¹ The best-known study of the sources of presidential popularity is found in Mueller, John, Wars, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), chaps. 9–10Google Scholar. For another interesting study see Brody, Richard and Page, Benjamin, “The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles, 09 7, 1972)Google Scholar.

² The terms “power” and “influence” are used interchangeably throughout this research to denote the ability of the President to move congressmen to support him when they otherwise would not. It is quite clear that there are numerous and as yet unresolved problems with the concept of “influence.” These include the relative costs to both parties of the use of influence and, more generally, simply proving that A caused B to do X at time T. We shall not be concerned with long-term costs here. Rather, the focus will be on the immediate effects of a power source while controlling for alternative explanations of those effects whenever possible. For some relevant discussions of the concept of power see Dahl, Robert, Modern Political Analysis, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), chap. IIIGoogle Scholar; Nagel, Jack, “Some Questions About the Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 13 (03, 1968), 129–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harsanyi, J., “Measurement of Social Power,” Behavioral Science, 7 (01, 1962), 67–80 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

³ Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power (New York: The New American Library, 1964), chap. 5Google Scholar.

⁴ For example see Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers, 4th rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 273, 285 Google Scholar; Binkley, Wilfred E., President and Congress, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 295, 306, 350, 356 Google Scholar; Herring, Pendelton, Presidential Leadership (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), pp. 20, 46 Google Scholar; Koenig, Louis, The Chief Executive, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1968), p. 184 Google Scholar; Hirschfield, Robert, “The Power of the Contemporary Presidency,” Parliamentary Affairs, 21 (Summer, 1961), 353–377, esp. pp. 361, 369 Google Scholar; Sundquist, James, Politics and Policy (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 488–89, 496 Google Scholar; Reedy, George, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 45, 46, 81, 82, 130, 147 but see p. 49Google Scholar; James, Dorothy, The Contemporary Presidency (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 115 Google Scholar; Egger, Rowland, The President of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1972), p. 172 Google Scholar.

For more skeptical views, see Strum, Philippa, Presidential Power and American Democracy (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 6 Google Scholar; Vinyard, Dale, The Presidency (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 22, 97, 98 Google Scholar; McConnell, Grant, The Modern Presidency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 73 Google Scholar; Cornwell, Elmer, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 302–03Google Scholar; and Jewell, Malcolm and Patterson, Samuel, The Legislative Process in the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 309 Google Scholar.

For an interesting approach between these polar positions see Brown, Stuart Gerry, The American Presidency (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 3, 4, 182, 183, 259 Google Scholar; Brown differentiates between types of presidential popularity and finds the “partisan” type more useful than the “unpartisan” type in passing controversial legislation. Unfortunately, however, he fails to clarify the distinction between the two. For general agreement with this point see Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 89 Google Scholar.

⁵ For a brief but suggestive effort see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 09 16, 1966, p. 2173 Google Scholar.

⁶ It is important to reiterate that what we are examining here is the President's success in gaining support from congressmen for his legislative program and not his success in passing legislation per se. A measure for the latter would give us only one figure per session of Congress and would mask any variability in support between individual congressmen or groups of congressmen.

⁷ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 89 Google Scholar.

⁸ Kingdon, John, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 41–42 Google Scholar.

⁹ See Clausen, Aage, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 19–20 for the view that roll-call votes reflect less visible decisionsGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Mayhew, David, Party Loyally Among Congressmen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ The Gallup Poll data used here come from the Gallup Opinion Index and the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College in Williamston, Massachusetts.

¹² As Mueller points out, because the percentage of “no opinion” answers has little variation over time, the trend in the “approval” rating of the President is largely a mirror image of the trend in his “disapproval” rating. See Mueller, , Public Opinion, p. 203 Google Scholar.

¹³ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 89 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁵ See for example Jewell, and Patterson, , Legislative Process, p. 309 Google Scholar; Brown, , American Presidency, p. 7 Google Scholar; and those authors cited in Cornwell, , Presidential Leadership, pp. 301–02Google Scholar and Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 714 Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Brody and Page, “The Impact of Events;” Mueller, Public Opinion, chaps. 9–10; Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 96 Google Scholar; Sundquist, , Politics and Policy, pp. 496–97Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, pp. 94, 98 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Schlesinger, , Thousand Days, p. 726 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Stokes, Donald, “Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency,” APSR, 60 (03, 1966), 19–28, at p. 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ Davidson, Roger, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1968), pp. 79, 80, 117 Google Scholar.

