¹ See Lemarchand, René & Legg, Keith, “Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (01. 1972), 149–178 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² A notable exception is William J. Foltz, “Social Structure and Political Behavior of Senegalese Elites.” Yale Papers in Political Science No. 33; see also Whitaker's, C. S. illuminating discussion of “clientage” phenomena in Northern Nigeria in The Politics of Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 373–375 Google Scholar. Nor is this neglect typical of political scientists alone, as can readily be inferred from a content analysis of a recent issue of the Canadian Journal of African Studies 1 (Winter, 1969)Google Scholar devoted to “Rural Africa:” Clientelism is conspicuously absent from the list of research priorities assigned to various cross-disciplinary subfields (Political Anthropology, Local Politics and Development Administration, Agricultural Economics, Rural Sociology and Communications, and Rural Geography).

³ Even where the evidence suggests the presence of clientelistic networks, these may in fact be so fluid and unstable as to defy analysis. Especially pertinent in this connection is Professor Young's query (in a personal communication): “Clientelism (in the Congo) is certainly crucial, but how can one deal with it when all is fluidity, when the networks are far more ephemeral, when mutual costs and benefits of maintenance of particular patron-client sets are apparently recalculated very frequently, and on the basis of very shortrun contingencies?” In such a spasmodic environment the analysis of clientelism is evidently a far more risky endeavor than in settings where client-patron relationships are more clearly institutionalized and offer a basis for relatively stable interactions among actors. If for no other reason, our analysis is restricted to the latter type of situation, as illustrated by Senegal, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Northern Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia. Among other states that might fit into this category but which are not specifically dealt with in this paper one might mention the Sudan, Chad, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Sierra Leone and Mauretania.

⁴ Lemarchand & Legg.

⁵ The case for ethnicity as a source of national integration is stated in Wallerstein, Immanuel, “Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa,” Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 1 (10, 1960), 129–139 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; using “tribalism” in a very different sense from that which Wallerstein ascribes to the term, Sklar, Richard makes a similar case in “The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in Western Nigeria,” Journal of Human Relations, 8 (Spring-Summer, 1960), 407–415 Google Scholar. Unless otherwise specified, our use of the term ethnicity incorporates Wallerstein's notions of “tribe” (a reference group defined by its loyalty to a tribal government, in a rural setting) and “ethnicity” (denoting loyalty to a community detached from its traditional government, in an urban setting). Our assumption here is that the boundaries of ethnicity are inevitably self-ascriptive, regardless of the setting—a point persuasively argued by Mercier, Paul, (“On the Meaning of Tribalism in Black Africa”) in der Berghe, P. Van, ed., Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 483–501 Google Scholar.

⁶ See Zolberg, Aristide, “Ethnicity and National Integration,” a paper prepared for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Bloomington, Indiana, p. 2 Google Scholar.

⁷ Wallerstein.

⁸ Smith, Michael G., Government in Zazzau (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 260 Google Scholar.

⁹ Gallais, Jean, “Signification du Groupe Ethnique au Mali,” L'Homme 2 (05–08 1962), p. 122 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ The term “super-tribalization.” suggested by Rouch, Jean in “Migrations au Ghana,” Journal de la Société des Africanistes 26, Nos. 1–2 (1956), 163–164 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, has more restrictive implications than Wallerstein's use of the concept of ethnicity as it suggests common cultural affinites between the group from which an individual is detached and that in which he is incorporated. For Wallerstein, ethnicity does not presuppose preexisting cultural bonds. Regardless of this distinction, the process to which these terms refer occurs on a far wider scale than that involved in ethnic mutation through the identification of a client with his patron; one might say that the latter is an individual mutation and the former a collective one usually taking place within the context of ethnic associations.

¹¹ Fraenkel, Merran, Tribe and Class in Monrovia (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 187 Google Scholar.

¹² The expression is borrowed from Whitaker, C. S., Politics of Tradition, p. 373 Google Scholar.

¹³ Nadel, Siegfried F., A Black Byzantium (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 123 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Whitaker, p. 374.

