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The War Policy of South Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Lucretia L. Ilsley
Affiliation:
Florida State College for Women

Extract

Neutrality versus support of the British Commonwealth was the issue which confronted the Union of South Africa when Great Britain, on September 3, 1939, went to war with Germany. A glance at recent South African political history will assist the reader in understanding the significance of the political crisis which marked the Union's entry into the conflict. As the outcome of an earlier crisis at the end of 1932, when South Africa abandoned the gold standard, a Coalition Government headed by two Boer generals was formed. Genaral Hertzog, leader of the Afrikaans-speaking Nationalist party, who had been prime minister in the preceding Nationalist-Laborite Pact Government, continued in the premiership. The post of deputy prime minister in the Coalition Cabinet was taken by General Smuts, the head of the South African party (made up of both Afrikaans and Englishspeaking elements of the population), which had formed the Opposition to the Pact Government. When this Coalition of 1933 was welded into Fusion by the formation of the United party in 1934, the rô1e of the official Opposition was assumed by the extreme Nationalists under Dr. Malan. Minor parties in Parliament were the Laborites and the Dominion party, an offshoot of the South African party with strong pro-British sentiments.

Type
International Affairs
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1940

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References

1 See statements in the House of Assembly by General Hertzog on Feb. 12, 1940, and by General Smuts on Apr. 1, 1940. As Professor Clokie has pointed out (“The British Dominions and Neutrality,” in this Review, Aug., 1940, p. 741), General Smuts, on Aug. 25, 1938, made an oft-reiterated statement to the House that the Union would not be automatically at war in case Britain were attacked, but he could not imagine South Africa's withdrawal from the friendly bonds uniting the two countries. It is evident, however, from his recent replies to General Hertzog's charges of inconsistency in connection with his stand for belligerency in 1939, that General Smuts in 1938 believed there was a reason for neutrality. Like statesmen in Great Britain and France, he was inclined to give Hitler the benefit of the doubt when the Fuehrer asserted that the Sudetenland was his last territorial claim in Europe.

2 As, for example, when a ministry which had secured a dissolution requested a second dissolution following a defeat at the polls. Keith, A. B., The British Dominions as Sovereign States (1938), p. 223.Google Scholar

3 Keith, A. B., “Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law,” Jour. of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol. 21 (Nov., 1939), pp. 254255.Google Scholar

4 Keith, A. B., The British Cabinet System, 1880–1938, p. 399.Google Scholar

5 If Sir Patrick Duncan's action be compared with Lord Byng's refusal of dissolution to Premier Mackenzie King of Canada in 1926, Lord Byng seems to have been less justified in his refusal. Mr. King was undefeated in Parliament, and there was no other minister who could command a parliamentary majority to carry on the government.

6 The Dominion party, since its formation in 1934, has held neutrality to be incompatible with Dominion status.

7 The significance of South Africa's three-day neutrality period, while Great Britain and other members of the Commonwealth were at war, has been discussed in Professor Clokie's article. Ibid., p. 743.

8 Although denying that he had ever contemplated the return of South-West Africa or Tanganyika to Germany, Mr. Pirow, early in 1938, admitted having once said he would welcome Germany as a colonial power. In June, 1939, he asserted that the problem of compensating Germany for the loss of her colonies must be faced.

9 Germany took 18.8 per cent of Union merchandise exports in 1938; 7.9 per cent of Union imports, including government stores, came from Germany in 1938.

10 Broadcast from London, Oct. 25, 1939. Since the Afrikaans element constitutes roughly 60 per cent of the European population and the British 40 per cent, Colonel Reitz's statement would imply that 70 per cent of the people favored entering the war. This proportion may be contrasted with the vote of 80 to 67 by which the Smuts amendment for belligerency was carried in the House.

11 At Losberg (Transvaal), the United Party candidate increased his majority by 200 over 1936; at Carolina (Transvaal), the Nationalists had counted on the seat, but the United party won by 114. At Hopetown, the Nationalists retained the seat by a majority of 339.

12 War with Italy was brought about by a proclamation of the Governor-General issued June 12. This proclamation dated belligerency from June 11, the day on which the Italian declaration of war took effect.

13 The Government in June commandeered all rifles and ammunition in the possession of individuals and rifle associations.

14 Keith, A. B., “Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law,” Jour. of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol. 16, p. 291 (Nov., 1934).Google Scholar

15 Speech on Empire Day, May 24, 1940.

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