¹ “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 44 (September, 1950, Supplement)Google Scholar. Hereafter citations to the report will be indicated by page number only.

² P. v.

³ P. ix. The words omitted are “creative political action.” It would be unwise to take political action based on the Committee's report until after more debate and much more intensive scientific study.

⁴ P. 30.

⁵ P. 19 (italics supplied). See also p. v. It is regrettable that the committee did not look to the President, and presidential candidates, for examples of the presentation of alternative policies. There is a tendency among political scientists to minimize such differences as existed, say, between Smith and Hoover, Roosevelt and Landon, or Truman and Dewey. The realignment of interest group support for the parties since 1928 is an indication that such groups perceived important differences. For the influence of President Franklin Roosevelt on both labor and business support see Bone, Hugh A., American Politics and the Party System (New York, 1949), pp. 319–326Google Scholar.

⁶ Perhaps the journalists are not entirely uninspired. Democrats might argue that the Republican press finds it to its advantage to minimize differences in party ideology. By reinforcing the belief of low-income Republicans that little partisan difference exists, the party may be able to retain their allegiance. The assumption of this strategy would be that high-income Republicans are less gullible than their poorer brothers. For statistics supporting these conclusions, see Saenger, Gerhart H., “Social Status and Political Behavior”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, pp. 109–110 (September, 1945)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ The sessions, with percentages of roll calls on which the parties differed significantly, are as follows: 1921, 85.7; 1928, 88.1; 1930–1, 82.8; 1933, 90.0; 1937, 87.1; 1944, 85.7; 1945, 95.0; 1948, 95.5. Average for all roll calls, 89.5. Roll call behavior was measured by the chi-square test, with 1/100 as the level of significance.

⁸ For a study of party votes on reciprocal trade legislation since 1934, see Richard Strout, “The Elephant, the Donkey and the Tariff”, Christian Science Monitor, September 17, 1949 (Magazine Section), p. 5Google Scholar. Mr. Strout discovered extreme party differences in all sessions in which the legislation was considered.

⁹ On some important bills the parties have failed to differ on one roll call, but have disagreed sharply on another—for example, farm relief in 1933, neutrality legislation in 1937, rent control in 1948. The roll calls on which there was no significant difference between the parties may be categorized as follows: farm legislation, 9; civil service pay and regulations, 6; defense, 5; claims, suits and government contracts, 5; immigrants and aliens, 4; House rules and procedure, 4; rent control, 2; veterans, 2; prohibition, 2; District of Columbia, 2; monopoly, 2; foreign affairs, 2; women pilots, 1; sale of convict goods, 1; Indian administration, 1.

¹⁰ The percentage of major party members who voted with the opposition more often than with their own party by years was as follows: House—1921, 0.7; 1928, 2.8; 1930–1, 5.0; 1933, 1.6; 1937, 1.9; 1944, 4.0; 1946, 14.3; 1947, 0.7; 1948, 0.2; 1949, 5.9; 1950, 5.3. Senate—1921, 4.2; 1930–1, 14.7; 1937, 15.2; 1944, 10.5; 1946, 6.4; 1947, 6.4; 1948, 1.1; 1949, 6.3; 1950, 2.1. Computations are based on members who voted on one-third or more of the issues on which party majorities were opposed in Congress. Figures for sessions from 1946–1950 adapted from the Congressional Quarterly and CQ Almanac.

¹¹ That insurgency is usually the result of constituent pressure, and not the vagaries of the congressman, is demonstrated by the marked tendency for insurgents to represent similar districts. Thus most modern Democratic insurgents come from the rural South; most Republican insurgents in the 1920's represented contiguous rural areas in the central states.

¹² Senator Wayne Morse, who defeated a conservative Democrat in Oregon, was the only exception in 1950.

¹³ Of 23 House insurgents in 1950, 17 were southern Democrats.

¹⁴ Key's, V. O.Southern Politics (New York, 1949)Google Scholar is a testimonial to the fact that one-party factional politics, in which voters cannot depend on a known, organized opposition, is at best an inadequate means of maintaining honest, efficient, and responsible government. See especially pp. 44–52, 72, 105, 146, 181–84, 201, 310–11, 364, 400, 444, 498–99, 523, 655–56, 670.

¹⁵ The number and percentage of victorious major party candidates who received various proportions of the major party vote in the 1948 congressional elections may be broken down as follows:

66.7–100% of vote—161 (37.1%)

60.0–66.7% of vote—80 (18.4%)

Below 60.0% of vote—193 (44.5%)

¹⁶ For example, in the author's home state of Massachusetts, blessed with close party competition for the governorship, party monopoly exists in many local areas. A bona-fide Republican candidate for mayor of Boston in 1949 was rejected by Republican leaders in favor of an independent Democrat who stood a better chance in the non-partisan election. In some rural towns in the same state there is no Democratic committee and no Democratic town caucus or primary. Democrats must run as Independents or else enter the Republican caucus.

¹⁷ The dilemma of Republican candidates in areas to which the Democratic national program appeals is illustrated by the remark of Joseph Clark Baldwin, former representative from New York City who was defeated by a conservative Republican: “For years now you've had to be a reactionary to get nominated in the Republican party and a liberal to be elected. Why should I continue to ride two horses and get a sore crotch?” PM, May 12, 1946, p. 4Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Violent upheaval is nevertheless a possibility. The behavior of labor and business in some non-political activities suggests that these groups are not averse to violence. It is unfortunate that the report does not refer to the conclusions of leading writers on this subject. See Herring, Pendleton, The Politics of Democracy (New York, 1940)Google Scholar; Agar, Herbert, The Price of Union (Boston, 1950)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Such as the Progressive split in the Republican convention of 1912, and the economic depression of 1929.

²⁰ For example, a Baltimore Democratic ward-heeler relates the amazement with which Democratic leaders viewed the switch of many Negroes to Democratic registration after 1932. “We didn't go out to get'em. They just came in and asked to have their registration changed.”