¹⁵ Foltz, , “Social Structure and Political Behavior …,” p. 153 Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Weiner, Myron, “Political Integration and Political Development,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (03, 1965)Google Scholar. 53. The distinctions drawn in this paragraph lean heavily on Weiner's classification. For a somewhat different approach, see Paden, John N., “Conceptual Dimensions of National Integration Theory, with Special Reference to Inter-Ethnic (Horizontal) Integration,” Internal Working Paper No. 2, Instability/Integration Project, Council for Intersocietal Studies, Northwestern University (01, 1968)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Nadel, , Black Byzantium, p. 126 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Gluckman, Max. Custom and Conflict in Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), pp. 45–47 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ For a further elaboration of this definition, see Balandier, Georges, “Les Relations de Dépendence Personnelle: Présentation du Thème,” in Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 9, 35 (1969), 345–349 Google Scholar.

²⁰ Cited in Gerth, Hans H. and Mills, C. Wright, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 297 Google Scholar.

²¹ Mair, Lucy, Primitive Government (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 153 Google Scholar.

²² Cohen, Ronald, “The Dynamics of Feudalism in Bornu,” Boston University Papers on Africa, Vol. II (Boston: Boston University Press, 1966), p. 91 Google Scholar. For further characterizations of “feudal” clientelism, see Mair, Lucy, “Clientship in East Africa,” Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 2, 6 (1961), 315–326 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steinhart, Edward I., “Vassal and Fief in Three Interlacustrine Kingdoms,” Cahier d‘Études Africaines, 7, 25 (1967), 606–624 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maquet, Jacques J., The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda (London: Oxford University Press, 1961)Google Scholar.

²³ Nadel, S. F., Black Byzantium, p. 126 Google Scholar.

²⁴ For Fallers and Lombard, a feudal relationship can only obtain among equals (i.e., among nobles); a clientele relationship, on the other hand, establishes reciprocities between nobles and commoners. See Fallers, Lloyd A., Bantu Bureaucracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1956)Google Scholar, and Lombard, Jacques, “La Vie Politique dans une ancienne société de type féodal: Les Bariba du Dahomey,” Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 1, 3 (1960), 5–45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ On the sociopolitical role of the diula in contemporary Bamako, see Meillassoux, Claude, Urbanization of an African Community (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1968)Google Scholar, and his article on “The Social Structure of Modern Bamako,” in Africa, 35, 2 (1965), 125–142 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Diop, Majhemout, Histoire des classes sociales dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Paris: 1971), pp. 148–152 Google Scholar. For an excellent account of the mai gida-dillali relationship in contemporary West Africa, see Hill, Polly, “Landlords and Brokers: A West African Trading System,” Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 6, 23 (1966), 349–367 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and her “Markets in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1, 4 (1963), 441–455 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. See also, Dorjahn, V. R. and Fyfe, C., “Landlord and Stranger: Change in Tenancy Relations in Sierra Leone,” Journal of African History, 3, 3 (1962), 391–399 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Perhaps the most illuminating discussion of this type of clientelism, from the standpoint of the political scientist, is Cohen, Abner, “The Social Organization of Credit in a West African Cattle Market,” Africa, 35, 1 (1965), 8–20 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an interesting discussion of the role of the diatigi in traditional African society, see in particular the contributions of Boutiller, J. L. and Amselle, J. L. in Meillassoux, C., ed., The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa (Oxford: 1971), pp 240–252, 253–265 Google Scholar.

