Organization is customarily considered a means to an end. The purposes to be realized are of first importance, while administrative structure is a lesser consideration. Thus organization is supposed to describe the division of work already decided upon and the assignment of authority in performing a given task. Only technicians and a few students who find some queer fascination in detail need give particular attention to organizational matters.

However widely held, any such attitude about organization ignores several fundamentals. For one thing, conception of purpose and organization are too closely interrelated to say that one precedes the other. Indeed, in any large enterprise the objectives to be accomplished usually represent the composite views of different component parts. Sometimes conflicting purposes have been fairly well resolved at the center of an agency, and oftentimes they are permitted to flourish without much check, let alone guidance. Frequently you must know the individual elements in order to understand the whole. Finally, organization vitally affects the ambitions, reputations, and fortunes of many individual persons. It is often the battleground which reflects much more far-reaching beliefs than strictly technical concerns about the most efficient method for performing a job.

In the simultaneous elections held on June 2, 1946, in France and Italy, it is not difficult to see a symbol of the community of destiny which, even now, seems to link the two countries. France and Italy are the two largest western European countries to emerge intact from the ordeal of fascism and war, and the political decisions they will make in the near future are bound to affect to a large extent the course of events in Europe. To find out what chances exist of a significant contribution by the continent of Europe to the solution of the political and economic problems of our time, it is legitimate to look to France and to Italy. To analyze in some detail the conditions under which the two countries voted, the issues presented to them, and the consequences likely to flow from the results of the elections—all this appears to represent an inquiry into developments vitally affecting one of the great areas which, if much impoverished and weakened at present, may still come back to influence the political structure of the world.

As an expression of the popular mind, the vote on June 2 was unprecedented for both countries. Never before had so many men and women taken part in elections: forty-five millions exercised their right to vote (in Italy their duty as well), while the greatest number (with men only voting) in pre-war France was less than ten millions and in pre-fascist Italy less than seven millions.

The rôle played by public opinion in a democracy, particularly as it affects the legislative process, has long been a subject for speculation by political scientists. The advent of controlled quota sampling permits of the study of this important relationship in measurable terms. The object of the present discussion is to trace the interaction of public opinion and the executive and legislative branches of government as they have dealt with a single public question—reorganization of the Supreme Court, as presented to Congress for consideration by President Roosevelt on February 5, 1937. Enlargement of the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen members was the most controversial feature of the general reorganization of the federal judiciary proposed by the President, aimed at speeding up the process of clearing cases through the federal court system, and making the system more “representative” of the wishes of the people.

The debate on enlargement of the Supreme Court provides a useful and interesting case study for several reasons. The case as a public issue has a definite beginning and end, ranging from the proposal of the judiciary reform bill by the President on February 5 to the death of Senator Joseph T. Robinson on July 14, 1937. As it was debated by public and legislators, the issue was a relatively clear-cut one, uncomplicated by side issues or utterly foreign events that might have influenced the course of either legislators or the public. Finally, and of decided importance, the American Institute of Public Opinion made weekly measurements of opinion toward the proposal during the entire period that reorganization of the Court was a public question. This permits the correlation of reliable opinion samplings with events in the debate and the observation of their relationship.

Rattling the “superstate skeleton” has become the principal pastime of those who oppose the establishment of regional agencies for the development of the natural resources of the nation. While the superstate argument was used against TVA during its early existence, it forms no part of the present thinking of the people of the Tennessee Valley and their public institutions which have collaborated with TVA for the past thirteen years in the development and utilization of the resources of the region. Any needed proof of the fallacy of the argument that TVA has undermined state and local institutions in the Tennessee Valley is provided by the testimony of the governors of the seven states on the coöperative and profitable relations between their states and TVA.

Such misunderstanding as still prevails outside the Valley regarding TVA and its relationships with state and local governments seems to arise, in large measure, from the sedulous spreading of misinformation on the nature of TVA's grant of powers.

