¹ See UN document S/5002 (S/4985/Rev. 1, as amended); cf. UN Charter, Articles 1 and 55.

² Cited by former Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy, Robert in “The Principle of Self-Determination in International Relations,” Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 33, No. 857 (11 28, 1955), p. 889Google Scholar. The official view-point of the administration on the Katanga secession was clearly stated in the address delivered in Los Angeles on December 19, 1961, by Under Secretary of State Ball, George W., reproduced in Africa Report (01 1962), p. 17Google Scholar.

³ As one authority remarked, “[self-determination] might mean incorporation into a state, or some measure of autonomy within a state, or a somewhat larger degree of freedom in a federation or commonwealth or union, or it might mean complete independence,” Eagleton, Clyde, “The Excesses of Self-Determination,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 14 (7 1953), p. 594CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an interesting discussion of the problems raised in its application, see Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), esp. chs. 16 and 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Cobban, Alfred, National Self-Determination (London, New York, Toronto, 1945)Google Scholar, and Rivlin, Benjamin, Self-Determination and Dependent Areas, International Conciliation, No. 501 (01 1955)Google Scholar.

⁴ The delegates to the San Francisco Conference were not unaware of these divisive implications. One Committee Report for example emphasized that “the principle [of self-determination] conformed to the Charter insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession,” UN Conference on International Organization (New York, 1945) Vol. 6, p. 226Google Scholar, cited in Benjamin Rivlin, op. cit., p. 198.

⁵ See Bulletin de la Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, No. 12 (12 1958), p. 462 ff.Google Scholar; and La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi en 1957, Ministére des Colonies (Bruxelles, 1958), p. 49Google Scholar.

⁶ For a global appraisal of the economic activities of the UMHK see Joye, Pierre, Les Trusts en Belgique (Bruxelles, 1960), p. 121 ff.Google Scholar and Joye, Pierre and Lewin, Rosine, Les Trusts au Congo (Bruxelles, 1961)Google Scholar. Cf. “The Colonial Big Five,” Fortune (11 1952), p. 113 ff.Google Scholar

⁷ See Berg, Elliot J., “The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa,” this Review, Vol. 54 (06 1960), pp. 391–405Google Scholar.

⁸ See Toussaint, E., “L'Avenir de la Population Bantoue du Haut Katanga Industriel,” Congrès Scientifique d'Elizabethville, Vol. 6 (Elizabethville, 1956), p. 45Google Scholar.

⁹ La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi en 1958, Ministère des Colonies (Bruxelles, 1959), p. 22Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Rapport Annuel sur la Colonie du Congo Belge en 1924, p. 83; ibid, 1947, p. 258.

¹¹ Drawing a distinction between the colonie de peuplement where “immigrants bring along with themselves their own laws and institutions, exercize political rights and control over the local institutions,” and the colonie d'encadrement “where the metropole has established its sovereignty over a numerous native population and [where] local government merely exercizes delegated powers,” the late Professor Marzorati unambiguously identified the former Belgian Congo with the latter type of dependency. See Marzorati, M. A., “L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Congo,” Compte Rendu des Journées Universitaires d'Etudes Coloniales (Bruxelles, 1952), p. 8Google Scholar.

This distinction reinforced the Belgian government's determination to withhold political rights from both Africans and Europeans. It also provided a rationale for allowing admission into the colony only to those elements that seemed sufficiently capable or resourceful not to become “public burdens” or embittered agitators.

¹² Article 2 of the statutes of the Ucol; Ucol (Elizabethville), 01 1947Google Scholar.

¹³ Their reaction was expressed by the Chairman of the Fedacol in the following terms: “The European community is too much aware of the excellency of Western civilization to let it run the slightest risk of being submerged under the flood of a hydrid combination of civilization and barbary,” L'Opinion Publique devant l'Assimilation des Indigènes (Bruxelles, 1951), p. 3Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See “La Fédération des Classes Moyennes,” CRISP, Courrier Africain, No. 25 (07 1959), p. 19 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The record suggests that the Belgian Liberal Party (PLB) displayed the most emphatic support for the views and aspirations of the colonat. See in particular the declarations made before the Chamber of Representatives by the Liberal deputy Lahaye, Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants, 04 21, 1959, p. 13 ff.Google Scholar Similarly, the conservative daily La Libre Belgique, whose views tend to reflect the opinions of the Social Christian Party (PSC), has at times expressed an overt sympathy towards settler interests.

