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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
The Council of the League of Nations being commonly considered in the United States as the League's supreme organ, as the body which represents par excellence the League system and spirit, it would seem obvious that there should have been the greater hesitation, in view of our non-membership in the League and our official anti-League declarations, to have direct relations with it. Nevertheless, the record reveals that it has been impossible for the United States government to ignore the Council consistently, and that, as a matter of fact, official relationships of one kind or another have been occasionally entered into with that body also. These relationships have, in the first place, taken the form of direct correspondence between the Council and the United States, which has been carried on at intermittent periods and on various subjects, but which has involved every Administration, and which by this time amounts to a considerable volume.
1 By Secretary Colby with respect to the mandates in 1920-21; by Secretary Hughes with respect to the traffic in arms in 1922-24; by Secretary Kellogg with respect to the World Court in 1926 and 1929, and the Opium Convention in 1928; by Secretary Stimson with respect to the Liberian and Manehurian questions in 1931; and probably other occasions.
2 Entire correspondence in Council Minutes, XII, 68–76Google Scholar; the Colby-Da Cunha letters also in Official Journal, II, 137–143 (Mar.-Apr., 1921)Google Scholar.
3 Cf. report of Viscount Ishii to Council, July 18, 1922. Official Journal, II, 847 (Aug., 1922)Google Scholar.
4 “The new draft mandates resulting from the conversations with the government of the United States differ only very slightly from the text which we began to discuss in February, 1921. … The majority of the changes are purely verbal.” Lord Balf our to Council, July 18, 1922. Ibid., 847. Treaties have now been negotiated and ratified by the United States with respect to nine of the mandates, each of which incorporates verbatim the mandates agreement previously entered into between the Council and the mandatory Power. It ought also to be noted that Colonel House sat officially with the Supreme Council's commission on mandates in the summer of 1919, and helped formulate the tentative drafts of mandates agreements for all three classes of mandates. Miller, , Diary, XX, 348-349, 383–389Google Scholar.
5 Statements by Dr. Nansen, Lord Cecil, and the President of the Council, July 5, 1923. Official Journal, IV, 903-904, 1014 (Aug., 1923)Google Scholar; Hudson, Manley O., in World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, VII, no. 1 (1924), p. 191Google Scholar. The Council also set up a small committee, consisting of Dr. Nansen, a representative of the Greek government, and a representative of the American relief organizations, to arrange for temporary relief until the loan should become effective; and later appointed an American, former Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, as chairman of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, set up to administer relief under the terms of the loan. Morgenthau was eventually succeeded by two other Americans in turn, Charles P. Howland and Charles Eddy.
6 Art. 19. Text of convention in Official Journal VI, 689–715 (May, 1925)Google Scholar.
7 This was done at its session of Aug. 31,1928. Ibid., IX, 1441-1442 (Oct., 1928).
8 Text of letter in Ibid., 1973 (Dec, 1928). Secretary Kellogg aid, however, offer to furnish information to the Opium Board, and this has since been done.
9 It may be recalled that the Opium Conference for drafting this convention had been particularly urged by the United States in the Fourth Assembly (1923), but that the American delegates had walked out before the Conference completed its work. The Opium Board was one of Porter's ideas.
10 The letter was drafted and sent particularly on the insistence of Mr. Dandurand of Canada, the Council rapporteur on this subject. Sir Austen Chamberlain had misgivings as to the necessity or expediency of the reply, but felt that Mr. Dandurand must be “better informed upon feeling at Washington than himself,” and therefore agreed to it. Official Journal, X, 54–55 (Jan., 1929)Google Scholar.
11 It is well understood, however, that this was done only after assurances had been received that the American government would not object to having an American on the board.
12 The members so appointed were Sir Arthur Barclay (former president of Liberia), Dr. Charles Johnson (professor at Fisk University), and Dr. Cuthbert Christy (British), representing the Council.
13 To Liberia, Sept. 8, 1930, to the United States, Oct. 21, and to the Council, Dec. 15; a summary of the Commission's findings was submitted to the Council Oct. 6. The whole series of events is well summarized in report of M. Zaleski to Council, Jan. 22, 1931. Official Journal, XII, 186–190 (Feb. 1931)Google Scholar.
