¹ The new policy on wage and price controls was set forth in the President's statement of August 16, 1945 and in Executive Order No. 9599, dated August 16, 1945. The President's statement read in part as follows: “The stabilization act is effective until June 30, 1946. During its continuance wage adjustments which might affect prices must continue to be subject to stabilization controls. With the ending of war production, however, there is no longer any threat of an inflationary bidding up of wage rates by competition in a short labor market. I am therefore authorizing the War Labor Board to release proposed voluntary wage increases from the necessity of approval upon condition that they will not be used in whole or in part as the basis for seeking an increase in price ceilings. Proposed wage increases requiring price relief must continue to be passed upon by the Board.” Executive Order No. 9599 specified the guiding principles to be followed by the stabilization agencies in administering this policy. See Report of the National Wage Stabilization Board (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 25.

² “In these circumstances, Leon Henderson, then director of the Office of Price Stabilization, came to the firm conclusion that the 1941 wage increases, as a matter of public policy, should not be passed along into higher steel prices. Furthermore, he concluded that the best way to avert the danger and to insure some stability of steel prices in the immediate future was to issue an order which would provide a clean-cut freeze on steel prices on the then existing level.” Cutler, Addison T., “Price Control in Steel,” in Studies in Industrial Price Control, Historical Reports on War Administration, General Publication No. 6 (Washington, D.C., 1947)Google Scholar.

³ New York Times, August 1, 1945.

⁴ “The [OPA] Administrator remained firm in his conviction that this was not the time to raise steel prices. It had, however, become necessary to take a public position on the matter. Accordingly, a short, but significant press release was issued on November 23, quoting Price Administrator Bowles to the effect that OPA finds ‘no cause at this time for a general increase in steel prices’ but promising that the situation would be reviewed promptly and carefully when the next financial returns of the steel companies were submitted after January 1, 1946.” Cutler, op. cit., p. 65.

⁵ Actually, there was more than moral support of the White House, since the Administration's wage policy clearly favored wage gains. In a statement on October 30, 1945, the President said: “While the position of different industries varies greatly, there is room in the existing price structure for business as a whole to grant increase in wage rates …. Wage increases are … imperative—to cushion the shock to our workers, to sustain adequate purchasing power and to raise the national income.” Report of the National Wage Stabilization Board, 1947, p. 27.

⁶ The breakdown in the Administration's postwar wage-price policy came in three stages. The first was the February 14 intervention in the steel case, which was followed by parallel wage and price adjustments throughout manufacturing industries. The second was the temporary suspension of controls in July, following the failure of Congress to renew controls at the expiration of the old Price Control Act on June 30. When the new controls act became effective July 26, 1946 it was weaker than its predecessor, but meanwhile the period of rapid open inflation had started. The third stage was the President's announcement of the supension of price ceilings on nearly all commodities November 9, 1946. At the same time, wage and salary controls were formally terminated. This third step was some-what like locking the barn after the horse got out, since meat controls had been suspended a month earlier, resulting in widespread price increases, and the congressional elections of the week preceding November 9 had elected a Republican majority in the 80th Congress—bent on redressing the balance of labor's influence over the nation's economy.

⁷ See letters of Senator O'Mahoney, in New York Times, July 30, 1948, p. 16Google Scholar, and August 14, 1948, p. 12; statement of Senator McGrath, , New York Times, July 29, 1948, p. 13Google Scholar; Representative Spruce, New York Times, August 3, p. 1; and President Truman's remarks on steel prices, New York Times, January 28, 1949, p. 25Google Scholar.

⁸ “Charges were even made that the Taft-Hartley Law had been written before the termination of committee hearings in the House, where it was introduced in April, 1947. It was also charged that the House version of the bill was ‘written with the help of’ prominent employer and industry spokesmen. Such allegations were made from the first days of the debate and continued even after the final conference measure was passed over the President's veto …. It was said also that, no matter what one could say about who wrote it, comparison of the bill with the 1946 legislative proposals of the NAM showed amazing similarities.” Millis, Harry A. and Brown, Emily Clark, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations (Chicago, 1950), p. 370Google Scholar.

⁹ Ironically, on June 28, seventeen days before the date of the threatened strike, the Administration's bill to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act was defeated in the Senate, on an amendment dealing with the President's powers to cope with emergency disputes. The Administration's bill (S.249, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.) provided a procedure much like that of the Railway Labor Act, with a fact-finding board with power to make recommendations, and no injunction on the union. An assault of amendments to this bill finally left it with only its first paragraphs, the Taft-Hartley Act having been amended into it completely. It was never brought to vote because of the certainty of a presidential veto. Congressional Record, Vol. 95, June 28, 1949Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The New York Times reported a letter made public by Earl Bunting, NAM Managing Director, sent to 15,000 NAM members, saying that he and other “officers and staff” of the NAM “regretted that steel management had agreed to take part in the panel hearings.” Several of the steel executives appearing before the Presidential Fact-Finding Board in New York City attacked the Board as politically inspired, or flatly challenged the legality of the Board on the ground that the Taft-Hartley Act was designed by Congress for handling emergency disputes. See statement of Clarence Randall, President of Inland Steel Company, New York Times, August 12, 1949, and statement of Arthur B. Homer, President of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, New York Times, August 17, 1945.

¹¹ At a press conference on October 27, 1949, after the steel strike had been in progress for over three weeks, Mr. Truman was reported to have said: “A national emergency in coal and steel is a long way off.” The New York Times reported that “he was firm and emphatic in his views in his news conference that he would not use the Taft-Hartley Law's emergency dispute provisions unless and until there was an emergency.” New York Times, October 28, 1949.