²¹ Davidson, Roger, Kovenock, David, and O'Leary, Michael, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (New York: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), p. 64 Google Scholar.

²² Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 53 Google Scholar.

²³ Schlesinger, Joseph, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 90–99 Google Scholar; see also Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 54 Google Scholar.

²⁴ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 88 Google Scholar.

²⁵ Dexter, Lewis A., “What Do Congressmen Hear: The Mail,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (No. 1, 1956), 3–29 Google Scholar; Tacheron, Donald and Udall, Morris, The Job of a Congressman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 282–83Google Scholar; Rieselbach, Leroy, Congressional Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 216 Google Scholar; Kingdon, , Congressmen's Voting, pp. 56–57 Google Scholar; Dexter, Lewis, “The Representative and His District,” in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. Peabody, Robert and Polsby, Nelson W. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963)Google Scholar; Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel Pool, and Lewis Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 419–20Google Scholar.

²⁶ Rieselbach, , Politics, p. 218 Google Scholar.

²⁷ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 88 Google Scholar.

²⁸ Davidson, , Role of the Congressman, p. 121 Google Scholar.

²⁹ Stokes, Donald and Miller, Warren, “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress,” POQ, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Miller, and Stokes, , “Constituency Influence on Congress,” APSR, 57 (03, 1963), 45–65 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cnudde, Charles and McCrone, Donald, “Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model,” APSR, 60 (03, 1966), 66–72 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ Kingdon, John, Candidates for Office (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 145 Google Scholar. See also Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting, pp. 59–61.

³¹ Miller, and Stokes, , “Constituency Influence,” 55 Google Scholar.

³² Significance levels are not appropriate here because we are not dealing with a sample of members of the House. Thus, there is no possibility of sampling error. Also neither the dependent nor the independent variables take on extreme values which would bias the findings.

³³ Miller, and Stokes, , “Constituency Influence,” pp. 45–65 Google Scholar.

³⁴ Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, American Business, passim; Clausen, . Congressmen Decide, pp. 223–24Google Scholar.

³⁵ When it is stated that the presidential support by one group of congressmen is more or less positively correlated with presidential prestige than is the support displayed by another group, this is not the same as saying that one group of congressmen has a higher or lower level of presidential support than another group. In fact, it is possible for the group of congressmen most responsive to presidential prestige to display the lowest level of presidential support.

³⁶ This is consistent with Miller's finding that congressmen from safe seats are more likely to reflect what they understand to be constituency preferences than their colleagues from marginal districts. Miller, Warren, “Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government,” in Cleavages, Ideologies, and Parly Systems, ed. Allardt, Erik and Littunen, Yrjo (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 362, 363, 368 Google Scholar.

³⁷ There does not appear to be a time lag between a rise or decline in presidential prestige and a commensurate rise or decline in presidential support. Although frequently the two variables do not appear to be related at all, they are more closely related as correlated here than if the presidential support measures were lagged one year on the possibility that it would take congressmen a year's time to become cognizant of presidential prestige.

³⁸ Dexter, , “The Representative,” pp. 3–29 Google Scholar; Clausen, , Congressman Decide, pp. 126, 127, 182, 188 Google Scholar; Kingdon, , Congressmen's Voting, p. 34 Google Scholar; Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 215 Google Scholar; Miller, and Stokes, , “Constituency Influence,” pp. 49–50 Google Scholar; MacRae, Duncan, Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 264 Google Scholar.

³⁹ For both the eight- and six-year periods under study here all the categories of the variables of sex and age failed the criterion of distinctiveness and were eliminated from the analysis. Moreover, for both time periods the categories of the variables which serve as indicators of socioeconomic status (education, occupation, income, city size) were partially intercorrelated. This occurred when there were more than two categories within a variable and some, but not all of the categories were related at .85 or more. In this case the most representative of the intercorrelated categories (the category most highly correlated with the others) was used and the rest were dropped from the analysis.