14 Note of Nov. 5, and memorandum of Nov. 17, 1930, from the Secretary of State to the government of Liberia, communicated to the Secretary-General, Dec. 23, 1930. See League of Nations Doc. C. L. 3, 1931, VI, printed in Ibid., 467-469.
15 “My Government has made every effort to prove its good will, stating that it would be ready to do more as soon as the state of its finances permits. It requested a foreign government [the United States] to appoint two commissioners to assist in reforming the internal administration of the country. These commissioners were to take up their duties immediately. The foreign government in question, the government of a very wealthy country, did not reply to my government's request, or rather, it insisted on the latter accepting to the letter all the recommendations and suggestions of the Commission and that it would appoint not five [sic] commissioners but a far greater number. The government to which I refer is, however, fully aware of the financial situation of my country, I do not know by what right.” Statement of Mr. Sottile (Liberia) to Council, Jan. 22, 1931; cf. his letters to the Secretary-General, Jan. 9 and 23, 1931. Ibid., 190-192, 466-467, 470.
16 Ibid., 219.
17 Text of Secretary Stimson's telegram in Ibid., 582 (Mar., 1931).
18 These were the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Venezuela, and Liberia (Liberia being for this question a temporary member of the Council under Art. 4 of the Covenant). Venezuela, having retired from the Council, was, on Sept. 28, 1931, replaced by Panama.
19 These experts were: one in general administration (M. Brunot, French), one in finance (M. Ligthart, Dutch), and one in health (Dr. Mackenzie, British, of the League's Health Section). Their report was completed during the summer of 1931, and, although still confidential, its general character and conclusions were revealed after the above was written. It recommended, in particular, a system of far-reaching administrative and financial assistance to Liberia, under League auspices, to be carried out through advisers appointed by the League, and amounting virtually to temporary control of Liberia by the League. These recommendations were approved in principle by the Council committee at a second series of meetings in Geneva, Jan. 25-Feb. 1, 1932, but final action was, at the urgent request of Liberia, postponed until May (1932), when the committee was to meet in connection with the regular session of the Council itself. Mr. Eeber again attended all these meetings, expressly approved the plan of the experts on behalf of the United States, and promised to continue his collaboration with the Council committee until its work should be completed. See Preliminary Beports of the Committee of the Council, submitted to the Council by M. Zaleski (Poland), May 21, 1931, and Feb. 4, 1932. Official Journal, XII, 1119-1122, 1448–1450 (July, 1931)Google Scholar, and Doc. C. 170, 1932, XII. (Feb. 4, 1932).
19a See Information Section Communiqué, No. 5465 (Jan. 30, 1932), and Report to the Council, Feb. 4, 1932, op. cit.
20 This article authorizes the League to “take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.” The broad powers thus conferred are unfortunately limited by the requirement of unanimity in the Council, even including the disputants. It may be noted, in this connection, that the Twelfth Assembly (1931) adopted and opened for signature the General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, which will, when ratified, largely correct this defect and strengthen the hand of the Council under Art. 11. See report of Third Committee on this convention (Doc. A. 77. 1931. IX).
21 Sept. 19-30 (other business also being transacted), Oct. 13-24, Nov. 16-Dec. 10, Jan. 25-Feb. 29 (other business also). These several phases of the question are conveniently described in a day-by-day summary by the Geneva Research Committee, in “The League and Manchuria,” Geneva Special Studies, II, nos. 10-12 (Oct., Nov., Dec, 1931)Google Scholar, and “The League and Shanghai,” Ibid., III, no. 3 (Mar., 1932). The writer has relied heavily upon his personal observations and upon the press reports.
22 This had actually happened in the case of the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute in 1928, so that Briand, as acting president of the Council, finally summoned the American and Argentinian chargés d'affaires in Paris to a personal conference and handed each an aide-mémoire, sharply reminding them that it was essential “that the efforts of all those at present engaged in securing a settlement of the dispute by pacific means should be completely coördinated,” and asking them to inform him of the measures their governments proposed to take. The Council had already communicated the League documents to these governments. The disputing countries accepted the mediation of the Pan-American Conference the next day, and no further complications ensued. Official Journal, X, 73, 266–268 (Feb., 1929)Google Scholar.
