¹ See Ranney, Austin and Kendall, Willmoore, Democracy and the American Party System (New York, 1956), p. 399Google Scholar; Schattschneider, E. E., Party Government (New York, 1942)Google Scholar; and the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” this Review, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950)Google Scholar.

² See Truman, David B., “The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the U. S. House of Representatives,” this Review, Vol. 50 (Dec., 1956), p. 1023Google Scholar; Truman, , The Congressional Party (New York, 1959), pp. vi–viiGoogle Scholar; Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressure on Congress (Baltimore, 1951)Google Scholar; and Leiserson, Avery, Parties and Politics (New York, 1958), p. 379Google Scholar (appendix).

³ Huitt, Ralph, “Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate,” this Review, Vol. 55 (1961), p. 334Google Scholar; see also Peabody, Robert L. and Polsby, Nelson, New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago, 1963), pp. 269–270Google Scholar.

⁴ See Huitt, op. cit.; Jewell, Malcolm E., “The Senate Republican Policy Committee and Foreign Policy,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 12 (Dec., 1959), pp. 966–980CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bone, Hugh A., “An Introduction to the Senate Policy Committees,” this Review, Vol. 50 (June, 1956), pp. 339–359Google Scholar; Galloway, George, “Leadership in the House of Representatives,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 12 (1959), pp. 417–441CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Robinson, James A., The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis, 1963)Google Scholar. Hasbrouck, Paul, Party Government in the House of Representatives (New York, 1927)Google Scholar, is an older treatment of some parts of the House leadership.

⁵ These are “Whips' Effectiveness Tested on Close 1961 House Votes,” Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report #24 (June 16, 1961), pp. 992–998Google Scholar; and Steinberg, Alfred, “Shepherds of Capitol Hill,” Nation's Business, Jan., 1952, pp. 31–33Google Scholar. The first article presents roll call data and infers “effectiveness” from them; but no direct link between the data and the whips is established. The second is a popular treatment of the role and importance of the whips.

A short article for a small audience (University of Oklahoma alumni) but with some general interest is Albert, Carl, “Oklahoma and the Democratic Whip,” Sooner Magazine, July, 1955, pp. 18–19Google Scholar.

⁶ See Miller, Clem, Member of the House (New York, 1962), pp. 52–54Google Scholar; Alexander, DeAlva S., History and Procedure of the House of Representalives (Boston, 1916), pp. 104–106Google Scholar; Brown, George, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis, 1922), p. 222Google Scholar; Truman, , The Congressional Party, pp. 227 ff.Google Scholar; MacNeil, Neil, Forge of Democracy (New York, 1963), pp. 97–100Google Scholar; Galloway, George, History of the United States House of Representatives, H. Doc. 246, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961), pp. 102–103Google Scholar; Riddick, Floyd M., Congressional Procedure (Boston, 1941), pp. 75–77Google Scholar; and Riddick, , The United Stales Congress: Organization and Procedure (Manassas, Va., 1949), pp. 101–102Google Scholar.

⁷ Clark, Champ, My Quarter Century of American Politics (New York, 1920), vol. 2, p. 337Google Scholar.

⁸ The name “whip” derives from the British fox-hunting term “whipper-in,” used to describe the man responsible for keeping the hounds from leaving the pack. It was first applied to the British Parliament about 1770. For a description of the British whips see Young, Roland, The British Parliament (London, 1962), pp. 75–77Google Scholar; also Alexander, Eric, Chilston, Viscount, Chief Whip (London, 1961)Google Scholar.

For a brief description of the whip in the United States Senate see a speech by J. Hamilton Lewis, long-time Democratic Senate whip, Congressional Record, Vol. 80, pt. 7, pp. 7044–7046 (1936)Google Scholar.

⁹ See MacNeil, op. cit., pp. 97–100; and Alexander, op. cit., p. 104. See also Barry, David S., Forty Years in Washington (Boston, 1924), pp. 100 ffGoogle Scholar. for comments on one Republican whip in the late 19th Century, Omar Conger of Michigan.

¹⁰ Clark, op. cit., p. 338, says he was acting as volunteer whip as late as 1909. Important Republicans who acted as volunteer whips in the late 19th Century were Thomas Reed of Maine and James Wilson of Iowa.

