No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Ministerial Responsibility versus the Separation of Powers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Extract
Formerly political scientists were inclined to criticize the American theory and practice of the separation of powers in the federal and state governments and to commend instead the cabinet or parliamentary form of organization. Thus Walter Bagehot, Sir Henry Maine, Woodrow Wilson, Frank J. Goodnow, along with many others, pointed to the advantages of cabinet or parliamentary government over presidential government as developed in the United States. A consensus of opinion was expressed by Wilson who said, “As at present constituted, the federal government lacks strength because its powers are divided, lacks promptness because its authorities are multiplied, lacks wieldiness because its processes are roundabout, lacks efficiency because its responsibility is indistinct and its action is without competent direction.” At one time the American plan of separation of powers was compared unfavorably with the French system in which governmental powers were divided into two branches—a policy-forming branch or “Politics” and a policy executing branch or “Administration.” On another occasion the tripartite system of the separation of powers was charged with responsibility for much of the political corruption prevalent in American politics. The same theory of separation has often been condemned as requiring too many checks and balances and as involving a do-nothing policy for legislative and executive officers.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1922
References
1 Wilson, , Congressional Government, p. 318.Google Scholar
2 Goodnow, Politics and Administration.
3 Ford, Cost of the National Government, ch. vi.
4 Howe, , “The Constitution and Public Opinion,” in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (October, 1914), p. 7.Google Scholar
5 Marriott, , “The Machinery of Government,” in 88 Nineteenth Century, 1086.Google Scholar
6 Dicey, , “A Comparison between Cabinet and Presidential Government,” in 85 Nineteenth Century, 85.Google Scholar
7 Cf. Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, Lord Haldane chairman (1918).
8 President Millerand announced in this connection that he intended to select premiers who would carry out his policies, and thus far he has managed to retain the dominant position.
9 See Lambert, , Le Gouvernement par les Juges et la Lutte contre la Législation Sociale aux États-Unis—L'expérience Américaine du Controle Judiciaire de la Constitutionalité des Lois, (Paris, 1921).Google Scholar
10 Goodnow, Politics and Administration.
11 Lambert, op. cit.
12 Review of The Case of Requisition, Scott, and Hildesley, , 21 Colorado Law Review, 833.Google Scholar
13 Cf. 1 Southwestern Political Science Quarterly, 95.
14 Ibid., II, p. 106.
15 See Willoughby, and Rogers, , An Introduction to the Problem of Government, pp. 95ff.Google Scholar, for a brief summary of the modifications of the rule of law in England during the World War.
16 Cf. Fairlie, , “Administrative Legislation,” in 18 Michigan Law Review, 181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
17 See Laski, , Foundations of Sovereignty, pp. 34ff.Google Scholar
18 See Lambert, op. cit., 224.
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.