The Meiji constitution was in effect from November 29, 1890, until May 3, 1947, a period of fifty-six years and approximately five months. The present constitution, which may be known after the demise of Emperor Hirohito as the Showa constitution, was proclaimed in effect by Premier Yoshida Shigeru in the presence of Hirohito on May 3, 1947. The proclamation was read from a platform on the Palace plaza in Tokyo. The audience of five thousand people which stood in the rain before the platform was small in comparison with the huge crowd that surged around the imperial carriage on November 3, 1946, following the official ceremony of promulgation; but it was equally enthusiastic in its demonstration of loyalty. On both occasions, it was apparent that the embarrassed-looking, bespectacled little Emperor, and not the constitution, was the center of popular interest.

Socialist thought has long contained two potentially contradictory doctrines concerning the control or management of productive enterprises under a socialist régime. One of these is the idea of workers' control: the concept that under socialism workers will no longer be merely passive victims of the productive process, but, direct participants in the control of productive enterprises. The other is the idea of central control on behalf of the entire community: the concept that socialism will replace “the anarchy of production” under capitalism with a central determination of the appropriate goals of economic activity. That there is possibiUty of conflict between these two objectives is self-evident. The decentralization of economic administration implied by workers' control may easily contradict the desire for centralization of certain kinds of economic decisions. Conceivably, one goal or the other might have to be abandoned, or at least seriously modified.

Today, for the first time in any major industrial nation, a socialist party pledged to the maintenance of democratic institutions is undertaking the task of building socialism. The achievements of the British Labor party may well determine the future goals and techniques of democratic socialists elsewhere. It is not inconceivable that success or failure of the British experiment will determine the path that Western Europe will follow. It is noteworthy, then, that during the last decade the Labor party has abandoned the goal of workers' control; in its current program of nationalization, it is making no provision for direct control of production by workers. This modification of socialist objectives, representing a swing away from the syndicalist content of socialist thinking in the direction of Fabian ideas, was achieved only after the entire socialist movement and the Labor party itself underwent the test of a protracted internal struggle, both of an intellectual and of a practical kind.

During the past few months, many Americans have been preparing verbally to bury Great Britain and her Empire. They seem to consider this the prerogative, if not the duty, of relatives of one who has long fought off various economic and social ills and more recently has suffered a series of bad setbacks.

Without doubt, Britain's economic position is serious. A vigorous, diversified, international trade is essential to maintaining or increasing her prewar standard of living. Before the war, she paid for roughly sixty per cent of her imports by tangible exports of goods and materials of various kinds. The other forty per cent was taken care of by returns on her foreign investments and by shipping, financial, insurance, and other services. The war and its aftermath have cut down alarmingly her foreign exchange from these latter sources and, at the same time, have added to her overseas expenditures to meet financial charges on her war borrowings, to maintain troops, and to meet her share of occupation and rehabilitation costs in other countries.

In short, Britain can maintain the standard of living of most of her population only by increasing her exports substantially above prewar levels. As the sign-boards say: “To fill the shops, we must fill the ships.” And this must be done against the handicaps of war losses and damage, labor shortages, loss of many prewar markets, widespread fatigue, a limited diet, and last but not least, obsolete equipment in such basic industries as coal and textiles.

This study represents a preliminary inquiry into certain of the functional aspects of the natural law doctrine, particularly as it applies to American constitutional development. Throughout, the conceptual considerations, as such, will be ignored. Instead, the basic consideration will be one of usage. How does natural law work? What does it do? If this distinction seems arbitrary, the writer can only point out that law and politics are not theoretical studies; that they are the bone and sinew of society; that if the social order is to serve humanity with the greatest possible direction, it should know the proper functioning of its constituent elements. Natural law, like atomic energy, is important because it works, not because it was invented. And by the same token, it is best understood by a respectable familiarity with its usage, not by memorizing the symbols of its essence.

The easy identification of natural law with the constitutional development of this country is apparent from even a cursory examination of the great body of constitutional doctrine. We have, for example, the whole concept of property relationships as they have come to us from the eighteenth century. We have a similar form-pattern in the development of certain processes of the law itself. We talk of the “reasonable man,” or we invoke the “rule of reason.” But the decisive characteristic of American constitutional development has been none of these. Rather it has been the acceptance of the working principle of negation. To avoid an enactment or a statute is considered, in this country at least, a valid exercise of authority. While it might be difficult to seek the legitimate derivation of such an action, or even to justify it, it is possible to consider its assumptions.

Among the responsibilities which the Constitution imposes upon Congress is the regulation of the succession to the office of president in certain contingencies. The framers of the Constitution themselves disposed of the problem in part by creating the post of vice-president and making that officer a first recourse in filling a vacancy in the presidential office. Realizing the need for designating more than one prospective successor, since vacancies might occur in both offices simultaneously, the convention at a late stage in its proceedings added as a seeming afterthought a clause authorizing Congress to make further provision by law on the subject. Although seven presidents and seven vice-presidents have died in office and one vice-president has resigned during the time the Constitution has been in operation, the situation envisaged by the framers has never actually arisen. Nevertheless, the power entrusted to Congress is important potentially. During nearly one-fourth of the time since 1789, a federal statute rather than a constitutional provision has governed the succession to the presidential office in an immediate sense.

Two fundamentally opposed theories have been advanced concerning the officer upon whom Congress should cause the powers and duties of the presidency to devolve. One is that the presiding officer of the House or the Senate should be designated, in order to insure that any person becoming acting president shall achieve that status through an elective process.