¹¹ DeAlva S. Alexander, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 105, states that Watson was, in 1899 (his second term), the first whip chosen by party caucus; and he indicates that Tawney succeeded Watson. Alexander's assertion is repeated by MacNeil, p. 97; Galloway, , History, p. 102Google Scholar; Steinberg, op. cit.; and in a speech by Representative Guy Hardy of Colorado in 1928, which is cited in Cannon's, Precedents, vol. 8, p. 958 (1936)Google Scholar.

This view is mistaken. Tawney was the first whip and was succeeded by Watson in 1905; see the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1905, 3:2; the Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1905, 2:2 and Dec. 13, 1905, 4:6; Taylor, Edward T., A History of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, H. Doc. 299, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), p. 51Google Scholar; and Thompson, Charles W., Party Leaders of the Time (New York, 1906), pp. 153, 195Google Scholar.

The exact date of Tawney's appointment as whip is as obscure as his method of appointment. Taylor, loc. cit., gives the date as 1897 and says that Speaker Reed made the choice. Thompson, op. cit., refers to Tawney as being whip in 1902, although he does not indicate how long he had then been so. Before 1920 the documentation for the identity of party whips was almost non-existent. I have therefore given footnote references identifying the whips before that date.

¹² Hechler, Kenneth W., Insurgency (New York, 1940), p. 70Google Scholar.

¹³ See MacNeil and Alexander; also the New York Times, Jan. 20, 1928, and the Washington Star, March 14, 1909, 1:8Google Scholar; March 22, 1909 1:5; and April 4, 1911, 4:2.

¹⁴ Cannon's, Precedents, vol. 8, p. 961Google Scholar.

¹⁵ In 1919 the old-guard Republicans dominated the Party Conference, to the dismay of more progressive members. Fights over many issues, including the choice of the new whip, occurred in the Conference. See the New York Times, March 12, 1919, 1:4Google Scholar. Knutson, the winner, received 118 votes out of 182 cast.

¹⁶ The only reference to Burke as whip I could find was on the floor plan of the Capitol in the Congressional Directory for the 63d Congress. For Hamilton see the Washington Star, April 1, 1917, 1:2Google Scholar. Hamilton also returned a form to the office of the Biographical Directory of Congress in 1928 in which he indicated that he was the Republican whip in the 64th and 65th Congresses. Knutson listed his tenure as whip as the 66th and 67th Congresses, on a similar form. Vestal became whip in 1923, not in 1925 as the Biographical Directory states. The files of the Biographical Directory indicate that his service as whip began in 1923; so does his obituary in the Anderson (Ind.) Daily Bulletin, April 2, 1932.

¹⁷ See the Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1900, 4:5Google Scholar; and the New York Times, Jan. 10, 1900, 1:6Google Scholar. Sydney P. Epes of Virginia, who died two months later, was named assistant whip.

¹⁸ Lloyd's service as whip is mentioned in the following places: Congressional Record, vol. 90, pt. 3, p. 3420 (1944)Google Scholar; the Hannibal (Mo.) Courier-Post, April 4, 1944; and the Canton (Mo.) Press-News, April 4 (?), 1944. Watson, James E., in his memoirs, As I Knew Them (Indianapolis, 1936), p. 295Google Scholar, mentions Claude Swanson of Virginia as a Democratic whip. I have found no other substantiation for this, however. Lloyd was the designated Democratic whip during the entire time Watson was the Republican whip. I wish to thank Professor Clarence Berdahl for bringing Lloyd's service to my notice. See Berdahl's articles, “Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress,” this Review, Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 309–321, 492–508, 721–734Google Scholar, for a treatment of many important facets of party history.

¹⁹ The Congressional Directory floor plan of the Capitol for the 63d Congress shows Bell as whip. His obituary in the March 20, 1941, Gainesville (Ga.) News speaks of him as Democratic whip “for a term or two.” Berdahl thinks that Bell was whip from 1909 until 1919; I have not been able to substantiate this. Timmons, Bascom N., in his Garner of Texas (New York, 1948), pp. 59–60, 61, 64, 74Google Scholar, indicates that John N. Garner was Democratic whip, probably during the 1909–1913 period. I have been unable to find other evidence for this.

²⁰ This expectation was not a guarantee, however. In 1962 all of the leaders advanced one place after the death of Speaker Rayburn. This provides some precedent but does not establish a pattern. For evidence that Albert's tenure as whip helped lead to his election as Majority Leader see Polsby, in Peabody and Polsby, op. cit., pp. 246–247. It is customary, especially on the Democratic side, for the floor leader to become Speaker when that office falls vacant.

