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Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Frank J. Sorauf
Frank J. Sorauf
Affiliation:
The Pennsylvania State University
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Extract

American political parties have long been the victims of a peculiarly ambivalent public attitude—an attitude which on the one hand views them as perverters of the democratic spirit while on the other hand it gives them a vital role in the political process. Much of the regulation imposed on the parties in this spirit of distrust makes it all the more difficult for them to carry out their political role. To operate successfully, they have been forced to adapt their organization and functions to rigorous legal climates.

The vagueness and flexibility of political organization in the states reflect this constant struggle the parties wage to maintain their vitality and integrity against what are frequently severe legal odds. Parties have learned to create informal organs which will be effective and practical. Consequently, the real centers of political power rarely parallel the orderly, pyramided party organzations that the states create. The state or local party leader who holds no formal party office and the extra-legal organization or “machine” are commonplaces in American politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , September 1954 , pp. 692 - 704
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1954

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References

1 Wisconsin, Statutes, 1953, Ch. 5.35, 5.36.

2 In the city of Milwaukee the committeemen are elected by wards. The Milwaukee county committee, therefore, consists of the ward committeemen from the city and the precinct committeemen from the other governmental units in the county.

3 Included in the statutory convention also are the hold-over state senators whose terms have not yet expired.

4 State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615 (1916). See also State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518 (1929).

5 The Milwaukee county units within both voluntary organizations are composed of delegates from the active ward groups, most of which also hold periodic meetings.

6 The constitution of the RPW also provides for a “state Republican committee” composed of the party officers, the national committeeman and committee woman, the district representatives, and at least five members from each county. To the best of the author's knowledge, this elaborate committee has never met.

7 In the odd-numbered years the DPW convention meets in autumn.

8 The Republican primary is especially important since most of the Wisconsin political battles are settled there. Only in 1932 did the Democrats elect a governor in this century, and the state legislature is three-quarters Republican.

9 While the DPW formally eschews endorsement, an informal consensus among party leaders (“general agreement”) often achieves a similar result, but the party, as a party, does not enter the campaign.

10 This problem is heightened, as are so many problems of the Wisconsin parties, by the fact that Wisconsin has an open primary. Party leadership is therefore elected at a primary where there is no test of party membership.

11 The limits range all the way from the $10,000 permitted the candidate for the United States Senate and state executive office to the $400 allowed the candidate for the state assembly. In addition, since 1951 each candidate is allowed to purchase one-fourth page of advertising in newspapers having a circulation within the district he seeks to represent and to mail one communication to each voter in the constituency. Wisconsin, Statutes, 1953, Ch. 12.20.

12 The corrupt practices legislation is found in Wisconsin, Statutes, 1953, Ch. 12.

13 State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615 (1916).

14 State ex. rel. LaFollette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518 (1929), pp. 563–64.

15 The bill, tabbed the “fence bill” by its opponents, was vetoed with a stinging message by Governor Walter Goodland. The governor, already a popular political figure, was widely praised in the press for the veto. The Republican majority in the legislature could not muster enough votes to override the veto.

16 Wisconsin, Statutes, 1953, Ch. 6.32, 6.31, and 6.61.

17 Ibid., Ch. 5.36 (1) and 5.37 (5).

18 Ibid., Ch. 5.18.

19 Traditional as it is, such action has no legal authorization. The attorney general in 1934 expressed an opinion that the committee could fill only those positions where originally a committeeman had been elected. Opinions, Vol. 23 (1934), pp. 709–11Google Scholar.

20 Wyngaard, John, Green Bay Press-Gazette, Jan. 29, 1949Google Scholar, is the source for the 1948 figures; the 1952 totals are official party estimates.

21 These figures on receipts and expenditures are taken from the reports filed with the secretary of state.

22 In 1948, however, a Democrat was elected attorney general.

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