¹ The closeness is in time. The writer brings to his task, not the intimate observations of active participation, but the point of view of an outsider.

² If legislation is needed to enlarge administrative powers of compulsion in such matters as war savings and manpower, it is the responsibility of the President to ask for it.

³ Thus willingly accepted, such methods are not really authoritarian in the fascist sense.

⁴ In this respect, war-time Washington is, of course, not unlike peace-time Washington. Cf. Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest.

⁵ High points of the organizational history may be traced through the several issues of the U. S. Government Manual and the Federal Register for the period. See also L. F. Schmeckebier's periodic articles in this Review, notably that in the June, 1942, issue, and Howard, L. Vaughan, “War and the Federal Service,” in this Review, Oct., 1942.Google Scholar

⁶ The writer is indebted to Ernest K. Lindley and Raymond Clapper, and by chance to a less extent to Walter Lippmann, whose syndicated columns make valuable contributions to such tentative appraisal as is currently possible.

⁷ Consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

⁸ This consisted of seven Commissioners in charge, respectively, of Industrial Production, Industrial Materials, Employment, Farm Products, Transportation, Price Stabilization, and Consumer Protection.

⁹ The OEM had been anticipated by Executive Order No. 8248 (September 8, 1939). This order was an outgrowth of transfers made by the Reorganization Plans under the Reorganization Act of 1939. After setting up five principal divisions of the Executive Office of the President, the Order added simply: “(6) in the event of a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency, such office for emergency management as the President shall determine.”

¹⁰ Its first head was Mr. William H. McReynolds, one of the Administrative Assistants to the President.

¹¹ Under the chairmanship of Mr. Knudsen, and with Donald M. Nelson as Administrator.

¹² U. S. Government Manual (Mar., 1941), 69–70.

¹³ Formed from the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), part of the staff of the Coördinator of Information (COI), the Office of Government Reports of the Executive Office of the President, and the Division of Information of OEM.

¹⁴ See Executive Order No. 9250 (Oct. 3, 1942).

¹⁵ These are too many to enumerate; nor would a mere enumeration be helpful.

¹⁶ Permanent Joint Board on Defense (August, 1940); Materials Coördinating Committee (May, 1941); Joint Economic Committees (June, 1941); Joint Defense (later War) Production Committee (November, 1941).

¹⁷ Combined Raw Materials Board, Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, and Munitions Assignments Board (January, 1942); Combined Chiefs of Staff (February 1942), with Coördinator of Information (COI) becoming Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Joint United States Chiefs of Staff (June, 1942); Combined Food Board, and Combined Production and Resources Board (June, 1942).

¹⁸ The distinction was recently drawn by Mr. Ernest K. Lindley.

¹⁹ Another reason seems to be a personal weakness of Mr. Roosevelt: dislike of personal clashes or show-downs with those who work with him.

²⁰ Thus a proposal of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, of which Representative John H. Tolan, of California, is chairman, threatens to place the President in the position of following rather than leading in this respect. House Report No. 2589, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 20, 1942). Suffice it to say here that, in proposing the creation of an Office of War Mobilization, the report views the problem in the grand manner of administrative statesmanship. It is said that Senator Truman, another constructive critic, supports the plan.

²¹ The ability of favored individuals to “sell” ideas to Mr. Roosevelt without due regard to the total picture appears to have been an important source of administrative disorganization and confusion. The limits of space forbid any examination of this factor, as the limits of the topic forbid any examination of the influence of political considerations in shaping the organizational development, or of the extent to which this influence has been justified.

²² An interesting study would be of the rôle of “commodity specialists” in OPA. But has finality of decision tended to pass to the OPA lawyers, and if so, is this a consequence of judicial supremacy? Were some of the “commodity specialists” retained in OPA after priorities had practically eliminated the problem of prices for civilian use of their special commodities? If so, does this reflect the heading of OPA by men whose concentration on economic problems gives them too little appreciation of administrative management?

²³ This emphasizes the administrative importance of public relations. Leon Henderson's bold frankness, if it annoyed Congressmen and farm lobbyists, won him respect among the thinking—and large sections of the consuming—public.

²⁴ As this is written, it is reported that the disgraceful pressure to force postponement of nation-wide gasoline rationing, due December 1, 1942, has collapsed.

²⁵ It seems safe to predict that Mr. Roosevelt's name will be inscribed on the short roll of the great when those self-important men of narrow vision whose patriotism does not preclude wanton abuse of their Commander-in-Chief will be remembered only by the worms that feed on decayed organisms. In sharp contrast to wanton abuse stands Wendell Willkie's wholesome criticism.

²⁶ This appraisal stands as it was originally written. It takes no account of further important concentrations of authority made by the President just before the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor. These related to petroleum (Executive Order No. 9276, of December 2, 1942), manpower (Executive Order No. 9279, of December 5, 1942), and food (Executive Order No. 9280, of December 5, 1942).