23 Council Minutes, 65th Session, 2nd Meeting, p. 6; Ibid., 3rd Meeting, p. 2. The action of the Council in the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute was an important precedent.
24 Geneva Special Studies, II, no. 10, pp. 15, 18Google Scholar; Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.) and N. Y. Times (Clarence K. Streit corr.), Sept. 24, 1931, p. 4Google Scholar, c. 6.
25 Wales, Henry, in Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Sept. 25, 1931Google Scholar.
26 Text of Stimson note in Doc. C. 597, M. 239, 1931, VII; of Council resolution in Council Minutes, 65th Session, 3rd Meeting, p. 2.
27 Text in Information Section Communiqué No. 5342 (Sept. 24, 1931). In view of the later objections of the Japanese to American participation in the Council, it may be noted that the Japanese representative, Yoshizawa, agreed to this note. He is reported to have objected only to the first wording, “general coöperation,” accepting instead the words, “common endeavour.” N. Y. Times (Clarence K. Streit corr.), Sept. 25, 1931, p. 3Google Scholar, c. 5.
28 Minister Wilson to president of Council, Sept. 25, 1931. Doc. C. 610, M. 247, 1931, VII.
29 Secretary Kellogg to the Secretary-General, Feb. 19, 1929, in respect to the World Court. Official Journal, X, 780 (Apr., 1929)Google Scholar.
30 The reason for this was said to be a desire to save the face of Baron Shidehara, the Japanese foreign minister, known as a moderate and a liberal, with whom the Washington government was on the best of terms. His hand was said to be forced in this matter by the Japanese militarists.
31 Text of resolution in Council Minutes, 65th Session, 7th Meeting, p. 4.
32 Martin, William, in Journal de Genève, Sept. 29 1931Google Scholar (translation mine). Practically all responsible opinion in Geneva was identical with that of M. Martin. Cf. Geneva Research Information Committee, op. cit., no. 10, p. 29; Wales, Henry in Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Sept. 27, 1931Google Scholar; Streit, Clarence K., in N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1931, p. 9Google Scholar, c. 4. Similarly, it was reported from Washington that the abandonment of the commission of inquiry and the presumption of direct negotiation “were accepted [by the State Department] as pointing to an agreement on policy with this country.” N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1931, p. 9Google Scholar, c. 3; cf. Journal tie Genève (ed. matin, du), Nov. 8, 1931Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle, No. 1552 (Oct. 1, 1923), pp. 412, 414, 416Google Scholar.
33 Note from Prentiss B. Gilbert to the Secretary-General, Oct. 11, 1931, announcing that such observers had been sent on Oct. 6. Doc. C. 687, M. 293, 1931, VII. It seemed to be understood in Tokyo, however, that “the American mission seeks only information and is not a forerunner of intervention or mediation, and that it also differs completely from the proposed joint investigation commission of the League of Nations.” N. Y. Times (Hugh Byas corr.), Oct. 9, 1931, p. 5Google Scholar, c. 3.
34 Full text in N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1931, p. 1Google Scholar, c. 8; also published in Geneva on same date as Doc. C. 700, M. 308, 1931, VII, and printed in Official Journal, XII, 2485 (Dec, 1931)Google Scholar. The White Paper issued by the State Department contains a memorandum to the Council, dated Oct. 5, which is evidently the memorandum delivered to the Secretary-General on Oct. 9 and dated Oct. 12. It seems to have been carefully edited before delivery to the Secretary-General, there being a number of verbal and grammatical changes, and the last sentence being omitted altogether, as follows: “By this course we avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the course to which it is now committed.” See Conditions in Manchuria (S. Doc. No. 55, 72 Cong., 1 Sess.), p. 14.
35 This seems to have been first intimated at Washington on Oct. 10, three days before the Council convened. N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1931, Sec. 1, p. 1Google Scholar, c. 6; p. 19, cc. 6-7.