¹² The President's Fact-Finding Board had recommended a non-contributory pension plan costing about 6C per hour, and a non-contributory social insurance plan costing about 4ȼ per hour. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation settled with the union on a pension plan, non-contributory, costing about 7C per hour, and a social insurance plan costing about 5C per hour, shared equally by employer and employees.

¹³ Senator Joseph O'Mahoney was most outspoken in stating that the steel price rise was excessive. But in response to an inquiry by the New York Times, other Administration spokesmen were less critical. “The steel industry was reportedly given assurance in Washington that it would not be subject to criticism at this time for its price increase if it showed good faith in absorbing a large percentage of its higher costs and by holding its price rise in moderation.” New York Times, December 3, 1950.

¹⁴ Congressional response to the re-establishment of the Wage Stabilization Board by Executive Order 10233, April 22, 1951, was one of suspicion. In both Houses, committees summoned members of the new Board for an accounting of their powers to handle emergency disputes. Congressmen were concerned with the non-statutory basis of the new Board, and its possible “short-circuiting” of the Taft-Hartley law with its emergency disputes procedure for defense industries. In the House, the latter concern was expressed by Representative Lucas during the examination of George W. Taylor, Chairman of the new WSB, before the House Committee on Education and Labor:

“… And we know the President's attitude toward it [the Taft-Hartley Act] too; and is this going to be a means, and the great question is all over the country, is this going to be a means by which the Taft Hartley Act will be evaded?” Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor.House of Representatives, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to H.R. 73: Disputes Functions of the Wage Stabilization Board, p. 105.

Representative Gwinn concluded similarly:

“… Now what more perfect historical basis could we find for the fact that when you take over a labor dispute in a Wage Stabilization Board that you intend to by-pass the Act?” Ibid., p. 121.

In the Senate, Senator Taft admitted the need for a more flexible procedure to handle emergency disputes during the defense effort, but wanted it to be established by Congress, not by executive order:

“It [the WSB procedure] is not covered by law at all, and now we are considering the Defense Production Act renewal, and if we want to set up this kind of system, Congress ought to set it up and it should not be done by Executive Order …. Now I do not say the Taft-Hartley Law is inadequate. It does not make any difference to me whether or not you violate the Taft-Hartley Law; I do not think you do anyway.” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., on Wage Stabilization and Disputes Program, p. 19.

Senator Douglas stated the Administration's position clearly:

“… Well, I do not care at all for the Taft-Hartley procedure, so if this is an alternative, I welcome it.” Ibid., p. 34.

Those who favored limiting the authority of the Wage Stabilization Board to economic issues introduced in the House the Lucas Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1951, which would have removed from the WSB its powers to make recommendations in labor disputes. This proposal and its companion, the Kersten Amendment, were defeated.

¹⁵ This package consisted of a total wage increase of 17½ cents per hour; reduction of North-South wage differential by five cents; increase in shift differential pay by 2 and 3 cents per hour for second and third shifts; double-time pay for six holidays, and time and a quarter pay for all Sundays worked; and other fringe benefits.

¹⁶ Charles E. Wilson, as Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, was considered to have been the negotiator for the steel industry for price relief. With his resignation on March 27, 1952, hopes for a steel price increase at that time were defeated. The industry's original estimate of the cost increase necessary to recoup the cost of the Board's recommendations was $12 per ton. However, the New York Times reported that the industry had brought down its ceiling to $7.50 a ton early in April in negotiations with officials of the Office of Price Stabilization. The final decision on price was $5.20 a ton, awarded by OPS the day after the settlement, July 25, 1952.

¹⁷ On June 10, President Truman addressed Congress, requesting powers to seize the steel industry until the industry and the union reached a settlement. At this time he stated: “I do not recommend that the Congress adopt the Taft-Hartley approach. I think it would be unwise, unfair, and quite possibly ineffective. The nation has already had the benefit of whatever could be gained by action under the Taft-Hartley Act …. In the steel case the union already, even before April 9, had voluntarily postponed the strike action for ninety-nine days. Insofar as fact-finding and delay are concerned, therefore, the practical effects of the Taft-Hartley Act were achieved in this case some time ago.” New York Times, June 11, 1945.

¹⁸ John Stephens, Vice President of U.S. Steel Corporation, testifying in 1953 on the proposed amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, stated: “… but I also said that no matter what had happened on prices that the question of compulsory unionism constituted a very substantial barrier to settlement, and, in fact, continued for something like 6 weeks after the economic terms had been completely satisfied by conferences in the White House and in the old State Department Building ….

“… So, if the Government had decided come December 31 (1951) that the steel prices could have been increased X dollars a ton, there still would not have been any agreement.” Hearings, before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate 83rd Cong., 1st sess., on Proposed Revisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 855.

¹⁹ Provision is also made for an escape period at the end of the agreement, giving all union members the right to drop membership during the last 15 days of the contract.

²⁰ Despite the political effect of almost any type of White House intervention, particularly in the early stages of an “emergency,” it is likewise possible that a “lassez-faire” position of the White House could have a considerable impact upon the negotiations, depending, of course, upon the position of the industry, the strength of the union, and the strategy of each at a given time. Such a hands-off policy could itself represent a political position of the Administration.

²¹ That this might become the strategy of the Union in the 1954 negotiations in the absence of a sympathetic Administration is indicated by A. H. Raskin, New York Times labor reporter. Such one-at-a-time bargaining “would reduce the general hardship caused by the shutdown and would focus intense competitive pressure upon the strike-bound corporation.” New York Times, June 23, 1954, p. 14Google Scholar. He further observed that “the attitude of ranking labor officials in Washington was that the threat of a steel strike next week did not call for White House intervention of the type that was customary under Democratic Administrations.” New York Times, June 24, 1954, p. 18Google Scholar.