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The Mutiny in the Greek Armed Forces, April, 19441
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 January 2017
Extract
In April, 1944, a mutiny broke out in the land, sea and air forces of the Greek government-in-exile in the Middle East. This mutiny, although speedily suppressed, had far-reaching political repercussions. It forced the resignation of the Tsouderos cabinet and paved the way for the Lebanon Conference, out of which emerged a national unity government including representatives of the principal political parties and resistance groups. It was this government, headed by Premier George Papandreou, that returned to Athens in October, 1944, on the heels of the retreating German's.
Little was known about the mutiny at the time of its occurrence. Censorship restrictions forbade mention of the mutiny for a week after the outbreak, when for the first time a Tass dispatch revealed its existence.
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- Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies 1950
Footnotes
1
This article is based on research made possible by grants-in-aid from the Committee on Research of the Graduate School of Northwestern University.
References
2 The Tass dispatch, released on April 8, provoked an official British protest to Moscow. A few weeks later Allied correspondents protested formally to British and American authorities in the Middle East against the censorship imposed in Cairo on news concerning the mutiny and Greek affairs in general. New York Times, April 4–11, December 17, 1944; New York Post, May 2, 1944; Michael Clark, “Greek Politics and Puppets,” Nation, CLIX (December 23, 1944), 766.
3 The National Liberation Front or EAM [Ethniko Apeleutherotiko Metopo] was the principal resistance body in occupied Greece and was largely controlled by the Communists. The most important rival groups were the Greek Democratic National League or EDES [Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos] and the National and Social Liberation or EKKA [Ethnike kai Koinonike Apeleutherose]. For sources, see the bibliographical article on Greek developments since the beginning of World War II by Stavrianos, L. S. and Panagopoulos, E. P., “Present-Day Greece,” Journal of Modern History, XX (June, 1948), 151–54 Google Scholar.
4 For the expansion of the armed forces, see E. I. Tsouderos, Ellenikes Anomalies ste Mese Anatole [Greek Anomalies in the Middle East] (Athens, 1945), pp. 5–6; Panagiotes Kanellopoulos, 1935–1945. Enas Apologismos [1935–1945. A Report] (Athens, 1945), pp. 36–44. Kanellopoulos, who was the leader of the National Unity Party [Ethniko Enotiko Komma], served as Vice-Premier under Tsouderos from May 2, 1942, to March 5, 1943.
5 Upon the death of Metaxas the King proclaimed publicly that “the work that has been done up to now in all fields of activity, the political, the military, and the fields of labor and agricultural reform, as well as the organization of national youth, will continue with the same spirit as before.” New York Times, January 30, 1941.
6 List of secret societies in Tsouderos, op. cit., p. 8.
7 Premier Tsouderos later observed that “a large part of the responsibility for what happened falls on the loyal-minded officers [royalist and Metaxist] and on the Court, who, with their concern for the King, suspected everybody…. They were always probing. Their measures against existing and non-existent dangers defeated our conciliation policy and prevented us from restoring discipline. They sought to establish discipline with a policy that destroyed discipline.” Ibid., p. 9. This testimony is corroborated by the report of the Cairo correspondent of the New York Times, February 8, 1942.
8 Kanellopoulos, op. cit., pp. 24–27 Google Scholar; Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. 25–28 Google Scholar.
9 These royalist officers, some 200 in number, were urged by the King and by British authorities to modify their position and return to their posts. Only 29 did so, and the remainder were removed to a detention camp in the Sudan. Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. 28—36; Kanellopoulos, op. cit., pp. 45–49.
10 Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. 47–48. King George announced in February, 1942, the official termination of the unpopular Metaxas dictatorship, but this failed to stem the tide against him.
11 This announcement was made following the suggestion of the British Ambassador in Cairo and a formal resolution by the Tsouderos cabinet. Details in ibid., pp. 58–61.
12 This conference was arranged on the initiative of Brigadier E. C. W. Myers, Chief of the British Military Mission to the Greek Guerrillas, with the aim of settling the monarchy question which was dividing and weakening the resistance groups. Komnenos Pyromaglou, E Ethnike Antistasis [The Natioml Resistance] (Athens, 1947), p. 108.
13 Text in Tsouderos, op. cit., p. 64.
14 Text of cabinet resolution in ibid., p. 65.
15 Text in ibid., pp. 66, 67.
16 For the discussion and decision at the Quebec Conference, see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (NewYork, 1948), II, 1240. Texts of replies to King in Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. 67–68. See also New York Times, September 1, 1943. The United States at this time formally recognized British primacy in Near Eastern Affairs. See L. S. Stavrianos, “The United States and Greece: The Truman Doctrine in Historical Perspective,“ Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee, ed. by Dwight E. Lee and George H. McReynolds (Worcester, Massachusetts, 1949), pp. 36–59Google Scholar.