36 Ibid., Oct. 13, 1931, p. 1, e. 7 (Washington despatch by Richard V. Oulahan).
37 Letters from Yoshizawa to Briand, Oct. 15 and 17; and memorandum and declaration to the Council, Oct. 15 and 16. These are found in Council Minutes, 65th Session, 10th Meeting, pp. 2-4; Ibid., 11th Meeting, p. 2; and Doc. C. 729, M. 334, 1931, VII.
38 This proposal was supported by the German representative (Von Mutius), which action one correspondent said “provided the comedy element in a tense afternoon.” Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Oct. 16, 1931Google Scholar. Yoshizawa himself, however, refused, when pressed, to agree to abide by the conclusions of such jurists.
39 Oct. 14-36; one private session of 3 hours, one public session of 3 hours, several sessions of the Twelve (the whole Council except the Japanese and Chinese representatives) and of the Five (four Great Powers and Spain), and many conferences between Briand, Yoshizawa, other members of the Council, and Mr. Gilbert.
40 This was a neat escape from the logical necessity of inviting at least the other important signatories, such as Bussia, whom the Poles and others on the Council did not want, the other “proponent” being France, already a member.
41 The Poliah, Jugoslav, and Norwegian representatives supported the invitation, but with the express understanding that the legal questions involved were reserved. It was reported later, on “good authority,” that the Polish representative (M. Sokal) had at iirst desired to support the Japanese objections. If true, this may have been, due to fear of opening the way for a Russian seat also. N. Y. Herald (Paris ed.), Nov. 4, 1931Google Scholar.
42 Council Minutes, 65th Session, 10th Meeting (Oct. 16, 1931), pp. 1–2Google Scholar.
43 Notes from Prentiss Gilbert to the Secretary-General and to the president of the Council, both dated Oct. 16, 1931. Press copies distributed in Geneva; latter printed in Ibid., 12th Meeting, p. 1.
44 He was formally ushered in and placed at the foot of the table, in one of the seats regularly reserved for special members; he was assisted by two of the other special American League observers from the Geneva consulate, Messrs. Everett and Eiddleberger.
45 Numerous meetings of the members of the Council, exclusive of the Chinese and Japanese, were held. These were commonly referred to in Geneva as the Terrible Twelve, and in Paris as the Doubtful Dozen. The Big Five was the special Council committee, composed of the representatives of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain, constituted at the beginning of the dispute to work out details. Since neither group was actually the regular Council, the record of their meetings is not available in the Council minutes.
46 Text in N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1931, p. 2Google Scholar, c. 4.
47 The Norwegian representative (Braadland, foreign minister) also refrained from uttering any words of welcome, but later, in view of the comment, issued a statement to the press, saying that of course he too welcomed the American collaboration. Information Section Communiqué No. 5368 (Oct. 19, 1931). I t was generally understood in Geneva that he had refrained at first in order to make the Japanese abstention less conspicuous.
48 Cf. memorandum of Yoshizawa to Briand, Oct. 17, 1931. Doc. C. 729, M. 334, 1931, VII, printed in Geneva Special Studies, II, no. 11, p. 41Google Scholar. This memorandum was fairly characterized as “a startlingly bitter and unexpected note reiterating and emphasizing her protest against the presence of an American representative during the Council's consideration of the Manchurian question, declaring she did not see why the United States any more than any other non-member should be asked to participat” Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Oct. 19, 1931Google Scholar.
49 A Geneva paper, usually quite accurate in its information, reported, while the invitation was under consideration, that the Council was preparing to seat (lie American representative “on a footing of equality with all the other members of the Council,” and later stated that this was abandoned following the Japanese opposition. Journal des Nations, Oct. 15, Nov. 14, 1931.
50 N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1931, p. 1, c. 8 (Tokyo corr. by Hugh Byas)Google Scholar; cf. Geneva Special Studies, II, no. 11, pp. 39, 43Google Scholar. The withdrawal of the objections was announced in Washington on Oct. 19 by Ambassador Debuchi, after a conference with Secretary Stimson. Yoshizawa made a statement to the Council on Oct. 22, in which, as a matter of fact, he maintained the legal position he had taken, but spoke in a friendly manner of the United States, to which Mr. Gilbert responded.
