¹ Ploss speaks of a “legislative procedure”; see Ploss, Sidney, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 283–287 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² By “rationalization of decision making,” I refer to a process whereby an increasingly wider segment of the society's decisions come to be made on the basis of instrumental criteria. In the literature of political development, such changes are seen as the consequences of modernization, social differentiation, functional specialization, and the increasing complexity of both technical and social issues. Thus rationalization entails (1) increased reliance on rational-technical decision-making criteria, (2) the decline of ideology as a dominant decision-making criterion, and (3) an increased role in decision making for those elements of the society who possess technical skills. The newfound role for those holding technical skills may come about through the increased reliance on specialized groups or through a process by which the political elite itself acquires the necessary skills. Increased reliance on specialists will be noted below in the discussion of interest groups; for evidence of the political elite's acquisition of technical skills, see both the comments on elite change below and the writings of Paul Cocks and Jerry Hough on the rational-technical work style of Party administrators: Hough, Jerry, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 272–320 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Cocks, Paul, “The Rationalization of Party Control,” in Change in Communist Systems, ed. Johnson, Chalmers, (Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 181–182 Google Scholar. Philip Stewart's study of elite mobility suggests, however, that rational-technical performance criteria explain only a part of the upward mobility of secondary Party figures, with other factors such as patron-client ties and the level of political conflict equally important at times; see Stewart, Philip D., Arnett, Robert L., Ebert, William, McPhail, Raymond E., Rich, Terrence L., and Schopmeyer, Craig, “Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models,” American Political Science Review, 66 (12, 1972), 1269–1291 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Fleron offers a useful distinction between “coopted” Party leaders who have had extensive career experience in nonapparatus technical or administrative roles and “recruited” leaders who enter fulltime Party work shortly after the completion of their education. While the former have enjoyed increased membership in the Central Committee in recent years, the latter have continued to dominate the Politburo and the key apparatus posts. See Fleron, Frederic J., “Toward a Reconceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union,” Comparative Politics, 1 (01, 1968), 228–244 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation of Change: The Soviet Political Leadership System,” Polity, 2 (Winter, 1969), 176–201 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an updating of Fleron's figures, see Donaldson, Robert H., “The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite,” World Politics, 24 (04, 1972), 382–409 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Fischer, George offers similar observations in The Soviet System and Modern Society (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), pp. 47–64 Google Scholar. For more general data on elite change, see Gehlen, Michael P. and McBride, Michael, “The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 62 (12, 1968), 1232–1241 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ To be sure, Milton Lodge offers a study of the changing attitudes of five elite groups. Two points, however, must be made regarding his findings: (1) His is a study of group attitudes toward decision making based on content analysis of specialized journals which speak for these groups and not a study of their actual behavior in decision-making situations. (2) His study makes no effort to relate changing attitudes to the educational or occupational experiences of group members. See Lodge, Milton, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969)Google Scholar. Lodge has subsequently enlarged the focus of this original study to include an examination of the relationship between career experiences and policy preferences. See his article “Attitudinal Cleavages within the Soviet Political Leadership,” in Comparative Communist Political Leadership, Beck, Carl et al. (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 205–225 Google Scholar.

⁵ See Skilling, H. Gordon, “Interest Groups in Communist Politics,” World Politics, 18 (04, 1966), 435–451 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mills, Richard M., “The Formation of the Virgin Lands Policy,” Slavic Review, 29 (03, 1970), 58–69 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barry, D. D., “The Specialist in Soviet Policy-Making: The Adoption of a Law,” Soviet Studies, 16 (10, 1964), 152–165 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stewart, Philip D., “Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education,” World Politics, 22 (10, 1969), 29–50 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schwartz, J. J. and Keech, William, “Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union,” American Political Science Review, 62 (09, 1968), 840–851 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A good summary of such group activity is to be found in Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, ed. Skilling, H. Gordon and Griffiths, Franklyn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁶ Kelley, Donald R., “Interest Groups in the USSR: The Impact of Political Sensitivity on Group Influence,” Journal of Politics, 34 (08, 1972), 860–888 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 81–84 Google Scholar.

⁹ Gore, William J., Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 125–126 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Of course it is possible that such a decision will not satisfy both criteria. In this case, it will either fail to deal with the objective problem or produce organizational tensions which, if severe, will require a second series of decisions to return the organization to equilibrium or to redefine its place in the society.

¹¹ Diesing, Paul, “Socioeconomic Decisions,” in The Making of Decisions, ed. Gore, William J. and Dyson, J. W. (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 64–84 Google Scholar.

¹² Ibid., pp. 69-70.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 70-71.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 75-76.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 77-78.

¹⁶ Kelley, pp. 860-876.

¹⁷ In the long run, however, even maximizing decisions may have more far-reaching social and political consequences; what makes them “maximizing” rather than “integrative” or “political” is the way in which they are perceived by the decision makers.

¹⁸ As we have noted, organizational conflict does not immediately involve the interests of competing leadership factions, although they may ultimately be touched by these decisions. A good example of this relationship is to be found in the 1958 school reform decision, for while the decision to shift to vocationalized training had little immediate impact on any leadership faction, it would ultimately have exercised profound influence on the elite itself.

¹⁹ The decision-making style of each participant closely resembles what March and Simon have termed “satisficing,” i.e., the search for a solution which satisfies the minimal requirements of each of the participants; see March, James G. and Simon, Herbert A., Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), pp. 140–141 Google Scholar.

²⁰ This concept has long been applied to the study of American political behavior. See Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960)Google Scholar.

²¹ This level of conflict intensity is similar to that described by Myron Rush during succession periods. Unlike Rush, however, I maintain that such conflict may occur at any point in time, inasmuch as leaders since Stalin have seemed unable to consolidate their power completely and thus have been constantly compelled to try to keep their coalitions together or to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition. What then separates systemic political conflict from organizational conflict is the perception by one or another leadership faction that a particular decision will affect its political fortunes. See Rush, Myron, Political Succession in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

²² It is obvious that competing leaders must regard time as an important variable in estimating the political implications of organizational conflict.

²³ Shabad, Theodore, “Brezhnev, Who Ought to Know, Explains Politburo,” New York Times, 06 15, 1973, p. 3 Google Scholar. Informal subject-matter committees were formed within the Politburo even in Stalin's day, and a special Bureau of the Presidium was formed after that body was enlarged at the 19th Party Congress. In the latter case, formal membership in the Bureau was never revealed; apparently the identity of those involved in the Bureau's work shifted from time to time in response to the political fortunes of Stalin's lieutenants. See Conquest, Robert, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: Harper, 1967), pp. 159–163 Google Scholar.

²⁴ In the Soviet case, this has usually come to mean seeking the support of groups with representation on the Central Committee.

²⁵ Kelley, pp. 876-888.