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Current “Mass Line” Tactics in Communist China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

H. Arthur Steiner
Affiliation:
University of California (Los Angeles)

Extract

The Problem. Chinese communist leaders generally attribute their conquest of power to the faithful pursuit of effective “mass line” tactics. They now regard a “correct” mass line as the essential prerequisite for the full consolidation of power, for the successful implementation of the ambitious and farreaching policies to which they are committed, and for the ultimate transition from the “people's democratic dictatorship” to the complete socialist order. Recognizing that large numbers of cadres adequately trained in mass line tactics are critically needed for these purposes, the Chinese Communist Party intensified its cadre training program in 1950–1951 to insure that all party (and other public) workers would be carefully indoctrinated in basic Marxist-Leninist mass line theory and practice. Training in mass line tactics ranges in scope from propaganda to public administration, but finds its principal focus in the delicate area of the Party's public relations with the great masses of Chinese people who have yet to be sold on the communist program. The problem is so serious, and the need for a solution so urgent, that the party leadership has temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the current cadre training program.

Type
Foreign Governments and Politics
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1951

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References

1 Shao-ch'i, Liu, Kuan-yü hsiu-kai tang-chang ti pao-kao [Report on the Amendment of Party Constitution] (reissued; Hongkong, 1948)Google Scholar, Ch. 2, pt. 4.

2 General Introduction to the Party Constitution.

3 This theme is reflected in most of Mao's essays, books, reports, and public statements, usually in protest against doctrinaire attitudes that fail to reconcile Marxist-Leninist theories with the practical experiences of the Chinese people. A clear theoretical explanation of the problem is found in his Kai-tsao wo-men ti hsüeh-hsi [Reform Our Learning] (May 19, 1941). A more specific condemnation of “subjective dogmatism” is developed in his “On Practice,” an essay ascribed to July, 1937, but generally made known for the first time when “reissued” on December 29, 1950, in an authoritative text. See Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] (Peking), December 29, 1950Google Scholar.

4 During the anti-Japanese war, at a time when the KMT-CCP United Front had in fact been breached, the Party Politburo adopted two decisions reflecting this view: a decision of July 1, 1941, on “The Strengthening of the Party,” and another of September 1, 1942, on “Party Leadership and Relations between Various Organizations in Anti-Japanese Resistance Bases.” For the texts of these decisions, which are basic in the organization and practice of the Party, see Cheng-feng wen-hsien [Documents on the Party Renovation Movement] (Hongkong, 1949), pp. 125–128 and 129137Google Scholar, respectively.

5 Jen-min jih-pao, July 1, 1950.

6 Address at the Cadre Meeting Celebrating the May 1 Labor Day in Peking, Hsin-hua yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 510 (May, 1950)Google Scholar; English translation in People's China, Supplement to Vol. 1, no. 10, pp. 310 (May 16, 1950)Google Scholar.

7 Struggle for a Basic Improvement in the Financial and Economic Situation of the Country”, Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, Vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 487488 (July, 1950)Google Scholar; English translation in People's China, Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 46 (July 1, 1950)Google Scholar.

8 Text in Hsin-hua huo-yeh wen-hsuan [New China Leaflets], no. 58 (Shanghai, April, 1950)Google Scholar.

9 Ibid., no. 66 (May, 1950).

10 New China News Agency, Peking release, January 1, 1951.

11 This campaign resembled familiar campaigns in the Soviet Union, and was in part inspired by the reissue of Soviet documents dealing with criticism and self-criticism. It was characterized by the most fulsome adoration and praise of Chairman Mao, the high party leaders, and the policies of the Central People's Government. “Criticism and self-criticism,” of course, did not extend to a critical reëxamination of current official policies and programs.

12 “An Important Link in Closely Uniting the Party with the Masses”, Jen-min jih-pao, January 3, 1951Google Scholar.

13 General Introduction. Tse-tung, Mao, in Part 5 of Lun lien-ho cheng-fu [Coalition Government] (April 24, 1945)Google Scholar, listed four supplementary “sins”: “dogmatism,” “empiricism,” “sectarianism” (or “factionalism”) and “arrogance.”

14 Tse-tung, Mao, “Tasks of the National Anti-Japanese Front in China”, Address to a Cadre Conference in Shensi Province, May 3–7, 1937Google Scholar, as given in Communist International, Vol. 14, p. 828 (New York, Nov., 1937)Google Scholar.