51 Council Minutes, 65th Session, 12th Meeting, p. 2.
52 At the suggestion of the Council in private session on Oct. 17, the governments represented on the Council sent identic notes to Japan and China formally invoking the Pact; the Council, through the French government, notified the United States (and other signatories) of this action, whereupon it too similarly invoked the Pact on Oct. 20. See statement of Briand to Council, Oct. 22, 1931. Ibid., 13th Meeting, pp. 1-2.
53 Text of Council resolution in Ibid., p. 3. In view of the requirement of unanimity under Art. 11, the resolution was of course not legally binding.
54 “Amid a deep silence, Mr. Gilbert asked leave to speak. The eagerness with which eyes turned to him and listeners leaned forward to hear, in the expectant wish that the American government might have authorized its representative to make some declaration in regard to the Council's resolution, had to be chilled. Ha thanked the president and the representative of Norway for what they had said, and promised to transmit their words to his government.” Geneva Special Studies, II, no. 11, p. 59Google Scholar.
55 Time, Nov. 2, 1931, p. 21Google Scholar.
56 N. Y. Times (special Washington despatch), Oct. 23, 1931, p. 2Google Scholar, c. 2. It was even thought by some that reassurances and possibly pressure from Washington had caused a strengthening of the Council resolution. Ibid. (Lansing Warren corr.), p. 1, c. 4; Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Oct. 23, 1931Google Scholar.
57 Ambassador Forbes, on Nov. 5, delivered to Baron Shidehara a communication which was not a formal “note,” but merely a “memorandum” accompanied by an oral explanation. Text in Conditions in Manchuria (S. Doc. No. 55, 72 Cong., 1 Sess.), pp. 30-32. Secretary Stimson emphasized, in public statements, this distinction between a note and a memorandum.
58 N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1931, p. 3Google Scholar, c. 6.
59 Statement quoted in Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Nov. 1, 1931Google Scholar; cf. N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, Sec. 1, p. 22, c. 3. This reason for inaction or for failure to support the League was henceforth used on numerous occasions. The writer understands that this statement by Mr. Castle was the first intimation to League officials in Geneva that any formal invitation was expected after the close relations established by Mr. Gilbert; even the American officials in Geneva were daily expecting a declaration of some sort from the State Department.
60 N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1931, p. 3Google Scholar, c. 6.
61 “In carefully couched diplomatic language, Under-Secretary of State William R. Castle, Jr., tonight [Oct. 31] indicated that the United States will not stand for Japan's continued occupation of Manchuria.” Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Nov. 1, 1931Google Scholar; cf. N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, Sec. 1, p. 22, c. 3.
62 That there may have been some grounds for this fear is indicated by the fact that even the pro-League N. Y. Times declared that “if any action of this sort is really undertaken, the United States cannot be expected to have a part in it.” See editorial, “United Efforts for Peace,” Nov. 10, 1931.
63 The writer has good reason to believe that the decision to meet in Paris was due, at least in part, to “unofficial” American suggestions that it would be easier to send an important American representative like Dawes to Paris than to Geneva, the latter being too obviously League atmosphere.
64 Text of Secretary Stimson's statement in N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1931, p. 1Google Scholar, c. 8. Both this statement and that of Gen. Dawes implied that Dawes might sit if necessary.
65 See his statement pleading for ratification of both Treaty and Covenant, in Chicago Tribune, Sept. 1, 1919.
66 Neither Prentiss Gilbert nor any other American official that had carried on the previous contacts with the Council was sent to Paris to assist Dawes.
67 See accounts by Streit, Clarence K. and Warren, Lansing, in N. Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1931, p. 18Google Scholar, cc. 4-5; Nov. 25, p. 10, c. 1.