²⁶ For a detailed analysis of the sociopolitical role of the Mouride brotherhoods of Senegal, see O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise, The Murids of Senegal: The Socio-Economic Structure of an Islamic Order (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1969)Google Scholar. See also Behrman, Lucy, “The Political Influence of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal” (unpublished ms.), and “The Political Significance of the Wolof Adherence to Muslim Brotherhoods in the 19th Century,” in African Historical Studies 1 (1968), pp. 60–78 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a broader perspective, see Trimingham, J. Spencer, The Influence of Islam upon Africa (New York: Praeger, 1968)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Under what conditions a particular form of clientelism brings another into being is a question that lies beyond the scope of this paper. What seems clear, however, is that there is no logical relationship between forms of government and types of clientelism (except where governmental and clientelistic structure merely duplicate each other, as in the case of patrimonialism). If there is any common denominator to these forms of clientelism, it is to be found, in Ronald Cohen's words, “in conditions of personal insecurity, a lack of widespread use of payment for specific purposes, lack of adequate social control outside such (clientelistic) relationships, and the inability of the kinship units to perform all the required and desired services for individuals.” See Cohen, , “The Dynamics of Feudalism in Bornu,” p. 91 Google Scholar. Given our ignorance, the most that can be said at this point is that the emergence of mercantile clientelism, as a historical phenomenon, has been dependent upon, as well as limited by, the growth of centralized state structures; conversely, the expansion of state structures has itself been conditioned by the economic and political resources made available through the development of regional trade circuits. For further evidence on this point, see Vansina, J., “Long-distance Trade Routes in Central Africa,” Journal of African History, 3, 3 (1962), 375–388 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ The brokerage function traditionally performed by the diatigi is described by Charles Monteil in the following terms: “Dans les centres soudanais les étrangers sont parqués dans un quartier spécial. Les simples passagers doivent se présenter au chef de la localité et ce chef leur assigne un hôte ou diatigi (“le maître de Vetranger”). Cet hôte est, à proprement parler, le répondant de l'étranger et celui-ci ne doit agir que par son intermédiaire…. Souvent par leur nombre et leur richesse, non moins que par l'importance du personnel qu'ils emploient, les étrangers sont assez puissants pour jouir d'une indépendence relative, moyennant paiement de redevances. Voire même ils arrivent à constituer un état dans l'état, et dominer les pouvoirs locaux.” Monteil, Charles, “Les Empires du Mali,” Bulletin du Comité d'Etudet Historiques et Scientifiques de l'AOF, 12, 3–4 (1929), 326 Google Scholar. See also Dubois, Felix, Tombouctou la mystérieuse (Paris, 1897), p. 295 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ A further qualifier is that the above typology only deals with highly institutionalized forms of clientelism and thus excludes societies in which clientelism, though never firmly institutionalized, did in fact play a major role in the definition of traditional power relationships. Traditional Ibo society is a case in point:

“As in the urban communities of Boston, New Haven, and New York, political survival in an Ibo community hinged fundamentally on the leader's ability to mould and maintain a personal following…. In the Ibo context, as in the American, the politician acted as a broker of conflicting interests and personalities and as a provider of personal favors. His political success, in short, was a function both of his ability to resolve disputes and his generosity.” ( Wolpe, Howard E., “Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 7 [1969], 475.CrossRefGoogle Scholar)

Such noninstitutionalized forms of clientelism are obviously relevant to our discussion; their omission from our typology is only justified by the lack of relevant anthropological and historical data and the consequent difficulties involved in the task of classification and comparison.

³⁰ The basic theoretical work on this theme is Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967)Google Scholar. The relevance of Blau's insights to an understanding of traditional African political structures is suggested by Polanyi's description of reciprocity patterns in precolonial Dahomey; see Polanyi, Karl, Dahomey and the Slave Trade: An Analysis of an Archaic Economy (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1966), especially pp. 33–95 Google Scholar.

³¹ Gouldner, Alvin W., “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,” American Sociological Review, 15 (1960), 175 Google Scholar.

³² Foltz, “Social Structure & Political Behavior of Senegalese Elites.”

³³ See Vidal, Claudine, “Le Rwanda des Anthropologues ou le Fétichisme de la Vache,” Cahiers d'études Africaines, 9, 35 (1969), 384–401 Google Scholar.

³⁴ Cohen, Abner, “The Social Organization of Credit…,” p. 12 Google Scholar.

³⁵ A very similar process appears to have taken place in Northern Nigeria; see, for example, Smith, M. G., Government in Zazzau, pp. 6–8 Google Scholar.

³⁶ See Lemarchand, René, Rwanda and Burundi (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1970)Google Scholar, and “Les relations de clientèle comme agent de contestation: Le cas du Rwanda,” Civilisations, 18, 4 (1968), 553–573 Google Scholar; see also Person, Yves, Samori: Une Résolution Diula, Mémoires de l'IFAN, No. 80 (Dakar, 1968)Google Scholar; for another historical example of the same phenomenon, see Sy, Moussa Oumar, “Le Dahomey: Le Coup d'Etat de 1818,” Folia Orientalia, 6 (1965), 205–238 Google Scholar.