¹⁶ As early as 1925 the Association des Colons Belges introduced a motion to the Comité Regional du Katanga in which they urged the “competent authorities” “to examine the way in which they could facilitate the exercise of their political rights”; Comité Régional, Katanga, 1926, p. 15Google Scholar. In 1946, speaking on behalf of the Ucol before the Commission du Colonat, a prominent spokesman of the colonat stated: “The Belgian colon does not want to be regarded as a foreigner in a country which is now his. The Congo must therefore remain a Belgian entity, perhaps in the form of a British dominion”; Commission du Colonat Procès Verbaux (Bruxelles, 1946), p. 30Google Scholar. And in 1953, the delegate of the Ucol to the Conseil Colonial National declared that “the establishment of legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the the Congo” was “the immediate objective of the settler population”; Congrès Colonial National, 9ème session (Bruxelles, 1953), p. 140Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Le Gouvernement du Congo Belge: Projet de Réorganisation Administrative (Elizabethville, 1920)Google Scholar; cf. Sépulchre, Jean, Propos sur le Congo Politique de Demain: Autonomie et Féderalisme (Elizabethville, 1958), p. 48Google Scholar.

¹⁸ The influence exerted by the Union of South Africa on the settler community of the Katanga is evidenced by the following statement, which appeared in the issue of November 17, 1911, of the Etoile du Congo, one of the first newspapers to be published in Elizabethville: “If Katanga is to become a credit to South Africa a very different state of affairs than at present exists must be inaugurated in the country …. If our new Governor is to be a success he will not consult any man holding an official position; he must put aside officialdom altogether and must call together real businessmen who understand the true inwardness of affairs.” It is also reflected in the suggestion made by the Comité Régional du Katanga in 1924 that a system of native reserves, “similar to that which prevails in South Africa,” be adopted in order to satisfy the demands of the colons; Comité Régional, Katanga, 1925, p. 15Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Le Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1900–1925 (Bruxelles, 1927), esp. Annexe III, pp. 119–120Google Scholar.

²⁰ As M. Renkin, then Minister of Colonies, declared before the Chambers: “La mesure la plus importante prise au cours de l'exercice 1910 est la création du Vice Gouvernement Général du Katanga. C'est une mesure essentiellement décentralisatrice, dont le but est de favoriser le développement de la région en lui assurant le plus d'autonomie possible. Y aura-t-il d'autres Vice Gouvernements Généraux comme celui du Katanga? C'est peu probable; l'organisation d'une administration autonome se justifiait au Katanga, district minier où l'industrie s'implantera facilement. Elle ne se justifierait pas ailleurs pour le moment.” Annales Parlementaires, 1 Feb. 1911, p. 9.

²¹ The resentment caused by the administrative reorganization of 1933 found a graphic expression in an article entitled “Entreprise de Démolition,” which appeared in L'Essor du Congo, July 3, 1933. Referring to “le dictateur Tilkens,” the author of the article stated: “Le grand destructeur de Kalina, qui n'a lui à son actif qu'une incompétence notoire et une incomprehénsible suffisance, n'a pas hésité à sacrifier ces remarquables serviteurs de l'oeuvre coloniale pour le seul motif que leur valeur le gêinait. Un homme de petite taille n'aime pas s'entourer d'athlètes. Lorsqu'on examine ces fameuses mesures de réorganisation, l'on s'aperçoit en effet que le seul, le vrai but de ce renversement n'a été que d'écarter de l'entourage du Gouverneur General les hommes de valeur qui le surplombaient”; cited in Jean Sépulchre, op. cit., p. 38.

²² The decree of March 23, 1957, provided for the election of municipal councillors in the European and African communes of those urban centers which had been officially recognized as villes, namely Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville. Similar elections were held in December 1958 in Stanleyville, Bukavu, Coquilhatville and Luluabourg. The text of the decree will be found in Piron, P. and Devos, J., Codes et Lois du Congo Belge, Tome D, 1957 (Bruxelles, 1958), pp. 39–53Google Scholar.

²³ “Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo,” Civilisations, Vol. X, No. 1 (1960), p. 66Google Scholar.

²⁴ The Conakat incorporated in its membership the Groupement des Associations Muiuelles de l'Empire Lunda, the Association des Baluba du Katanga, the Fédération des Tribus du Haut Katanga, the Association des Basonge, the Association des Bena Marunga, the Association des Ressortissants Bahemba, the Association des Minungu, and several other tribal associations. The most important of these numerically was the Association des Baluba, founded in 1957 by Jason Sendwe for the avowed purpose of “promoting the unity of the Baluba.” It agreed to join the Conakat on February 5,1959, on the condition that it would retain a large measure of autonomy. As specified by Sendwe in a letter sent to the Conakat leaders, “la Balubakat se réserve formellement le droit de garder son autonomie de direction et de gestion.” The writer wishes to acknowledge his debt to the Department of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Interior of the Katanga for permission to consult some of its files.

²⁵ The program of the Union Katangaise will be found in L'Essor du Congo, May 28, 1958; cf. Ucol: Doctrine Politique (Elizabethville, n.d.). mimeographed document.

²⁶ On February 13, 1959, Mr. Munongo wrote a letter to the provincial Governor which stated, among other things: “Les Katangais d'origine sedemandent avec raison si les autorités ne font pas exprès en accordant le séjour définitif auxgens du Kasai dans nos centres pour que les ressortissants de cette Province puissent, grâce à leur nombre toujours croissant, écraser ceux du pays. Ce fait pourrait faire déclencher dans un avenir plus ou moins proche des bagarres entre les habitants des deux Provinces …. Nous nous permettons de porter à votre connaissance quetrès nombreux sont les Katangais d'origine qui aimeraient travailler dans les grands centres de leur Province; impitoyablement on leur répond qu'il y a un arrêté interdisant l'accès vers ces centres. Et pourtant ce sont eux qui devraient avoir priorité.”

