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Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2009

IRINA DENISOVA*
Affiliation:
Centre for Economic and Financial Research
MARKUS ELLER*
Affiliation:
Oesterreichische Nationalbank
TIMOTHY FRYE*
Affiliation:
Columbia University
EKATERINA ZHURAVSKAYA*
Affiliation:
New Economic School
*
Irina Denisova is Lead Economist, Centre for Economic and Financial Research, New Economic School, Nakhimovsky prospect 47, 117418 Moscow, Russia (IDenisova@cefir.ru).
Markus Eller is Economist, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, 1090, Vienna, Austria (markus.eller@oenb.at).
Timothy Frye is Marshall D. Shulman Professor of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, and Member, Harriman Institute, 7th Floor, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 (tmf2@columbia.edu).
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya is Hans Rausing Professor of Economics, New Economic School, and Academic Director, Center for Economic and Financial Research, Nakhimovsky prospect 47, 117418 Moscow, Russia (EZhuravskaya@cefir.ru).

Abstract

Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and weak governance institutions, there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high- and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2009

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