²¹ This statement is based on the floor plans of the Capitol in the Congressional Directory for each session. The record may be somewhat incomplete.

²² This information comes from a perusal of the Legislative Appropriations Acts in the U. S. Statutes-at-Large. The title “whip” was first used in the 1913 legislation.

²³ When the Republicans captured the House in the 1952 elections John McCormack was slated to move from Majority Leader to minority whip. He asked Speaker Martin, Majority Leader Halleck, and Minority Leader Rayburn if he might keep one of his long-time employees as Administrative Assistant. He and the Republican whip, Les Arends, then agreed that they both would have Administrative Assistants.

²⁴ The value of the party whip organizations was widely enough recognized in the House by the late 1950s for a portion of the Democratic membership to imitate the political parties and establish a third whip organization. In 1957 a loose alliance of liberal Democrats was formed in the House under the leadership of Representative Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota. This group immediately established a whip organization, which functioned at least sporadically. In 1959 both the Democratic Study Group and its whip organization were formally established. The Secretary of the DSG also serves as its whip.

²⁵ See the speech by Majority Floor Leader Tilson, John Q. of Connecticut, Cong. Rec., vol. 69, pt. 2, p. 1757 (1928)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Letter from Carl G. Bachmann to the author, August 15, 1963.

²⁷ In 1949 Halleck expected Martin to appoint him Deputy Minority Leader and so did not desire to be whip. In 1955 Halleck saw no need to disturb the 11-year tenure of Arends as whip merely for the sake of a title.

²⁸ Letter from Clarence Cannon to the author, September 23, 1963; Cannon's, Precedents, vol. 8, pp. 961–962 (1936)Google Scholar; and Herring, E. Pendleton, “First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress,” this Review, Vol. 28 (Feb., 1934), p. 69Google Scholar.

²⁹ See the statement by McCormack, John after Boland's death, Cong. Rec., vol. 88, pt. 3, p. 4318, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942)Google Scholar. See also the Washington Star, August 18, 1935, D-2:6Google Scholar and June 4, 1936, A-10:l; the Washington Post, August 25, 1935, III-3:2Google Scholar; and the Scranton Times, May 18, 1942.

³⁰ The post of deputy whip as a formal leadership position was created in 1955 for Hale Boggs of Louisiana, the present whip. John Moss of California became deputy whip in 1962. Boland had a “principal assistant” or “chief assistant” whip, Thomas Ford of California. See the Washington Star, August 18, 1935, D-2:6Google Scholar, and Cong. Rec., vol. 88, pt. 3, p. 4320, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942)Google Scholar.

³¹ Boland apparently appointed his own assistant whips. In 1939 he threatened to “fire” some of them for disloyalty to the President's program. New York Times, August 22, 1939, 20:3Google Scholar.

The assistant whips may develop some independent weight in their state delegations. See the chapter by Alan Fiellin in Peabody and Polsby, op. cit., p. 70.

³² In the Democratic Study Group the Secretary and whip since its founding has been Frank Thompson of New Jersey. He was elected initially and has continued to be re-elected every two years by the full membership of the DSG, which totalled 126 in 1963. He has appointed four regional whips, each of whom has either four or five regional subwhips reporting to him. The subwhips are responsible for calling from four to six other DSG members.

The DSG whip organization takes no polls on legislation, since the group was formed on the basis of ideological congeniality. The organization distributes information on pending legislation and works for maximum attendance, particularly on teller votes on amendments in Committee of the Whole.

³³ One primary fact determined the time span here studied—the availability of files.

³⁴ This is not to suggest that Albert was not important as whip. Rayburn consulted him, but the whip organization as a whole was used less than in 1962–1963. It should be noted that when Albert became whip he replaced Percy Priest, who decided not to continue as whip in 1955 because he had become Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Cong. Rec., Vol. 101, pt. 1, pp. 191–192 (1955)Google Scholar.

³⁵ An unusual instance of this occurred in the drive for adjournment in October, 1962, when the leadership was having difficulty in keeping a quorum in Washington. The whip's office called or sent telegrams to all missing Democrats from east of the Mississippi at their homes, asking them to return. A similar situation, even more acute, developed in 1963 after President Kennedy's assassination, as the House struggled until Christmas eve to pass a foreign aid appropriations bill acceptable to President Johnson.

³⁶ For the 87th Congress Congressional Quarterly reports that Boggs had a 73 per cent and Moss a 91 per cent Kennedy Support Score.