68 Statement issued Nov. 20. Text in Ibid., Nov. 21, 1931, p. 2, cc. 1-2.
69 Statement issued on arrival in Paris, Nov. 13. Ibid., Nov. 14, 1931, p. 10, c. 8.
70 That is, with the representatives of the Great Powers, and particularly with those of Great Britain and France; he apparently ignored completely the smaller powers, and thereby incurred considerable resentment.
71 An American member of the Secretariat acted as the “contact man” between Dawes and the Council, aside from the personal conferences.
72 Streit, Clarerce K., in N. Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1931, p. 10Google Scholar, cc. 3-5.
73 Dawes issued a statement on Nov. 20, after an extended conference with Briand, which a Paris correspondent said “will require three denials by Secretary of State Stimson to clarify it,” but which explained quite plainly that his own non-presence at Council meetings “in no way indicates that the United States is not wholly sympathetic with the efforts being made by the League to support the objective of peace in Manchuria.” Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Nov. 21, 1931Google Scholar. Further, it was reported that “the opinion prevails [among State Department officials] that the League of Nations offers better facilities for dealing with Manchurian questions than the Nine-Power Treaty.” Washington despatches in Chicago Tribune and N. Y. Herald (Paris eds.), Nov. 26, 1931Google Scholar; cf. statements by Stimson, , in N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, p. 5Google Scholar, c. 1; Nov. 26, p. 2, cc. 3-4.
74 Statement by Dawes, Nov. 25. Chicago Tribune and N. Y. Herald (Paris eds.), Nov. 26, 1931Google Scholar. The text of this statement published in the State Department White Paper is obviously erroneous, in that it has Dawes approving a resolution proposed by the “Government of the United States” instead of by the “Council of the League.” See S. Doc. No. 55, 72 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 41. The formula was tentatively announced Nov. 20, officially proposed by the Japanese to the Council Nov. 21, considerably modified during the following three weeks, and finally adopted on Dec. 10, 1931. Approval of the resolution in its final form was given by Dawes on Dec. 9, and by Secretary Stimson on Dec. 10. Text of resolution in Official Journal, XII, 2374–2375 (Dec, 1931)Google Scholar.
75 Under-Secretary Castle revealed, on Nov. 12, that the United States expected to propose a compromise plan to the Council, but gave no details except that it would involve a neutral commission of inquiry; later, the State Department denied any such plan, but the reports persisted. Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Nov. 13, 15, 19, 1931Google Scholar; cf. N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, Sec. 1, p. 2, c. 6.
76 N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1931, p. 2Google Scholar, cc. 3-4.
77 Mr. Walker D. Hines was first appointed, but was unable to accept. The Commission was finally constituted as follows: Count Aldrovandi-Marescotti (Italian), General Claudel (French), Lord Lytton (British), Major-General McCoy (American), and Dr. Schnee (German). Lord Lytton. was elected chairman, the commission being since commonly referred to as the Lytton Commission.
78 Information Section Communiqué, No. 5445 (Jan. 21, 1932).
79 N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1932, p. 4Google Scholar, c. 5. While this reported preference of the American government may have influenced the choice of route, it should be noted that there was fear of interrupted service on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese representative on the Council, Dr. Yen, protested on several occasions against this choice of the longer route.
80 The Assembly, which met in special session on March 3, 1932, in response to China's request, assumed jurisdiction of the Manchurian, as well as of the Shanghai question, over Japanese protest. That action is not, however, taken to relieve the Council of its continuing responsibility in the matter, and the Lytton Commission appears still to be considered as a Council commission, although subject, through the Council, to the orders of the Assembly. See correspondence between the president of the Assembly (Hymans) and the president of the Council (Paul-Boncour), Mar. 18, 1932; and between the Chinese representative (Dr. Yen) and the Secretary-General, Mar. 19 and 21, 1932. Docs. A. (Extr.) 64, 1932, VII, and A. (Extr.) Com. spec. 1.
81 Under Art. 15, in contrast to Art. 11, the votes of the disputing parties are not taken into account, and the Council (or Assembly) has decisive, rather than merely conciliatory, powers. The procedure under Art. 15 also anticipates and may require the application of the sanctions provided by Art. 16. It should be noted that Dr. Yen made it plain that these articles would have been invoked at this time had there been no Shanghai incidents, and that the new Chinese appeal related to the whole dispute, not merely to Shanghai. Text of Chinese appeal and explanation by Dr.Yen, , in Official Journal, XIII, 335–336, 343 (Mar., 1932)Google Scholar.
