Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T11:52:36.509Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Bargaining With the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Terry Sullivan
Terry Sullivan*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I employ a simple game to suggest the effects of information and expectations on bargaining strategies and responses. I make use of members' predispositions in order to identify actors likely to be bargaining. Using administration headcounts, I show that while very few members misrepresent their preferences during the coalition-building process, those who do represent a large proportion of the administration's core supporters, make their misrepresentations unsystematic to avoid a costly reputation, and convert more readily than those who are not. Strategic considerations drive conversion among bluffing members, while identification with the administration determines conversion among other members. Compromise generates few conversions. A conservative estimate of bluffing suggests that the conversion of bluffers decided more than half the administration's critical votes. I speculate about a model to account for the observed bluffing.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 1167 - 1195
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aldrich, John, and Nelson, Forrest. 1984. Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models. Beverly Hills: Sage.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderberg, Michael R. 1973. Cluster Analysis for Applications. New York: Academic.Google Scholar
Bond, Jon, and Fleisher, Richard. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Bullock, Charles. 1962. “House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition.” American Political Science Review 67:1295–1300.Google Scholar
Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Califano, Joseph. 1975. A Presidential Nation. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Cater, Douglas. 1964. Power in Washington. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Clausen, Aage. 1973. How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. New York: St. Martin's.Google Scholar
Collier, Kenneth, and Sullivan, Terry. 1988. “Presidential Support and Influence: A Linkage with Prestige.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.Google Scholar
Covington, Cary. 1987a. “Mobilizing Congressional Support for the President: Insights from the 1960s.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22:77–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Covington, Cary. 1987b. “‘Staying Private’: Gaining Congressional Support for Unpublicized Presidential Preference on Roll Call Votes.” Journal of Politics 49:737–55.Google Scholar
Covington, Cary. 1988. “Building Presidential Coalitions among Cross-pressured Members of Congress.” Western Political Quarterly 41:47–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Cary, and McCubbins, Mathew. 1986. “Constituency Relations As a Redistributive Game.” Journal of Politics 48:270–89.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary, McCubbins, Mathew, and Sullivan, Terry. 1984. “Policy Choice As an Electoral Investment.” Social Choice and Welfare 1:231–42.Google Scholar
Dodd, Lawrence C., and Sullivan, Terry. 1979. “Partisan Vote-gathering in the House: Concepts, Models, Measures, and Propositions.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.Google Scholar
Edwards, George III. 1980. Presidential Influence in Congress. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.Google Scholar
Edwards, George III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Ellsberg, Daniel. 1956. “The Theory of the Reluctant Duelist.” American Economic Review 46:909–23.Google Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. Jr. 1978. Home Style: House Members in their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Fishel, Jeff 1985. Presidents and Promises: From Campaign Pledge to Presidential Performance. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirole, Jean. 1983. “Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information.” Review of Economic Studies 50:221–47.Google Scholar
George, Alexander. 1980. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder: Westview.Google Scholar
Holtzman, Abraham. 1970. Legislative Liaison: Executive Leadership in Congress. Chicago: Rand McNally.Google Scholar
King, Gary, and Ragsdale, Lyn. 1987. The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.Google Scholar
Kingdon, John. 1981. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. 2d ed. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Kreps, David M., and Wilson, Robert. 1982. “Sequential Equilibrium.” Econometrica 50:863–94.Google Scholar
McCubbins, Mathew, and Sullivan, Terry. 1984. “Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice.” Quantity and Quality 18:299–319.Google Scholar
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: the Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Neustadt, Richard. 1960. Presidential Power. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
Poole, Keith, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1985. “A Spatial Model of Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 29:357–68.Google Scholar
Rivers, Douglas, and Rose, Nancy. 1985. “Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 29:185–92.Google Scholar
Sanders, Barefoot. 1969. Oral History Project. Transcript of three tapes. LBJ Library.Google Scholar
Sinclair, Barbara. 1982. Congressional Realignment 1925–1978. Austin: University of Texas Press.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Terry. 1984. Procedural Structure: Success and Influence in Congress. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Terry. 1987. “Presidential Leadership in Congress: Securing Commitments.” In Congress: Structure and Policy, ed. McCubbins, Mathew and Sullivan, Terry. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Terry. 1988a. “The Bargaining Approach to Presidential Leadership.” Presidential Research 10:12–22.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Terry. 1988b. “Expectations, Headcounts, and Presidential Coalitions in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 32:567–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sullivan, Terry. 1990. “Explaining Why Presidents Count: Signaling and Information.” Journal of Politics 52:939–62.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Terry. N.d. “The Bank Account Presidency: A New Measure and Evidence on the Temporal Path of Presidential. Influence.” American Journal of Political Science. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Uebersax, John S. 1979. “CLUSMAC: A Description and User's Guide.” University of Texas, Austin. Mimeo.Google Scholar
Weisberg, Herbert. 1978. “Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 22:554–77.Google Scholar
Whitehurst, G. William. 1983. Diary of a Congressman. Norfolk, VA: Donning.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.