷ MacRae, op. cit., p. 299. See also pp. 142–143.

⁸ A complete exposition of the electoral system is available in Campbell, Peter, French Electoral Systems and Elections (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. xvi Google Scholar.

⁹ Williams, Philip, Politics in Post-War France-Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic (London: Longmans, Green, Second Edition, 1958), p. xvi Google Scholar.

¹⁰ For example, Williams, op. cit., p. xxii, cites that M. Chaban-Delmas joined the Republican Front. But there was no Republican Front apparentement in M. Chaban-Delmas' district. Other “Mendesist” Gaullists had similar behavior. Williams' analysis is also found in his revised and extended work, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (London: Longmans, 1964), pp. 47–48, 136 Google Scholar.

¹¹ However, some R.P.F. members individually favored joining coalitions. See Purtschet, Christian, Le Reassemblement du Peuple Français (Editions Cujas, Paris, 1965), pp. 310–311 Google Scholar.

¹² MacRae, op. cit., p. 194.

¹³ Ibid., p. 140.

¹⁴ The positions of various Gaullists are discussed in Stanley Hoffmann, “Les Oraisons Funebres,” in Lerner and Aron, op. cit., pp. 59–87 (French edition).

¹⁵ Purtschet, op. cit., p. 67, lists the founders.

¹⁶ The Q coefficient is used here largely for reasons of comparability with the MacRae study. Other measures of association might be appropriate were the data to be used for non-descriptive purposes.

¹⁷ See Rosenthal, Howard, “Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulation,” in Copline, William (ed.), Simulation and the Study of Politics (Chicago: Markham Press, 1968)Google Scholar and “Size and Winning Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic” in Groennings, Sven et al. (eds.), The Study of Political Coalitions (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Election statistics from Les Élections Legislatives du 17 Juin, 1951, (La Documentation Française, Paris, 1955)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Scale categories “0” and “1” were counted as “Right”; “2,” “3,” and “4” as “Left.” See MacRae, op. cit., pp. 140, 194.

²⁰ Although Professor MacRae has kindly made his data tapes available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, at this writing the author has not reprocessed these tapes to compute the additional scores.

²¹ Riker, William, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

²² Candidates running on homogeneous R.P.F. lists have always been treated as Gaullists. In the case of joint lists, a classification was made on the basis of whether the deputy joined the R.P.F. Assembly group after the election. (All heads of joint lists were elected.)

²³ On the assumption that the votes by party would not have been changed.

²⁴ Purtschet, op. cit., p. 280.

²⁵ Ibid., passim.

²⁶ Interviews conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) for research directed by the author and Guy Michelat.

²⁷ Williams, Politics, op. cit., p. xxii, n. 19, implies that Krieger had in fact tried to join with the Right and was rebuffed. Also, Williams would not count Bricout's alliance as Leftist. We have done so since we always consider homogeneous Radical-Socialist lists as Republican Front lists in order to have consistent classifications.

²⁸ It has been shown here that constituency characteristics are at least as strongly related to electoral coalition decisions as are intra-party voting decisions. It has also been shown that intra-party voting is related to constituency characteristics. But insofar as the “economic” scale is less strongly tied to the constituencies than the “Germany” scale (.52 vs. .84) and since Mac-Rae suggests that the “economic” scale is more closely linked to cabinet stability, we must entertain the hypothesis that ideology is more strongly related to cabinet coalition decisions than to electoral coalition decisions especially since cabinet decisions are more removed from the voter than electoral coalition decisions. In this case there would be room for both MacRae's “ideological” hypothesis and the present “opportunistic” hypothesis. See MacRae, op. cit., pp. 140–142.

²⁹ See n. 26.

³⁰ Purtschet, op. cit., pp. 176, 180, 280, 298, 314, 328.

³¹ Initially a number of deputies who personally favored the Paris Agreements voted against them, undoubtedly for electoral reasons, because they felt that the Agreements had enough votes to pass without their votes. Consequently, the Agreements were initially defeated and had to be reconsidered. See Leites, op. cit., pp. 53–54.

³² See n. 26.

³³ A manifestation of subset tactics is witnessed by the finding that on roll-call votes deputies from different parties in a given district “tended to take positions inversely related to one another.” MacRae, op. cit., p. 289.