82 These were Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Norway. The Italian consul, Signor Ciano, acted as chairman of this Consular Commission, and M. Haas, the director of the League's Transit Section, then in China for other purposes, as secretary.
83 See text of Stimson's statement, Feb. 1, 1932, in N. Y. Times, Feb. 2, p. 19, c. 5; cf. also Information Section Communiqué, No. 5471 (Feb. 1, 1932). This explanation is obviously misleading, in that Mr. Stimson ignores the fact that the Manchurian Commission is also, of course, acting under the Covenant (as have all the numerous other League commissions with which the United States has officially participated). Presumably the distinction between the Manchurian and the Shanghai commissions, to the Hoover-Stimson. Administration, lay in the fact that the former was appointed under Art. 11, with its purely conciliatory implications, while the latter was appointed under Art. 15, with its serious implications as to the application of sanctions. Even that distinction is scarcely any longer admissible, in view of the acceptance by both the Council and Assembly of the Chinese appeal of the whole case (including Manchuria) under Art. 15.
84 See Docs. C. 185, M. 90, 1932, VII (first report, cabled from Shanghai, Feb. 6), and C. 209, M. 109,1932, VII (U.S. approval, cabled Feb. 9), in Official Journal, XIII, 374, 378–379 (Mar., 1932)Google Scholar. Cf. also accounts in N. Y. Times, Feb. 6, p. 11, c. 1; Feb. 7, p. 25, c. 1; Feb. 12, p. 3, c. 2.
85 The first three of these reports were transmitted to the Council and later submitted to the Assembly as Doc. A. (Extr.) 3, 1932, VII. Texts in Official Journal, XIII, 374-376, 379-380, 382–383 (Mar., 1932)Google Scholar. The fourth was transmitted directly to the Assembly, that body then having convened. Doc. A. (Extr.) 15, 1932, VII.
86 The published correspondence shows that, in its separate notes to both China and Japan, the United States was constantly emphasizing the obligations of those powers under the Covenant and the Council resolutions, as well as under the Kellogg Pact. Conditions in Manchuria (S. Doc. No. 55, 72 Cong., 1 Sess.), passim.
87 Such a keen observer as Clarence K. Streit has expressed the opinion that this British policy of virtually taking the situation out of the hands of the Council was “to suit exigencies of the American policy.” N. Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1932, p. 23Google Scholar, c. 6.
88 Thus the five-point proposal by the United States and Great Britain was reported to the Council on Feb. 2 by Mr. J. H. Thomas, after it had been delivered to China and Japan; and the later armistice negotiations were similarly reported on Feb. 29 by Sir John Simon, following which report the Council officially proposed the roundtable conference. Even the other Great Powers, France, Italy, and Germany, were ignored by the United States when these negotiations were initiated, and would much have preferred to act through the League rather than merely to “support” the United States and Great Britain.
89 See declaration by the president of the Council (Paul-Boncour), Jan. 29; and Appeal of the Council Members to Japan, Feb. 12. Official Journal, XIII, 336-337, 383–384 (Mar., 1932)Google Scholar. The Japanese directed their resentment over this Council note largely at the United States, asserting that the State Department had even furnished the first draft. This was denied in Washington, and actually the British representative (Lord Londonderry) was responsible for the strongest paragraph; but it suggests the special danger in the isolated position of the United States. N. Y. Times (Tokyo corr., by Hugh Byas), Feb. 19, 1932, p. 10Google Scholar, c. 3. The Stimson letter of Feb. 24 to Sen. Borah similarly was endorsed by the Assembly and its principles incorporated into the Assembly resolution. The letter was officially communicated to the Secretary-General by Minister Wilson, and was thereupon circulated in Geneva as Doc. C. 276, M. 164, 1932 VII.
