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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Recent applications of more elaborate quantitative methods (e.g., bloc cluster analysis and Guttman scale procedures) to legislative politics have sharply improved the ability of political scientists to specify significant dimensions of voting behavior. Party affiliation, constituency characteristics and cohesion within state delegations have been correlated with the congressional vote in a number of subject matter areas. Because of the masses of data to be handled, however, even the best of these studies have been limited in scope to a single year or to one Congress. This restriction has not prevented the authors of these works from demonstrating clearly the utility of their methodology, but it has limited correspondingly either the generality or the reliability of their conclusions. The present study, limited to the single issue of congressional voting on foreign aid, is an attempt to discover, by the application of quantitative methods to votes over longer time periods, how far the relationships previously suggested persist over time or are peculiar to the individual sessions in which they occur.
1 See Truman, David B., The Congressional Party (New York, 1959)Google Scholar and MacRae, Duncan Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958)Google Scholar.
2 The Truman and MacRae studies both examined the 81st Congress (1949–50); in addition, each treated the parties separately.
3 As Truman recognizes, op. cit., pp. viii, 10–12.
4 The 76th Congress will be retained in the analysis both because the arms embargo repeal is related in content to the issues of the other sessions and because the near unanimity of party positions during the 76th Congress permits utilization of the arms embargo repeal vote as a base against which to note the subsequent breakdown of party solidarity on foreign aid.
5 See for example Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), pp. 54–58Google Scholar; and Kesselman, Mark, “Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 284–289CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 My “Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly,” International Organization, Vol. 14 (1960), pp. 291–306CrossRefGoogle Scholar, discusses the relative advantages of scaling and other quantitative methods.
7 The terms “isolationist” and “internationalist” are labels of convenience, not intended to carry normative baggage here.
8 For a full discussion of the study design, including the items comprising the foreign aid scales and the methods of calculation of the measures of the demographic variables, see my Congressional Isolationist Behavior (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1963)Google Scholar, ch. 2 and appendices I, II, and III.
9 Op. cit., p. 34.
10 See Jewell, Malcolm E., “Evaluating the Decline of Southern Internationalism Through Senatorial Roll Call Votes,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 21 (1959), pp. 624–646CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 For instance, Fensterwald, Bernard Jr., “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansionism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 (June and December, 1958), pp. 111–138 and 280–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar, finds Catholics in “the front ranks of the ‘isolationists’” (at p. 136), while Fenton, John H., The Catholic Vote (New Orleans, Hauser Press, 1960)Google Scholar finds that in 1959 Catholic representatives were more likely to support foreign aid than non-Catholics (pp. 87–108).
12 We applied controls only where there were a minimum of 10 congressmen in a party-religious category (e.g., there had to be at least 10 Republicans of each religious conviction before we used controls). In this instance, there were too few Catholic representatives from rural areas and from the South for additional controls to be used.
13 This corroborates and strengthens Fenton's assertion (see note 11, supra), for it indicates that urban-rural controls, which Fenton omits, do not destroy the relationship. See op. cit., pp. 105–108.
14 For evidence of a similar relationship in the Senate, see David N. Farnsworth, “A Comparison of the Senate and Its Foreign Relations Committee on Selected Roll Call Votes,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1961), pp. 168–175CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 Carroll, Holbert N., The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.
16 For a detailed discussion of the executive legislative relationships, see ibid, pp, 320–350.
17 Farnsworth, op. cit., states this view clearly with regard to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “The most effective way to destroy the Anti-Internationalist sentiment in the Senate, other than defeat at the polls, is to make those Senators holding such attitudes members of the Committee.” (p. 175) For an example of a similar mechanism on the House Appropriations Committee, see Fenno, Richard F., “The House Appropriations Committee”, this Review, Vol. 56 (1962), pp. 310–324Google Scholar.
