In the question of liberty and equality we are at the very root of all political science. Nothing is so fundamental as the problem of authority and liberty. In no age or place has discussion of state and government proceeded without the express or tacit assumption of dogmas as to the essence and relationship of the conceptions of liberty, equality and authority. And the dogmas on these subjects have not been confined in their application to the affairs of individuals. They have constituted the foundation of theory and of practice in the affairs of those aggregations of individuals that constitute governments, states and nations. It is therefore my purpose to devote myself here to some consideration of the manifestation and influence of the conceptions of liberty and equality in the field of international relations.

Much has recently been said concerning the moral obligations of the state. It is not infrequently asserted that it is the moral duty of a state to assume some function in the interest of international society. The reaction against the philosophy which considered all state action as moral and which posited the realization of national aims as a paramount ethical end, has been followed by an increasing emphasis on the ethical liability of the state to interests in addition to its own.

In attributing moral obligations to the state, the ethical standards of the individual are frequently invoked as applicable to state conduct, and upon this analogy judgment is often pronounced on problems of international right and wrong. The question, however, defies settlement by this simple identification of two moral entities essentially dissimilar in their nature. The ascription of ethical duties to the state, wholesome as it is readily conceded to be, requires considerable analysis lest an undue inference be drawn from the mere fact of its admission. To concede the state as a moral entity does not of itself suffice. The manner of its response to moral questions; its distinctive position in a society which yet lacks many of the elemental requisites for moral progress; the forces limiting the movement of international ethics to a higher level—an inquiry into problems such as these would seem more profitable than the constant reiteration of a principle which probably few persons would longer be disposed to deny.

It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that the terms monism and pluralism have been injected into the discussion of political theory and doubly unfortunate that they have been put forward as rival theories between which we are expected to choose. Both words are in fact very general, both are capable of many meanings and both have about them the connotations of centuries of philosophical dispute. And yet the one clear lesson from these disputes is that both monism and pluralism are inescapable aspects of our world and as such can neither of them be neglected. An effort to set the two in opposition, to picture them as incompatible, and to force a choice between them is surely wasted. The truth is that monism and pluralism are not theories but points of view or modes of attack, and any reasonable political theory will have to take account of both and both will have to be interpreted in such a way that they can be joined in one theory. It is not the purpose of this paper to undertake so large a task as this final reconciliation; but merely to state as exactly as may be what is connoted by such phrases as “a monistic theory of the state” and “a pluralistic theory of the state,” in order that the different points of view may be made as clear as possible and may be compared.

By political monism I understand a theory which holds that the state is ultimately a single indivisible authority, not subject to any other authority and therefore able itself to fix the limits and the content of the obligations to which it gives rise.

Numerically the political platform touches about six-tenths of one per cent of the legislation introduced in an average legislature. For instance, in the 1911 Indiana legislature, there were 1,111 bills introduced, while only six bills originated in the political platform of the controlling, in this case the Democratic, party. This revelation, although startling at first, is somewhat deceiving. In the first place, the political platform does not attempt, nor do the party leaders desire it, to touch upon all phases of legislation. There are various kinds of legislation, such as the relocation of county seats, weed laws and individual relief laws, which are too local or trivial to be included in the state platform, and there are other types, such as anti-liquor legislation, which the platform avoids because of their magnified importance.

Although the percentage given is correct, this six-tenths of one per cent is about twenty-five per cent of the important legislation considered. In this study of the twenty year period in Indiana, beginning with the inauguration of Governor Durbin in 1901 and through the successive administrations and ending with the first legislature under Governor McCray in 1921, we are interested in those platform planks alone which positively pledge the party to legislation.