³⁷ See footnote 40, infra, for a listing of the votes chosen.

³⁸ This evidence that assistant whips were more loyal (hence, more liberal) should be compared with Duncan MacRae's suggestion that elected party leaders tend to take middle-of-the-road positions on issues. MacRae, , Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958)Google Scholar, ch. 4.

The Congressional Quarterly study of the whips, op. cit., p. 994, concludes that in terms of Democratic party support for the first half of the 1961 session “The performance of the whips was matched roughly by that of the membership as whole …” Truman, David, The Congressional Party, p. 227Google Scholar, attributes some of the influence of the principal whips in the House to “their individual positions in the voting structure of the party.” Matthews, Donald, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill, 1960)Google Scholar, suggests that the Senate whips tend to fall off in party-line voting.

³⁹ The Republicans, starting with a base of greater party agreement on issues, look on their assistant whips as definite agents of the leadership. The method of appointment for Republican assistant whips—by the chief whip himself—insures some accountability to the leadership. On the Democratic side Boggs obviously cannot assume that the assistant whip appointed by Howard Smith will be an avid Administration supporter.

Boggs summarized the job of assistant whip in a telegram to the Shreveport (La.) Times in the fall of 1963: “The assistant whips keep members in their zones informed as to which bills will be scheduled for a vote and when. On a request from the House leadership, they ascertain how each member in their zone will vote on a specific measure, and report the results to the leadership. When important bills are being considered by the House, they try to make sure that the members from their zone are present for key votes. The assistant whips are responsible solely to their party colleagues in their zones. The executive branch has absolutely no voice in either selecting or removing assistant whips.”

⁴⁰ The specific issues in 1962 were: (1) final passage of the resolution disapproving the reorganization plan which would have created an Urban Affairs Department, (2) final passage of the 1962 Revenue Act, (3) final passage of an increase in the national debt limit, (4) recommittal motion on the feed-grains section of the farm bill, (5) recommittal motion substituting a one-year extension of reciprocal trade for the Trade Expansion Act, (6) recommittal motion on the accelerated public works bill, and (7) final passage of the bill authorizing the President to purchase U. N. bonds.

The specific issues in 1963 were: (1) adoption of the resolution permanently enlarging the Rules Committee, (2) passage of an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill adding $450 million to the accelerated public works program, (3) recommittal motion deleting medical student loan provisions from the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act, (4) final passage of an increase in the national debt limit, (5) final passage of a bill authorizing a voluntary feed-grains acreage diversion program for 1964–1965, (6) final passage of Area Redevelopment Act amendments, (7) final passage of a second debt-limit extension, (8) recommittal motion on the tax bill making a tax cut dependent on reduced governmental spending, (9) final passage of a third debt-limit extension, and (10) final passage of the cotton bill.

The recommittal motion on the 1963 tax bill did not fully meet the stated criteria, because part of the poll on the recommittal motion was taken through the Democratic members of the Commitee on Ways and Means. The 15 zones used by these men when acting as the Democratic Committee on Committees were also employed in this poll and the results were channeled first to Chairman Mills and then to the whip's office. Aside from this significant deviation, however—a display of Mills's independent power—the whip's office performed its normal functions during this struggle. Since the bill was one of the most important to the Administration and the House leadership in 1963, an accurate picture of the whip system could hardly be given without including it here.

A few examples in the text will come from whip operations on bills other than the 17 listed above.

⁴¹ The three lost were Urban Affairs and the farm bill in 1962 and the Area Redevelopment Act amendments in 1963. The phrase “close margin” means roll calls on which a change of 25 votes or less would alter the result. Urban Affairs, the recommittal motion on the trade bill, and U. N. bonds were not “close” in 1962. Only the medical student loan provisions was not “close” in 1963. Nine of the 17 voting results could have been changed by a shift of 15 or fewer votes.

⁴² The Majority Manager of Telephones on the floor also instructs his operators to call each member's office when a vote is near but the operators do not specify what is at issue.

⁴³ The Congressional Quarterly study of the first half of 1961, op. cit., pp. 993–994, documents the high voting turnout in that session and suggests the whip organizations might be part of the cause.

⁴⁴ The assistant whips had attendance records much like those of all Democrats on all roll calls, but on the 17 key votes they did somewhat better than the rank and file. In 1962 the assistant whips voted 83.4 per cent of the time on all roll calls and 84.7 per cent in 1963. But on the 17 key votes their voting attendance rose to 96 per cent.