The veto power is well known as one of the primary sources of the strength of a governor. Especially in the 38 states which give their chief executives the right to reject items in appropriation bills, the governors have been able to mold legislation to their liking. In a few states, including Pennsylvania, the power to veto items has been expanded to include the authority to reduce any item. Probably in no state in the union has the veto been a more effective club in the hands of the governor than in Pennsylvania. A study of the veto record in Pennsylvania over the past eight years reveals the extent to which the governor's will has prevailed.

The constitutional provisions concerning the veto in Pennsylvania are not unlike those in a number of other states. The governor may, within ten days after the passage of a bill by the General Assembly, disapprove it. If he fails to act within that period, the bill, unless approved by the legislature just before adjournment, becomes law without his signature. In addition, he is given the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills. The legislature may override any veto by a two-thirds vote of all the elected members of each house. A bill which is passed during the ten days before the close of the session becomes law unless vetoed by the governor within 30 days after the adjournment.

On September 23,19…, in Roscommon county in the Southern Peninsula of Michigan, the county clerk called the local officials together at the court house. Of the county administrators, the sheriff, treasurer, prosecuting attorney, circuit court judge, register of deeds, health and welfare administrators, and highway engineer were present. Many of the township supervisors had managed somehow to reach the court house in spite of the streams of refugees pouring northward from the destroyed industrial cities of southern Michigan. Already the county was bursting with new and unforeseen problems of public administration. The traffic jam on U. S. highway 27 from Lansing northward was something beyond the memory of the oldest living inhabitant. Near Houghton Lake, this traffic was jammed by another stream which had followed U. S. 23 northward from Saginaw and Bay City, turning inland at Standish by way of state highways 76 and 55 to connect with U.S. 27. The flight of stampeding and determined refugees was flowing like a river through the county seat of Roscommon and ever northward toward Cheboygan and Mackinaw City at the tip of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan.

“This meeting was called,” said the clerk, “to discuss how we can handle this emergency. One of the state police officers who has been on reconnaissance with a deputy sheriff will tell us what we are up against in this area. For 36 hours our telephone and telegraphic communications with Washington and Lansing have been out. We are on our own and must make the best of a terrible emergency.”

Legal Basis. On February 4, 1946, President Truman, by Executive Order 9691, further decentralized personnel administration to the departments and agencies. The order states: “In order to assure the maximum utilization, in the recruitment and placement of persons for the Federal service, of the field service resources of the departments and agencies, the Civil Service Commission, after consulting the departments and agencies concerned, may establish United States civil service boards of examiners in the field service, composed of officers and employees of the departments and agencies concerned.” Boards of examiners are not new. The Civil Service Act of 1883 directs the Commission, “where examinations are to take place,” to “designate and select a suitable number of persons, not less than three, in the official service of the United States, … after consulting the head of the department or office in which such persons serve, to be members of boards of examiners. …” The Commission “may at any time substitute any other person in said service … in the place of anyone so selected.” Civil Service Rule IV, promulgated by an earlier President in accordance with the basic act states: “The Commission shall designate from among persons in the Federal service … such boards of examiners as it shall deem necessary. Their members shall perform such duties as the Commission may direct, in connection with the execution of the Civil Service Act and these Rules, and in the performance thereof they shall be under the direct and sole control of the Commission. Such duties shall be considered part of the duties of the office in which they are serving, and time shall be allowed therefor during office hours.”

The International Labor Organization (hereafter referred to as“I.L.O.”) took the first steps toward establishing relations with a new organization which would replace the League of Nations in the spring of 1944. The 26th Session of the International Labor Conference, which met in Philadelphia in April–May, 1944—the first regular session held since 1939—adopted a resolution requesting the Governing Body of the International Labor Office “to take appropriate steps to assure close collaboration and full exchange of information between the I.L.O. and any other public organizations which now exist or may be established for the promotion of social and economic well-being.”

Acting on this recommendation, the Governing Body of the I.L.O., at its session of May, 1944, a few days after the close of the Philadelphia Conference, appointed a delegation composed of nine members of the Governing Body, its chairman, and the director of the International Labor Office, and authorized it to negotiate with any international authority in regard to the Organization's relationship to other international bodies. In January, 1945—still prior to the San Francisco Conference—the Governing Body reaffirmed the I.L.O.'s desire to be associated with the contemplated general international organization, “while retaining for the International Labor Organization the authority essential for the discharge of its responsibilities under its constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia.”

At the invitation of the United States Government, the I.L.O. was represented at San Francisco by a consultative delegation. The position of the I.L.O. within the new framework was discussed at some length at the Conference.

The field known as “political science” is in many ways a peculiarly American discipline. Although it plays a minor rôle in some European universities, and none in the rest, this particular field of the social sciences is of great importance in the United States. Besides a mounting interest in the study of government on the undergraduate level in this country, there has been a steady growth of professional training for the public service in special schools of public administration and in international affairs and diplomacy, both closely related to and usually staffed in part at least by political scientists.

To the non-American inquiring as to the reason for this special development, no exhaustive answer can be given at the present time. But mention may be made of a number of factors which have contributed to this phenomenal and persistent growth. In the first place, political science, backed by the ancient tradition of Aristotle's Politics, has a central appeal to young men and women seeking an integrated and over-all approach to the “great society” of a free and intensely democratic people. The pride Americans used to take in their political “institutions,” which was noted by many a foreign traveller, has in this age of democratic disillusionment found an uneasy refuge in academic study of the history of political thought and institutions. The well-known practical, or rather activist, tendency of American scholars has turned many an economist, such as John R. Commons, to legislative halls and thus has pushed the problems of government into the center of attention. Historians with similar propensities, like Charles A. Beard, came to enrich the work of political science.