¹ The sources for the quotations employed in this article are easily found, and it does not seem necessary to give citations in each individual case. Where a speech is quoted, the date will indicate where it is to be found in the Records of the 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Part II, June 30-–July 4, 1936, or in the Verbatim Record of the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, September 21–October 10, 1936. Where the text indicates that the written reply of a government is being quoted, it will be found in the League of Nations document, “Application of the Principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Communications from Governments” [1936. VII. 9]. These replies of governments may be found analyzed in another League document, “Study of the Proposals Submitted by Members of the League” [1936. VII. 8].

² [1936. VII. 13.]

³ Unofficial discussions, among many, may be found in the publications of the British League of Nations Society; the Chronicle of World Affairs published by the League of Nations Association, New York; the Federation of League of Nations Societies; the New Commonwealth Society (England), especially in the New Commonwealth Quarterly, September, 1936; Geneva Special Studies, “The Covenant and the Pact,” Vol. I, No. 9 (December, 1930), and “Reform of the League of Nations,” Vol. V, Nos. 7–8 (1934)Google Scholar; Shotwell, J. T., On the Rim of the Abyss (New York, 1936)Google Scholar; The Future of the League of Nations, Record of a Series of Discussions at Chatham House (Oxford University Press, 1936)Google Scholar; “L'eventuelle réforme de la Société” des Nations,” by Ray, Jean, in Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1936Google Scholar.

⁴ This attitude was taken by most states. The Chinese government “believes that what is needed is not a revision of the Covenant, but only an elaboration of the methods and procedure for the realization of the principles already embodied there-in” [1936. VII. 10[. M. Krofta, speaking on September 29, asserted that “as regards the reform of the League, the states of the Petite Entente do not think the Covenant should be altered.” Cuba, Iraq, Sweden, Australia, and others expressed similar views.

⁵ The reason for this attitude is perhaps to be found in such unofficial statements as that of Madariaga: “All attempts at subordinating League reform to a new ratification of the Covenant by the governments concerned is not only impracticable but positively dangerous, for I feel that few, if any, governments would re-sign the Covenant if they had an opportunity to do so.” M. Rappard had the same feeling: “To propose the method of formal amendments to the Covenant today would therefore, I am afraid, be to dig the grave of the League.” See their comments on a proposed revision of the Covenant in the New Commonwealth Quarterly, Vol. 2 (1936)Google Scholar.

⁶ Cf. the comments of Madariaga, Salter, and Politis, in the work cited in the previous footnote; and the argument of SirSalter, Arthur in a Chatham House discussion (The Future of the League of Nations, Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 67Google Scholar, including the following: “If countries really mean business, they can act without any actual change in Article 11. There is nothing to prevent countries which have come to a decision as to what is to be done in a particular case from putting that decision into effect because one or two dissentients stand out. They can act as if that decision had been a formal and legal one under Article 11.” (At this point Sir John Fischer Williams indicated agreement).

⁷ M. Münch of Denmark, speaking before the Assembly on September 28, said: “If the United States could decide to join it, the effect in favor of the stabilization of peace would probable be decisive. If it is impossible for the United States to participate as a member, we must at least try to devise means to enable the United States to share in measures to prevent war, should the eventuality arise.”

⁸ Nevertheless, it is probably true that the League as machinery for international cooperation is by now indispensable in the community of nations, and that it will be maintained and will claim the support of all states, regardless of what happens to its political powers.

⁹ It may be suggested, without over-much cynicism, that such a split will occur in any event, and that it may as well be upon the basis of those who wish to maintain law and order as against those who seek to achieve their ends through violence.

¹⁰ This would create a “juridical link between the League and the non-member states.” “It is necessary to bear in mind the fact, perhaps insufficiently appreciated in Europe, that the American nation made no objection to subscribing to the obligations embodied in the Argentine Pact. Consequently, this instrument proposed for universal adoption enables each acceding state to rely, for the high purpose of conciliation and harmony, on the invaluable coöperation of the great nation to which the Geneva institution indirectly owes its creation.” Quoted from the preface to Dr.Lamas', Saavedra work, The Argentine Pact of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic)Google Scholar, by the Secretary-General in his study of the proposals submitted [1936. VII. 8].

¹¹ In his study of the replies of governments, the Secretary-General lists Argentina, Peru, and Switzerland as throwing doubts upon the principle of security. Perusal of their replies seems to indicate that they are pessimistic rather concerning the method of achieving this security, i.e., sanctions. This, perhaps, was what was meant in the report of the Secretary-General, since the remark is found under the heading of Article 16.

¹² Perhaps also the United States, in view of the Pope Resolution. See footnote 17 infra.

¹³ In a speech before the Assembly on July 3, 1936, he had said: “The French government, however, does not attack the unanimity rule in general; it does not forget that the League of Nations respects the sovereignty of states. Moreover, the consent of those concerned is essential when there is a proposal to take measures which have to be applied upon their own territory, or which, in any case, call for their collaboration.” The Uruguayan and Peruvian governments also upheld the rule of unanimity, though the latter was willing to drop it in the use of Articles 15 and 19.

¹⁴ In a recent discussion at Chatham House, Lord Howard of Penrith said: “There is thus only one way in deciding how the League should act if action is to be taken to stop war, and this is to declare beforehand that, as soon as hostilities break out between two sovereign nations, no matter where, why, or when, that international body which shall be chosen for the purpose by the nations of the world, acting collectively, will notify the belligerents that unless they submit to sign an armistice within a given time and submit their dispute to some peaceful settlement, certain well-understood economic, financial, and other non-military sanctions will be applied to them, and continue to be so applied until they are willing to agree to cease fighting. If one declares himself to be so willing, sanctions will be raised as against him.” The Future of the League of Nations, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press, New York, 1936), pp. 91–92Google Scholar. And Professor Jessup, at the International Studies Conference, remarked: “If a policeman came on the scene, and found them both struggling, he would take them both off to the station house until a magistrate had decided which was the aggressor.” Bourgin, M., Collective Security (Oxford Press, 1936), p. 435Google Scholar.

¹⁵ New York Times, December 16, 1936.

¹⁶ New York Times, November 14, 1936.

¹⁷ Senate Joint Resolution 119, 74th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1935.