The old saws, “money makes the mare go” and “he who pays the piper calls the tune,” make for awareness of the central importance of budgeting in government. While these expressions indicate the possibility of a measure of general understanding of public budgeting, they also are indicative of the ease with which superficiality and misconceptions may develop in this field. A public budget, one authority has rightly declared “… is not what most people conceive it to be. It is not figures about sums of money to be set aside for definite expenditures, nor is it a series of graphic charts, nor multitudes of sheets indicating limits not to be exceeded.” While columns of figures, forms and procedures, and preparation of the budget document are important budget activities, they are only incidental to the basic functions of budgeting, which are to aid the executive in his job of management and to help simplify the task of the legislative body in determining policy. To carry out these two functions properly, the whole governmental organization, indeed, the citizenry, too, must be involved in budgeting.

The budget is a psychological device to make people in an administrative organization think and, as will be explained more fully, to make the people themselves think about their government. Budget reformers, hard at work in this worthy cause since the model municipal corporation act of 1899 was drafted, have emphasized the executive's rôle in budgeting: “it shall be the duty of the Mayor … in each year to submit to the Council the annual budget …” The tendency has been for the executive and his budget officer, commonly the controller, to work up a budget and then impose it, with councilmanic consent, on the administration.

Unsuccessful as plaintiffs and appellees in a prayer for relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, as amended, from the effects of the inequitable and outmoded act of Illinois of 1901 creating the present Congressional districts, Kenneth W. Colegrove (who in other capacities is chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University and secretary-treasurer of the American Political Science Association), Peter J. Chamales, attorney, and Kenneth C. Sears, professor of law at the University of Chicago, have nevertheless received from the District Court and from the Supreme Court encouraging dicta and dissent which foreshadow new developments in election law.

The legislature of Illinois has repeatedly refused to redistrict the state for Congressional representation, despite grave and increasing population shifts. A new but inequitable Congressional redistricting act, passed by the General Assembly in 1931, was declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court because it violated federal law and the provision of the Illinois constitution requiring that “all elections shall be free and equal.” Ten years later, when a similar attack was made on the long-standing and much more discriminatory act of 1901, the Illinois supreme court took an opposite view, declaring that the constitutional section is addressed primarily to the legislature and that to argue for a requirement, in all cases, that districts be equal in population “is to assert a millennium which cannot be reached.”

Although legally buried since 1891, the “precinct” in New Hampshire, like Banquo's ghost, continually arises to baffle students of New England local government. To the lawmakers, it is known as the village district; while in its annual report the state tax commission lists village districts as precincts, only adding to the confusion.

In making a count of governmental areas in New Hampshire, one finds the state divided into ten counties. Within these, there are eleven municipalities classed as cities and 224 towns. The cities were once towns, but have been incorporated as cities by the legislature, not in accordance with a population prerequisite, but upon application. The first city to be incorporated was Manchester in 1846.

All New Hampshire cities and towns include within their limits a great deal of rural land. Clusters of houses or settlements are sprinkled over these areas. Frequently, a settlement has several stores, a post office, and a railroad station and has the outward appearance of a village. Legally, however, such a settlement is not a village. It is administered entirely as a part of the town or city in which it is located, although it may be several miles from the principal urban center. New Hampshire has 639 such settlements, none of which is incorporated. Villages are not incorporated in New Hampshire as they are in Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine. Frequently they are referred to as places, but they should not be confused with the 23 so-called “unincorporated places” (found principally in the White Mountains), which are administered by the county and state governments almost completely. However, there are a few of the “villagelike” settlements within unincorporated places.

This report is concerned with the contribution of political science to the instructional needs of those who are preparing to teach, and of those now teaching, the social studies in elementary and secondary schools. How can political scientists in colleges and universities maximize the contribution which they, as specialists in one large field of human knowledge, can make to enrich the teaching of the social studies? Before offering suggestions which, if applied generally, should provide at least a partial answer to the question, the Committee on the Social Studies states two assumptions. First, most political scientists can do more than they have done in the past. Second, reverse lend-lease is anticipated. Political scientists have much to learn from teachers of the social studies as to what methods are effective in enabling youth to learn the ways of democracy and what types of material are most useful in the learning process. The recommendations in this report are presented in the hope that coöperation between the two groups will become more extensive and regular. The recommendations are divided into four classes, according to the incidence of responsibility for carrying them into effect.