Looking over the political scene of contemporary Europe, we observe that the European states are aligned in two fundamentally antagonistic camps of political institutions and ideals. Democracy and liberal institutions are still in force in Great Britain, the Irish Free State, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, in Switzerland, and in Czechoslovakia; while autocracies at present embrace Russia, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary; also among the Baltic states, at least Latvia and Estonia may be so classified. As for Spain and Greece, notwithstanding that democratic constitutions are nominally still in existence, it is at least open to doubt whether or not they at the present moment should be classified as democracies. By far the greater part of European territory and of European population is under dictatorial rule of one type or another. It might seem, therefore, appropriate to weigh the possibilities of a further expansion of the systems of government which, loosely but rather adequately, are termed dictatorships or autocracies.

When the German government announced on March 16 of this year that it no longer deemed itself bound by the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, a great step was taken toward the realization of the demand for Gleichberechtigung which has been the main objective of National Socialist foreign policy. In view of the forthcoming conversations which had been scheduled to take place at Berlin, the time chosen for this decision was unexpected. The act of denunciation itself had been foreshadowed, however, by the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, and by her actual rearming in defiance of the limitations of the Treaty. It involved no sudden innovation in policy, but was merely a public acknowledgment of the fait accompli; it marked the final stroke in one stage of a long and bitter campaign against the “Diktat” of Versailles.

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.

In the December, 1933, issue of this Review, pp. 942–955, appeared a tabular review of the changes in major units of the national government between March 4 and November 1, 1933. In the April, 1934, issue, pp. 250–254, appeared a supplementary list showing the changes between November 1,1933 and March 1,1934. In the October, 1934, issue, pp. 872–874, a second supplementary list showed the changes between March 1 and June 30, 1934; and a third supplementary list in the February, 1935, issue showed changes between June 30 and December 15, 1934. The present list indicates the reorganization effected and new units created between December 15, 1934, and June 16, 1935. As in previous lists, mention is made of units only specifically authorized by law or established by the President under general authority vested in him.

The Kansas experiment with a legislative council has probably made as much progress as could be expected under the circumstances, with the first year disrupted by special sessions and impeachment trials, and with no research staff until the last five months. While in certain aspects of the Council's work little progress was made, in others the accomplishments were definitely of value and promise.

Council Bills Passed. The natural tendency is to evaluate the work of the Council by the extent to which its recommendations were enacted into law. In the special session of 1933, of the Council bills, 60 per cent became law, as compared with 27 per cent of the total number of bills introduced. The Council recommendations were obviously effective.