18 For evidence and discussion in support of the assumption, see MacRae, op. cit., p. 278; Galloway, George B., The Legislative Process in Congress (New York, 1955), pp. 198–215Google Scholar; and Bailey, Stephen K. and Samuel, Howard D., Congress at Work (New York, 1952), pp. 112–126Google Scholar. For evidence of the concern of state legislators for the views of their constituents, see MacRae, Duncan Jr., “The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives,” this Review, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 1046–1055Google Scholar and Crane, Wilder Jr., “Do Representatives Represent?” Journal of Politics, Vol. 22 (1960), pp. 295–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the other side, see Stokes, Donald E. and Miller, Warren E., “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 531–546CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Miller, and Stokes, , “Constituency Influence in Congress,0 this Review, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 45–56Google Scholar.
19 Turner, op. cit., pp. 144–163; Grassmuck, George L., Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), pp. 141–174Google Scholar; MacRae, Dimensions …, op. cit., pp. 276–278; Smuckler, Ralph H., “The Region of Isolationism,” this Review, Vol. 47 (1953), pp. 386–401Google Scholar; Jewell, op. cit.
20 We have used the following regional break-downs:
EAST: Conn., Del., Me., Mass., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Pa., R. I., Vt. (10 states)
SOUTH: Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Md., Miss., N. C., Okla., S. C., Tenn., Tex., Va., W. Va. (15 states).
MIDWEST: Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. D., Ohio, S. D., Wis. (12 states).
MOUNTAIN: Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. M., Utah, Wyo. (8 states).
PACIFIC: Calif., Ore., Wash. (3 states).
21 Following MacRae, Dimensions …, op. cit., we have used the per cent of the male working force employed in farm occupations as a measure of ruralism. The following breakdowns were used: 24.0% or more—rural district; 6.0-23.9%—mixed district; 5.9% or less—urban districts. The present writer is indebted to Professor MacRae for supplying occupational distributions for the period after the 1950 census. Since our purpose is to focus on the “pure” types, the data for the mixed districts have been omitted.
22 A word is in order about the limitations on the controls used. In order to differentiate the extreme cases from the moderates, the variables were trichotomized. Given the skewed distributions of the constituency attributes, there were too few cases in some cells to permit meaningful controls. For example, with respect to ruralism, only in the Midwestern region were there sufficient numbers of representatives of both urban and rural districts to allow controls.
23 Samuel Lubell is a major proponent of this argument. See his The Future of American Politics (New York, 1952), pp. 121–132Google Scholar, and The Revolt of the Moderates (New York, 1956), pp. 52–74Google Scholar.
24 By ethnicity, we mean the proportion of the population of German and Irish ancestry. Using census data the districts have been categorized as follows: Low Ethnic: 0.0–0.4% of the population; Moderate Ethnic: 0.5–0.9% of the population; High Ethnic: 1.0% or more of the population born in Germany or Ireland. Though the numbers of foreign born are small, we have used them as an index of ethnicity on the assumption that those who emigrate to the U. S. tend to settle in parts of the nation where others from the “old country” have settled. Since the census omits the data for the Southern states, only those Southern districts composed entirely of census tracts are included in the analysis. Also, as with other variables, the moderate ethnic districts are omitted from Table VII.
25 Lubell, op. cit., relies mainly on pre-World War II data, specifically the behavior of the German-Americans in the 1940 presidential election, to support the ethnic-emotional argument. This may help account for the contrast between his view and that presented here.
26 On education, see Fensterwald, op. cit., p. 137 and Smuckler, op. cit., p. 399. On status, see Hero, Alfred O., Americans in World Affairs (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1959), pp. 43–68Google Scholar.
27 The measure of education, compiled from the census, is the per cent of the district population who had attended college at some time. The following categories were used: Low Education: 0.0–9.9% of the population college trained; Moderate Education: 10.0–14.9% of the population college trained; High Education: 15.0% or more of the population college trained. For a measure of SES, we have used MacRae's occupational distributions, specifically the per cent of employed males engaged in managerial, technical, and professional occupations. Education is usually a concomitant of such activities; they are often rewarded by high income. The districts were categorized as follows: Low Status: 0.0–14.9% of population in managerial, technical and professional occupations; Moderate Status: 15.0–19.9% of population so engaged; High Status: 20.0% or more of population so engaged.
28 See the works of Miller and Stokes cited above, footnote 18.
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