⁴⁰ Occupation, income, education, and city size were highly intercorrelated. Occupation was selected as the most representative and the most internally differentiated of these, and the other three variables were excluded. Occupation was then dichotomized as high and low socioeconomic status, and these terms are meant to signify general concepts and not precise delineations on the socioeconomic spectrum

A similar situation occurred for the variable of religion (Protestant, Roman Catholic). The former correlated strongly with high SES while the latter did the same with low SES. Hence, religion was also eliminated from the analysis as SES is more politically salient.

⁴¹ Sorauf, Frank, Party Politics in America, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), p. 173 Google Scholar.

⁴² Converse, Philip, Miller, Warren, Rusk, Jerold, and Wolfe, Arthur, “Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Elections,” APSR, 63 (12, 1969), 1083–1105 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ Turner, Julius and Schneier, Edward, Parly and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, rev. ed.; (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 104 Google Scholar; Clausen, , Congressmen Decide, p. 168 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Scammon, Richard and Wattenberg, Ben, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), pp. 181–84Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Stokes, and Miller, , “Saliency of Congress,” pp. 531–46Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ I wish to thank Douglas Rose for his suggestions regarding this point.

⁴⁷ Presidential party is operationalized here with “1“ representing Democrat and “0” representing Republican.

⁴⁸ Converse, Philip, Clausen, Aage, and Miller, Warren, “Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election,” APSR, 59 (06, 1965), 321–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ McClosky, Herbert, Hoffman, Paul, and O'Hara, Rosemary, “Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers,” APSR, 54 (06, 1960), 406–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ Shaffer, William, Weber, Ronald, and Montjoy, Robert, “Mass and Political Elite Beliefs about the Policies of the Regime” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, 09 7, 1973, pp. 14–16)Google Scholar. See also a mid-1974 column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak which discusses “a potentially disastrous Republican syndrome of mistaking the blind pro-Nixon loyalty of precint workers for popular opinion. What's more, they press this misconception on congressmen…” “‘Potentially Disastrous’ Republican Syndrome,” Washington Posl, May 19, 1974, sec. C, p. 7 Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Converse, Philip, “The Concept of a Normal Vote,” in Elections and the Political Order, ed. Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip, Miller, Warren, and Stokes, Donald (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9–39 Google Scholar; Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip, Miller, Warren, and Stokes, Donald, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 128–36Google Scholar.

⁵² This is reasonable despite the fact that there are high correlations between Independent and Republican opinion (.74 for 1965–1972 and .83 for 1965–1970) while there are very low relationships between Independent and Democratic opinion (–.08 and –.02, respectively), because presidential popularity among Independents does not influence Republican presidential support (the partial correlation for overall support is –.86). It should also be noted that the correlations above tell us nothing about levels of presidential prestige.

⁵³ Kingdon, , Congressmen's Voting, pp. 173–75Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Clausen, , Congressmen Decide, p. 196 Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ The independent variables which Mueller uses in his work on predicting presidential popularity on a nearmonthly basis (see footnote one) are not useful here because they are largely invariate over the time period under study and/or because the dependent variables here are aggregated on a yearly basis. Moreover, doubt is cast on the explanatory value of Mueller's variables in Hibbs, Douglas, “Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time-Series Regression Models,” in Sociological Methodology 1973–1974, ed. Costner, H. L. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 252–308 Google Scholar. While there are many other plausible reasons for congressmen supporting the President's policies in addition to presidential party and presidential prestige including ideological preference, patriotism, a desire for presidential favors, a desire to avoid presidential wrath, and presidential charm in personal relations, they should not systematically influence the relationships between presidential popularity and presidential support because they do not affect the former.

⁵⁶ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, p. 33 Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ See Mueller, Public Opinion, chaps. 9–10, for example.

⁵⁸ Neustadt, , Presidential Power, pp. 95–96 Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Kingdon, John, “Politicians' Beliefs and Voters,” APSR, 61 (03, 1967), 137–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Miller, and Stokes, , “Constituency Influence,” pp. 49–50 Google Scholar.