²⁷ L'Essor du Congo, May 26, 1959.

²⁸ L'Essor du Congo, July 29, 1959.

²⁹ Le Phare du Katanga, June 3, 1959.

³⁰ As one competent observer noted: “Immigrants and their descendants would be thrown out of the Katanga; jobs made scarce by the recession would be left to the natives of the Proince; in any case, the foreign labor which the industries might need would not be part of the community and would not participate in polls—these would be reserved exclusively to genuine Katangese and their civilizers”; A. Rubbens, op. cit., p. 68.

³¹ The alliance concluded by the Balubakat and the Fedeka on the eve of the Brussels Round Table Conference, in late 1959, also tends to confirm this fact. For further evidence see Kalanda, Mabika, Baluba et Lulua: Une Ethnie à la Recherche d'un Nouvel Equilibre (Bruxelles, 1959)Google Scholar; Vansina, J., “Migrations dans la Province du Kasai; Une Hypothese,” Zaire (January 1956), pp. 69–85Google Scholar; Verhulpen, E., Baluba et Balubaisés du Katanga (Antwerp, 1936)Google Scholar.

³² In a letter to Mr. Munongo, dated June 8, 1959, a group of Katangese commercants of various tribal origins declared: “Votre position vous a été dictée par l'Union Katangaise de colons pour nous imposer le fédéralisme qui sera aprés considèré comme l'apartheid et l'autonomie …. Nous vous demandons Munongo de rentrer à l'Uganda dont vous êtes ressortissant, et laisseznous Congolais seuls à réclamer notre droit à l'independence immédiate … Nous sommes tous Kinois, Bukaviens, Kasaiens, Katangais, en un mot Congolais et Bantoua.”

³³ The views contained in this paragraph and the next are based on oral and documentary evidence furnished by European and African personalities whose identity can not be disclosed.

³⁴ Commenting upon the financial aid extended to Katangese parties by Belgian “institutions with important moral and material stakes in the Katanga,” Jules-Gérard Libois notes that “the paradox lies in the fact that the Belgian source remained the same” and that “only the channels were different”; Etudes Congolaises, No. 1 (03 1961), p. 38Google Scholar.

³⁵ The text of the Loi Fondamentale will be found in Documents Parlementaires, Chambre des Representants, No. 489, pp. 1–44.

³⁶ See Congo 1960, Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, (Bruxelles, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 240. This work contains the most abundant source of documentation available to this date on the recent political evolution of the Congo.

³⁷ Gérard-Libois reports that this sudden defection was in part the result of a quid pro quo between Tshombe and Kalondji. The latter, anxious to obtain the support of the federal deputies of the Conakat for his candidacy for the post of federal Prime Minister, had apparently promised the leader of the Conakat to lend him the support of his own party in the provincial assembly on the condition that the Kasaian minority be given special guarantees. See Congo 1960, op. cit., p. 244.

³⁸ See “Loi relative aux elections legislatives,” Moniteur Congolais, No. 13, 03 28, 1960, p. 863 ff.Google Scholar

³⁹ In the Elizabethville constituency for example, where the Conakat polled 8,617 votes— exactly 7 more than the Balubakat—3 seats went to the Conakat, 2 to the Balubakat and one to the MNC-Kalondji. In Dilolo the Balubakat received only as many seats as the Conakat, in spite of the fact that it obtained 2,947 more votes than its opponent; see Congo 1960, op. cit., p. 243.

⁴⁰ An instructive account of this intervention will be found in Chome, Jules, La Crise Congolais (Bruxelles, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 48.

⁴² Congo 1960, op. cit., p. 253.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 305.

⁴⁴ On June 25 Tshombe and Munongo secretly appointed a former Belgian functionary, Franz Scheerlinck, to the rank of “special ambassador” and provided him with all necessary credentials, including an airplane ticket for New York, via Brussels. But the news leaked and the authorities of Leopoldville euchred Tshombe out of his “coup” by arresting his “special ambassador” before he had any chance to acquit himself of his mission. Ibid., pp. 254–256.

⁴⁵ Glinne, Ernest, “Le Pourquoi de l'Affaire Katangaise,” Presence Africaine (06–September 1960), p. 56 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 58.

⁴⁷ These requirements were specifically mentioned, among several others, by the Committee on Factors established by the General Assembly in 1952 to report on the qualifications for self-government; see Clyde Eagleton, op. cit., p. 599.

⁴⁸ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 1174 (12 25, 1961), p. 1062Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ The words are those of Ghana's President, Kwame Nkrumah; see Good, Robert C., “Four African Views of the Congo Crisis,” Africa Report (06 1961), p. 3Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., p. 1063.