16 Tsai Chin-Sui kan-pu hui-i shang-ti chiang-hua [Address to the Cadre Meeting of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Area] (Hongkong, 1948)Google Scholar.

17 Jen Pi-shih, Address to the Northwest People's Liberation Army Front Committee, January 12, 1948; North Shensi Radio, April 13, 1948.

18 A leading editorial in Chieh-fang jih-pao [Liberation Daily] (Shanghai), January 30' 1950Google Scholar, was devoted to this problem.

19 “Rectify Thoroughly the Deviation of Misinterpreting the ‘Policy of Magnanimity’”, leading editorial of Jen-min jih-pao, December 28, 1950Google Scholar. This “rightist deviation” in dealing with counterrevolutionary elements was also condemned by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security of the Central People's Government, in his Report for 1950 (ibid., Jan. 1, 1951).

An astonishing attempt to link the “mass line” with the present blood-letting in Communist China was made in apparent earnestness by P'eng Ch'en, a party Politburo member and vice-chairman of the central government's Political and Legal Affairs Committee, in an official report on the new “Regulations for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries,” adopted by the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951. P'eng insisted that “the mistaken practice of excessive magnanimity” in the punishment of counterrevolutionaries had “aroused the dissatisfaction of various classes of people,” and that the new regulations had been drafted in direct compliance with popular demands that “enemies of the people” be more sternly punished! (New China News Agency, Peking release, Feb. 21, 1951).

20 Ming-ling chu-i, also variously translated as “authoritarianism,” “orderism,” and “dictatorialism.”

21 New China News Agency, note in People's China, Vol. 2, no. 1, p. 8 (July 1, 1950)Google Scholar.

22 May Day Address, 1950, cited above, n. 6.

23 Cited above, n. 4.

24 Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 1, 1950.

25 “Resolutely Oppose ‘Commandism,’” September 14, 1950.

27 See Steiner, H. A., “People's Democratic Dictatorship in China”, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 3, esp. pp. 3840 (Mar., 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 “Resolutely Oppose ‘Commandism.’”

29 East China Directive, May 20, 1950, cited above, n. 24. The directive continues with a highly detailed statement of the curricular organization and content of the retraining movement. According to later official claims, over 350,000 cadres were exposed to general ideological retraining in the East China area between August and November, 1950, in addition to 176,000 cadres given ideological training in connection with preparations for agrarian reform (New China News Agency, Shanghai release, Mar. 10, 1951).

31 Coalition Government, Pt. 5.

32 Lun hsin chieh-tuan [On the New Stage] (Report to the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of the [Sixth] Central Committee, Oct. 12, 1938)Google Scholar, Ch. 7.

33 Text in I-chiu-ssu-ch'i nien i-lai Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang chung-yao wen-hsien chi [Important Documents of the Chinese Communist Party since 1947] (Hongkong, 1949), p. 62Google Scholar.

34 Cited above, n. 16.

35 Cited above, n. 8.

36 Directives of the East China, South-Central, Northwest, Southwest, Northeast and North China branch bureaus of the Central Committee are summarized in Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1950.

37 East China Branch Bureau Directive of May 20, 1950, cited above, n. 24.

38 Typical reports of non-party participation in party meetings emanated from Shanghai (Shanghai Radio, May 16, 1950), North Anhwei (Shanghai Radio, July 17,1950), and Chungking (Chungking Radio, July 22, 1950). Supplemental directives governing the procedure of opening party meetings to non-party elements were also issued by local party organs, as was illustrated by the June 20, 1950, directive of the Secretary of the Chungking Party Committee (Chungking Radio, July 18, 1950).

39 Op. cit. above, n. 1.

40 Throughout August-September, 1950, the columns of Jen-min jih-pao (Peking) and Chieh-fang jih-pao (Shanghai) were intermittently filled with reports on this campaign.

41 Chungking Radio, July 25, 1950.

42 Shanghai Radio, September 11, 1950, reported several such irregularities among party bureaucrats in Shanghai and Hangchow.

43 New China News Agency, Peking release, December 23, 1950.

44 See, for example, Stalin, , Foundations of Leninism (1924)Google Scholar and his report on the international situation (1927), as quoted in Burns, E., Handbook of Marxism (London, 1935), p. 909Google Scholar.

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