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Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Jeffrey Berejikian
Jeffrey Berejikian
Affiliation:
University of Oregon
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Abstract

Unraveling the nexus between agents and structures is fundamental to an understanding of political and social change. The two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action involve either individual reductionism or structural reductionism. Both approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory anomalies. An alternative proposed here utilizes the concept of framing developed in behavioral decision theory primarily by Quatrone and Tversky. It directly addresses the agent-structure problem by developing the proposition that individuals evoke alternative decision rules in different structural contexts. The result is greater theoretical coherence and resolution of anomalous cases. Additionally, this model begins to define a new role for ideology in explanations of revolutionary collective action.

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Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 86 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 647 - 657
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1992

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