³⁷ The expression, borrowed from Mannoni, Dominique O., Psychologie de la Colonisation (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1950)Google Scholar, carries unfortunate connotations as it suggests a cultural “hang up” of some sort or another, evenly distributed among all Africans, regardless of rank or status. I substantially agree with Professor Uphoff's objection (in a personal communication), to the effect that one is here dealing not so much with a “dependency complex” as with “more or less fruitful role relationships” (resource-exchange relationships) which a person having few resources seeks to establish. Creating a client-patron relationship is often the most fruitful. Has anybody found a “dependency complex” in a wealthy market-woman, or a powerful chief, or even a clan head? I suggest that what Europeans have observed is a function of power (or powerlessness) rather than of “Africanness.” What should be emphasized here is the persistence of certain psychological orientations to politics, which often tend to outlive the specific power relationships from which they originally stemmed. Externalization of the superego, leading to its identification with an outside authority or “patron” figure, is certainly a key characteristic of clientelistic orientations, a point persuasively argued by Scott, James in Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 80 ffGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of the affective component which enters into the patron-client nexus, see Cohen, Abner, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 91 Google Scholar.

³⁸ See Dominique O. Mannoni, Psychologie de la Colonisation; for further insights into the influence of the colonial framework upon the behavior and orientation of indigenous actors see Nettl, J. P. and Robertson, Roland, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies (New York: Basic Books, 1968), esp. pp. 63–127 Google Scholar. The notion of “inheritance situation” discussed by the authors provides a useful analytic framework for an understanding of the persistence of clientelistic norms after independence; see in particular their discussion of “Benefactor and Beneficiary as Their Reference Groups,” pp. 72–81. Their analysis of the process of the “role-taking of the benefactor by the beneficiary” evokes some of the familiar dimensions explored by Mannoni in the work cited above.

³⁹ Cohen, Ronald, “Research Directions in Political Anthropology,” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 3, 1 (1969), p. 27 Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ In Bornu, according to Cohen, “patron-client relationships continue to be of great importance … and people still utilize their associations with important superiors in the emirate, not the Nigerian, social system”—a statement that might also apply, mutatis mutandis, to contemporary Rwanda society within the context of an all-Hutu social system, and to Burundi within what threatens to become an all-Tutsi social system. (The above quotation is from Ronald Cohen's comments (p. 105) on Colson's, Elizabeth article, “Competence and Incompetence in the context of Independence,” Current Anthropology, 8, 1–2 (1967), 92–100 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of the transformations that have affected the operation of patronclient ties in contemporary Rwanda, see Lemarchand, René, “Political Instability in Africa: The Case of Rwanda and Burundi,” Civilisations 16, 3 (1966), 319 Google Scholar, and Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi.

⁴¹ From Alexandra's comments on Colson's article, p. 100.

⁴² Behrman, “The Political Influence of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal.”

⁴³ Meillassoux, Claude, Anthropologie Economique des Gouro de Côte d'Ivoire (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964)Google Scholar, and “The Gouro-Peripheral Markets between the Forest and the Sudan,” in Bohannan, Paul and Dalton, George, eds., Markets in Africa (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 67–92 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Bohannan and Dalton, p. 86.

⁴⁵ Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs? (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 226, 227 Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Colson, “Competence and Incompetence in the Context of Independence.”

⁴⁷ See Scott, James C., “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” American Political Science Review, 63, 4 (1969), 1142–1158 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ Whitaker, C. S., The Politics of Tradition, p. 375 Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ The distinction between first and second order resources is drawn from Jeremy Boissevain, “Patrons and Brokers,” (unpublished ms.). According to Boissevain a broker differs from a patron in that the former has control over second resources (i.e., contacts and connections) and the latter over first order resources; although the distinction between types of resources holds important implications in the context of colonial and independent Africa, it has relatively little utility for distinguishing between patrons and brokers. A more useful discussion of brokerage functions will be found in Swartz, Marc J., “The Political Middleman,” in Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives, ed. Swartz, Marc J. (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 199–204 Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Boissevain, “Patrons and Brokers.”

