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Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

John A. Armstrong
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin

Extract

It is hardly surprising that most investigations of Soviet bureaucracy have emphasized the unique aspects of that system rather than its relation to broader problems of administration. Yet the importance of Soviet experience makes a beginning in comparative analysis highly desirable. The purpose of this article is to identify some (by no means all) of the ways in which Soviet administrative behavior resembles or differs from administrative behavior in Western Europe, which is assumed here to be the norm of administration in a politically and economically modernized society. Where Soviet and Western European administrative behavior coincide, it is assumed that the behavior arises from requirements of the economically modernized societies which prevail in both the USSR and Western Europe at present. Where administrative behavior differs in the two areas, tentative explanations are sought in (1) the circumstance that the Soviet economy has become modernized more recently and more rapidly than the economy in Western Europe; and (2) the difference between the Communist political system and the pluralistic systems prevailing in Western Europe.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1965

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References

1 I use “bureaucracy,” “organization,” and “administration” in the sense employed by Blau, Peter and Scott, W. Richard in Formal Organizations (San Francisco, 1962), pp. 78Google Scholar; since the formal organizations I deal with are highly bureaucratic and engaged in administration, the terms are frequently interchangeable.

2 I make the distinction between economic and political modernization which Joseph LaPalombara clarifies on pp. 37 ff. of “Bureaucracy and Political Development” in the book which he edited on Bureaucracy and Development (Princeton, 1963)Google Scholar.

3 Obviously a different set of assumptions about the relation between the Western European and the Soviet political systems would have produced a different model leading to a different approach to the problem.

4 During 1963–64, I interviewed twenty-seven German, twenty-four British, and twenty French administrators who had either visited the USSR for professional or business purposes or who (in a small minority of cases) had dealt extensively with Soviet administrators in Western Europe. The wide commercial and official contacts of Western Europeans (in comparison to Americans) with Soviet administrators made these informants especially valuable. While it was not feasible to select a “sample” of the Western Europeans, I was careful to secure a distribution that was broadly representative of the European government officials and private businessmen and of welfare as well as “line” or industrial administrators within the official group. The interviews were open-ended, but highly structured, so as to cover a fairly standardized range of topics yet to permit intensive probing of informants who turned out to have made unusually significant observations of Soviet administration. I intend to deal more fully with the backgrounds of the informants in a subsequent article which will treat the differences in role perceptions of the various types of Western European administrators. At this point I should express my gratitude to the American Council of Learned Societies and the Graduate School and the International Studies Program of the University of Wisconsin, which provided the grants for extensive interviewing in Europe and a brief visit to the USSR.

5 Blau's, Peter M.The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago, 1955)Google Scholar is, of course, concerned with just such relationships in an American welfare agency.

6 Dimock, Marshall in Merton, Robert K. et al. , ed., Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), p. 399Google Scholar.

7 Armstrong, John A. and DeWitt, Kurt, “Organization and Control of the Partisan Movement” in Armstrong, John A., ed., Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, 1964), pp. 133–34Google Scholar.

8 Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 286Google Scholar.

9 How Russia Is Ruled, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 245Google Scholar.

10 As indicated below, the informants were fully convinced of the the operation of informal mechanisms such as tolkachi (expediters) which circumvented the formal structure of the agencies they dealt with, but they denied that these mechanisms were sanctioned by the rules or ideology of the system.

11 Cf. Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior (New York, 1961), p. 168Google Scholar.

12 Cf. Armstrong, John A., The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New York, 1959), p. 96 ff.Google Scholar

13 See especially Fainsod, Merle, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1958)Google Scholar.

14 Bonnier, M., Directeur Général Adjoint, Société Bénoto, “L'Expérience d'Exportation d'une Entreprise de Construction de Matériel d'Equipement,” Hommes et Techniques, Vol. 15 (07–August 1959), pp. 687–89Google Scholar.

15 Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics: Or Was Stalin Really Necessary? (New York, 1964), p. 276Google Scholar.

16 Ibid., pp. 269, 275.

17 “The Director's Time,” Pravda, 06 2, 1964Google Scholar, trans, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI, No. 22, pp. 2526Google Scholar. Cf. similar articles, ibid., XVI, No. 13, pp. 17–18; No. 31, pp. 11–12; No. 46, pp. 14–19.

18 “For Flexible Economic Management of Enterprises,” Pravda, 08 17, 1964Google Scholar, trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVI, No. 33, pp. 1315Google Scholar.

19 Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR (New York, 1954), p. 229Google Scholar.

20 Fainsod, , Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, p. 92Google Scholar; Berliner, Joseph, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Moore, op. cit., p. 290.

22 Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York, 1956), pp. 3536Google Scholar.

23 I advanced this hypothesis in The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, p. 11.

24 However, as I argued, ibid., the regime does frown upon the development of hobbies and avocations which do not indirectly improve an official's work ability.

25 Ibid., p. 40.

26 Berliner, op. cit., p. 261.

27 Deutsch, Karl W., “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” this Review, Vol. 55 (09 1961), pp. 495 ff.Google Scholar

28 An analysis of the backgrounds of industrial Party secretaries (to appear in Soviet Studies, Jan. 1966) suggests that these officials—dealing with the most modernized sector of the Soviet economy—have exhibited only half as much geographical mobility during their careers (during and since higher education) as Party secretaries of the same status and age group supervising the less modernized (agricultural and political) sectors.

29 Informants found ample evidence of discrimination against Jews in administration. While one German businessman was told by a Soviet official that the presence of Jews in the Ministry of Foreign Trade proved that there was no anti Semitism in the USSR, another was told jokingly, “all of our Jews have been sent to their own province in Siberia.” Other informants encountered more sharply anti-Semitic jokes, especially when the Soviet administrators had been drinking. An informant of Russian parentage overheard a young Russian woman remarking that she refused to dance with his superior (in a Western European administrative delegation) because he was obviously Jewish. It seems evident that Jews in Soviet administrative positions are subject to uncomfortable pressures, but it is not so clear that they develop a defensive solidarity. Some informants (but by no means all who commented on the ethnic situation) believed that Ukrainians in the administration also tended to stick together.

30 Smolensk under Soviet Rule, p. 92.

31 Berliner, op. cit., pp. 53–54.

32 Bauer, Raymond A., Inkeles, Alex and Kluckhohn, Clyde, How the Soviet System Works (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 58Google Scholar.

33 Inkeles, and Bauer, , The Soviet Citizen, (Cambridge, Mass., 1959) pp. 96 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. 120.

34 Ibid., pp. 226–27.

35 Cf. the very similar quotation from the Stalin-period press in Armstrong, John A., The Politics of Totalitarianism (New York, 1961), p. 182Google Scholar.

36 Ibid., p. 81.

37 See Merle Fainsod, “Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case,” in LaPalombara, op. cit.

38 Dibble, Vernon K., “Occupations and Ideologies,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (1962), pp. 229241CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 Russian tradition is a third factor influencing at least this characteristic.

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