90 Streit, Clarence K., in N. Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1932, p. 4Google Scholar, c. 2.
91 It was reported from Washington that the Administration was for a time seriously considering acting through the Italian, rather than through the British, representative. Arthur Krock, in Ibid., Feb. 27, 1932, p. 7, c. 1.
92 Council Minutes (mimeographed), Feb. 29, 1932. At the previous secret session of the Council, representatives of the smaller powers had pressed for a more inclusive conference at Shanghai, but Sir John Simon used his authorization to speak for the United States to force the adoption without change of the more limited plan, pointing out that the slightest changes would necessitate further consultation with Secretary Stimson, and thus delay matters.
93 Streit, Clarence K., in N. Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1932, p. 1Google Scholar, c. 7; cf. account in Chicago Tribune (Paris ed.), Mar. 1.
94 This communication was at the same time circulated to the press by Mr. Robert T. Pell, the press officer of the American disarmament delegation. It was circulated by the Secretary-General as Doc. C. 286, M. 173, 1932, VII.
95 These developments were well known in Geneva. See account in N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1932, p. 26Google Scholar, c. 8. Sir John Simon was during these weeks constantly in opposition to strong action, and moderated his attitude somewhat during the Assembly consideration of the dispute, probably as the result of increasing pressure of liberal British opinion.
96 Ibid. (special Washington dispatch), Mar. 1, 1932, p. 17, c. 4.
97 Chinese note of Feb. 12, requesting this action, and Council resolution of Feb. 19, formally acceding to the request and calling the Assembly. Official Journal, XIII, 371-372, 386 (Mar., 1932)Google Scholar.
98 The writer is not concerned, in this article, with the relations to the Special Assembly, but may merely call attention to the keen interest of the United States in the work of that body, as indicated by a statement made by Ambassador Hugh Gibson to the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference at its fifth meeting on March 8: “One of the arguments put forward in favor of our getting the commissions to work was that in doing this we should be satisfying the demand of public opinion that we get on with this work. It may not be very flattering to this commission, but I think we cannot escape the fact that public opinion is much more interested now in the far more urgent question that is occupying our attention here in Geneva, and that it would not be satisfying public opinion if we were to put aside that urgent question in ordur to go through a certain amount of preliminary work in our commissions. If we want to defer to public opinion, I think we should do so far more effectively if we were to allow our present work to be set aside in order that we might come to grips with the really vital and urgent question which is before the Assembly.” This statement was included in the stenographic record hung immediately after its delivery in the Press Room, but is not included in the printed minutes, which do not show Mr. Gibson making any remarks at all at that meeting. The “we” in Mr. Gibson's statement was particularly noticed and commented on in Geneva.
99 Statement issued in San Francisco, Oct. 15. N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1931, p. 2Google Scholar, c. 6.
100 N. Y. Herald (Paris ed.), Nov. 21, 1931Google Scholar; full statement in N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, p. 2, c. 5. He particularly attacked Briand, apparently for his reputed statement, on Nov. 19, to the effect that “intervention by the United States, whether independently or in cooperation with the League of Nations, would be helpful.”
101 Literary Digest, Oct. 24, 1931, p. 6Google Scholar.
102 Text of letter in N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1931, p. 2Google Scholar, cc. 5-6. The list of signers included ten of the most prominent university and college presidents; five governors and ex-governors, of whom four were Republicans; six former ambassadors and ministers, three Republicans; and such others as Newton D. Baker, Rabbi Wise, Jane Addams, William Allen White, Paul Warburg, Julius H. Barnes, and Admiral Sims.
103 Survey made by League of Nations Association; further summaries of newspaper opinion in Geneva Special Studies, II, no. 11, pp. 40, 42, 43, 46, 54, 59Google Scholar.
104 N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1931, p. 2Google Scholar, c. 4.
105 Editorial, “General Dawes in Paris”, in N. Y. Herald (Paris ed.), Nov. 21, 1931Google Scholar.
106 Editorial, “The Manchurian Crisis”, in The Nation, vol. 133, p. 419 (Oct. 21, 1931)Google Scholar. It may be worth noting that Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard also signed the letter to President Hoover mentioned above.
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