⁵¹ One might, for example, compare the different ways in which recruitment and patronage have affected the fortunes of the NCNC and the NPC in Nigeria. As Wolpe's study of Port Harcourt politics so plainly indicates, the growth of the NCNC has tended to reflect “profound alterations in the structures and criteria of political recruitment.” With the opening of new resources at each stage of the NCNC's historical development, a new category of elites emerged, displacing the old, and assuring that wealth and numbers became the most significant political resources. At this stage “the wealthy businessmen and traders became party ‘patrons,’ the petty traders and contractors, party workers (or town councillors)…. Simultaneously, the proportion of administrators and clerical functionaries on the one hand, and of professionals, educators and journalists, on the other, declined” ( Wolpe, , “Port Harcourt…” pp. 482–483 Google Scholar). In the case of the NPC, by contrast, control over the party apparatus remained firmly in the hands of the emirs throughout the preindependence period and for some time thereafter; moreover, neither wealth nor numbers played a significant part in recruitment processes or patronage. Status, rather, was the key factor. Thus if the picture conveyed by Port Harcourt politics in the fifties reminds one of contemporary New Haven or New York, this could hardly be said of Kano or Zaria. In one case power belonged to what Dahl called the “ex-plebes,” in the other to the “patricians.” See Dahl, Robert, Who Governs, pp. 11–24 and pp. 32–51 Google Scholar.

⁵² The concept of transaction flow is here used to refer to the movement of commodities, persons, or messages within and between communities. See Deutsch, Karl, “Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion” in Jacob, Phillip E. & Toscano, James V., eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia & New York: Lippincott & Co., 1964), pp. 75–97 Google Scholar.

⁵³ See Dudley, B. J. O., “Traditionalism and Politics: A Case Study of Northern Nigeria,” Government and Opposition, 2, 4 (1967), 516 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ Dudley, p. 518.

⁵⁵ Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter, Political Parties in West Africa (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 171 Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Donal Cruise O'Brien, “The Murids of Senegal…”.

⁵⁷ Hodgkin, Thomas & Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter, “Mali,” in Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, Carl G., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 223 Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ These expectations were natural considering the tenor of the economic policies contemplated by the US leaders: “At its extraordinary congress of 1960, the Union Soudanaise confirmed publicly some of its leaders' long-held economic views: The party resolved to launch ‘immediately and vigorously’ a program of economic decolonization; to create a new economic structures … to develop communications, intensify agricultural production, launch new industries, stress mineral exploration….” Zolberg, Aristide, “Political Revival in Mali,” Africa Report, 10, 7 (1965), 18 Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ For an excellent discussion of Mali's socialist options under Modibo Keita, see Hazard, John N., “Marxian Socialism in Africa: The Case of Mali,” Comparative Politics, 2, 1 (1969), 1–16 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The political implications of Mali's decisions to reenter the franczone, in 1967, are analyzed in Snyder, Francis, “An Era ends in Mali,” Africa Report, 14; 3, 4 (1969), 16–23 Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Forges, Alison Des, “Kings without Crowns: The White Fathers in Rwanda,” in McCall, Daniel, Bennett, Norman R., and Butler, Jeffrey, eds., Eastern African History, Boston University Papers on Africa, Vol. III (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 181 Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, p. 171 Google Scholar. Equally worth emphasizing are the patron-client relationships which in many cases prevailed between migrant Mossi workers and Ivoirien planters; these relationships help explain why the Mossi minority resident in the Ivory Coast never (at least until recently) became the source of acute intergroup tensions. According to M. Dupire, “l'attitude des immigrants Mossi envers les autochtones est faite de respect, de soumission et de crainte. Ils conservent souvent d'excellentes relations avec leurs anciens patrons, qu'ils assistent en reconnaissance des chances qu'ils leur ont offertes.” See Dupire, M., “Planteurs Autochtones et Etrangers en Basse Côte d'Ivoire,” Etudes Eburnéennes, 8 (1960), 50 Google Scholar.