⁴⁵ The Democratic whip's office also relays to the leadership whatever information it receives about Republican voting probabilities. Such information may come from lobbyists, Executive officials, or personal contacts between Democratic and Republican members. The Republican and Democratic whips' offices do not, of course, trade information.

Information on Republican voting tends to be quite unreliable when it reaches the Democratic whip's office. For example, during the debt-limit fight in May, 1963, it was supposed that at least eight to 10 Republicans would vote for the increase. Only one did. When the Administration lost the Area Redevelopment bill in June, 1963, the whip's office had received information that 21 Republicans would vote for the bill. Only 15 did. During the 1963 struggle over enlarging the Rules Committee six Republicans who finally voted with the Democratic leadership had been written off as lost to Halleck and Judge Smith.

⁴⁶ There are several reasons for a member's making an inaccurate report of his position. He might want to avoid leadership pressure by not alerting anyone to his opposition. He might be annoyed at the inconvenience of repeatedly reporting his position. Finally, he might use the report of opposition as a bargaining device. For example, on the poll on the debt limit increase in May, 1963, a loyal Administration supporter from the midwest reported “doubtful” and, at the same time, indicated his eagerness for final Treasury confirmation that a new Internal Revenue Service installation would be located in his district.

⁴⁷ Conceivably, some inferences might be drawn from a comparison of the winning percentage on roll calls used by Congressional Quarterly in computing its Presidential Support Index with the Administration's record of success on the key votes analyzed here. The question could be put whether the President won a greater percentage of the time when the Democratic whip organization was fully engaged in the battle. On the 17 key votes the President won 14 times—82 per cent support—as against an overall 85 per cent winning record (on 60 roll calls) in 1962. From this it might be argued that the whip organization made no material difference, since the winning percentages are about the same. But it might also be argued that since the roll calls used here represent the “toughest” of the more numerous roll calls chosen by Congressional Quarterly the winning percentage is higher than could be expected without concentrated whip activity.

⁴⁸ Three of the 13 voted with the leadership even though they were not ultimately needed. The other 10 voted nay but remained on the floor after voting, ready to change their votes if necessary.

⁴⁹ Seven of these 10, largely at the urging of Mills, voted aye even though not needed. Mills was anxious to have a respectably large margin of victory. He was trying to set a precedent for November, when another debt limit increase would be necessary.

⁵⁰ Truman, “The State Delegations …,” op. cit., p. 1045.

⁵¹ Turner, op. cit., p. 23.

⁵² Truman, , The Congressional Party, p. 245Google Scholar.

⁵³ Truman's reference to “the ambiguity surrounding the term ‘the leadership’” (ibid., p. 282) is also to the point here. “The leadership” is a fairly precise term when used in connection with a specific piece of legislation. It always includes the Speaker, Majority Leader, whip, and Committee Chairman. It may include the deputy whip, a Subcommittee Chairman, or a senior Committee member who is going to act as floor manager of the bill.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 285.

⁵⁵ Bauer, Raymond, Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Dexter, Lewis A., American Business and Public Policy (New York, 1963), p. 466Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Truman, , The Congressional Party, p. 278Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ See ibid., ch. 8.

⁵⁸ On implicit bargaining see Froman, Lewis A. Jr., People and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp. 55–56Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Again this coincides with the findings of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, op. cit. The importance of information is highlighted by Clapp, Charles, The Congressman (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1963)Google Scholar. He reports, p. 302, that criticism of both party whip organizations by House members centers “around the failure to perform the informing function.” Lewis Anthony Dexter, in Peabody and Polsby, op. cit., pp. 312 ff., discusses “the tyranny of information” in another context.

⁶⁰ See the forthcoming book by Charles Jones on the House Republican Policy Committee.

⁶¹ The voting records of the 1963 Republican and Democratic assistant whips over the previous two years indicate that each party organization had a similar number of “mavericks.” Five Democratic assistant whips had a mean Larger Federal Role Support Score 22.6% lower than the mean Support Score of all 16 assistant whips who had been members of the 87th Congress. Five Republican regional and assistant whips had a mean Larger Federal Role Support Score 23% higher than the mean Support Score of all 14 regional and assistant whips who had been members of the 87th Congress. The Support Scores for individual members come from Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1962.

Both the Republican and Democratic assistant whips had served, on the average, slightly more than nine years in the House by the end of 1963.

⁶² Bone, Hugh, American Politics and the Party System (New York, 1955), p. 597Google Scholar.