⁶² Morgenthau, p. 170. This is why the CPP in Ghana never developed the characteristics of a “machine” in the sense in which the term might apply to the PDCI in the Ivory Coast. Feith's description of the CPP as a machine which “exists almost exclusively to stay in power” conveys an oversimplified view of both the CPP and machine politics and thus fails to bring out the essential differences between the CPP and the PDCI: the latter's original clientele was not made up of “verandah boys” but of rural workers; its resource base is still overwhelmingly dependent upon a plantation economy; and its “bosses” are themselves closely connected with the rural sector, most of them still owning large plantations. As of 1969, the Bureau Politique and Comité Directeur of the PDCI comprised, respectively, five and eight planters, and at least five of the members of the High Court of Justice and the State Security Court were planters. Cf. Feit, Edward, “Military Coups and Political Development: Some lessons from Ghana and Nigeria,” World Politics, 20, 2 (1968), 179–194 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ Further evidence of this phenomenon may also be found in Wolpe, , “Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm,” esp. pp. 478–485 Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Geertz, Clifford, “The Integrative Revolution,” in Geertz, Clifford, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 109 Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ I am grateful to Professor Crawford Young for forcefully reminding me of this fact.

₆₆ Smith, M. G., “Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism,” in Kuper, L. and Smith, M. G., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 56 Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ This tends to confirm the more general hypothesis developed by Dahrendorf in his theory of social conflict: The more consistent the criteria of differentiation between groups—i.e., the more they tend to define and isolate groups from each other through cumulative cleavages—the greater the likelihood of violence among them. See Dahrendorf, Ralf, Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Cohen, Abner, “The Social Organization of Credit …” pp. 16–17 Google Scholar; see also his Custom and Politics in Urban Africa.

⁶⁹ Zolberg, , “Ethnicity and National Integration,” p. 7 Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,” American Political Science Review, 63, 4 (1969), p. 1157 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷¹ Scott, p. 1158

⁷² The point is persuasively argued in Davidson, Basil, “The Outlook for Africa,” The Socialist Register 1966 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁷³ Post, Kenneth W. J., The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 58 Google Scholar, The prime example of a machine-type clientelism is offered by the NCNC, between 1955 and 1959. The political fortunes of the NCNC were heavily (if not exclusively) dependent on the direct or indirect financial support it received from Marketing Board and Eastern Region Finance Corporation, (via the African Continental Bank). See Post, p. 56–58.

⁷⁴ Kilson, Martin, Political Change in a West African State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 268 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ See Lucy Behrman, “The Political Influence of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal.”

⁷⁶ Bailey, Frederick G., Tribe, Caste and Nation: A Study of Political Activity and Political Change In Highland Orissa (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960), p. 248 Google Scholar. In contrast with the types of strategy described earlier, usually originating from the center, a “bridge-action,” in the context of this discussion, refers to the motives which cause the actors in the subsystem (whether patrons or clients) to establish a new type of relationship with another system.

⁷⁷ Foltz, “Social Structure and Political Behavior…”

⁷⁸ Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: University Press, 1967), p. 412 Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 17, 3 (1965), 393 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ Coleman, James S., “Introduction” in Coleman, James S., ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 15 Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Coleman, p. 15.

⁸² See “Tubman Asks for Opposition,” West Africa, January 3, 1970.

⁸³ Amin, Samir, Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Powell, John D., “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics.” American Political Science Review, 64 (06, 1970), 411–425 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁵ O'Brien, The Murids of Senegal ….

⁸⁶ O'Brien.

⁸⁷ Absorption of opposition elements (mainly student and trade-union leaders) through clientelistic techniques has been a standard procedure in both Senegal and the Ivory Coast; how far this technique can be used without posing a major threat to development goals remains to be seen. For further information on the sources and implications of the mouvements contestataires in each country, see Le Monde (Sélection Hebdomadaire), December 18–24, 1969.

⁸⁸ See Uphoff, Norman T., “Ghana and Economic Assistance: Impetus and Ingredients for a Theory of Political Development,” a paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 1970 Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Ilchman, Warren E. and Uphoff, Norman T., The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969)Google Scholar. Other discussions of political exchange that might interest social scientists dealing with clientelist politics, include: Heath, Anthony, “Exchange Theory,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, Part 1 (01 1971), 91–119 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Dupré, Georges and Rey, Pierre-Philippe, “Réflexions sur la pertinence d'une théorie de l'histoire des échanges,” Cahiers International de Sociologie, 46 (01.–06 1969), pp. 133–162 Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ These and other questions are tentatively dealt with in my unpublished manuscript “Political Exchange, Clientelism, and Development in Tropical Africa”, a paper presented for delivery at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1970 Google Scholar.