17 The British officials were General Sir Maitland Wilson, Ambassador Reginald Leeper, and the Minister without Portfolio in the Middle East, Mr. Richard Gardiner Casey. Tsouderos, op. cit., p. 67.
18 The EDES delegate, K. Pyromaglou, comments that, “We were transported like prisoners to the airport…. On the mountains of Greece, we, and the guerrillas we represented, were the ‘heroic Greeks.’ In Cairo, because we disturbed British policy and the plans of the King, we were ‘undesirables'.” Pyromaglou, op. cit., p.III..
19 This little-known Cairo Conference is also significant for its influence on later developments in Greece. It increased the suspicion and intolerance of the contending factions and was a basic factor in the outbreak of hostilities between EAM and EDES a few months later. This viewpoint is expressed, among others, by Pyromaglou, op. cit., pp. 106–114. See also Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. 63–69; C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in their International Setting (London, 1948), pp. 151–58; Stephanos Saraphis, O ELAS (Athens, 1946), pp. 169–76Google Scholar.
20 Between the ending of the Cairo Conference and the establishment of PEEA, another incident occurred indicating the extent of the opposition to the King. In December, 1943, Colonel E. Fradellos was sent from the Middle East to Greece bearing messages from the King and the Government to Archbishop Damaskinos. These messages authorized the Archbishop to form a secret political committee to administer the liberated areas, end the dissension amongst the guerrillas and send three or four representatives of the political parties to Cairo to broaden the Government. Colonel Fradellos returned on March 6, 1944, with letters from several political leaders, all urging that the Archbishop be appointed Regent in place of the King. On March 10 the King wired from London that the proposed Regency was “inadmissible.” Among the documents that Colonel Fradellos brought to the Middle East were revealing and disquieting reports on the current political situation in Greece by Professor A. Svolos, Th. Sophoulis and S. Gonatas. Texts in Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. 81–115.
21 Texts of telegrams of the King, Tsouderos, PEEA, and Athens political leaders, in ibid., pp. 116–129. For the establishment and decrees of PEEA, see Archeio Ethnikes Antistases [Archives of National Resistance] (Athens, 1946).
22 The memorandum was signed by what appears to have been an ad hoc “Committee of Rational Unity of the Armed Forces of the Middle East,” consisting of three Lieutenant Colonels (air force), one Captain (medical corps), seven Majors (air, infantry and'cavalry), and two Lieutenants (infantry and artillery). Text in Tsouderos, op. cit., pp. H30–133.
23 Texts in ibid., pp. 133–135.
24 Ibid., pp. 137?.
25 Texts in ibid., pp. 143–146. Meanwhile Tsouderos had sent two more cables to the King requesting him that Venizelos be appointed Premier. On April 6 Tsouderos received a message from Churchill requesting him to remain in office and informing him that the British Admiral had been made responsible for dealing with the disorders in the Greek navy. The following day General Bernard Paget informed the Minister of War that the disturbances were jeopardizing security in the Middle East and that he (Paget) was assuming immediate command of the Greek army. In fact, as early as April 4 British forces had aided the Government to recapture ministry buildings occupied by the rebels. Ibid., pp. 15iff.
26 Ibid., p. 162.
27 On April II Tsouderos received the answer of the political parties in Greece. They agreed to send representatives to Cairo, but it is significant in the light of later complications that the Liberal Party leader, Themistocles Sophoulis, opposed the inclusion of the EAM and urged that “PEEA should be dissolved and denounced.” An affirmative reply had been received from the resistance groups a few days earlier. Ibid., pp. 163,. 164.
28 Ibid., p. 170.
29 Ibid., pp. 170–72. Between ten and twelve thousand rebels were placed in detention camps in Egypt, Libya and East Africa. They were not released until after the advent of the British Labor Government in July, 1945 Google Scholar.
30 For different versions of the Lebanon Conference and the aftermath, see Saraphis, op. cit., pp. 261–306; Pyromaglou, op. cit., pp. 114–25; Papandreou, George, H Apeleutherosis tes Ellados [The Liberation of Greece] (Athens, 1945), pp. 47–66 Google Scholar; National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book May 1944-March 1945(New York, 1945), pp. 1–7 Google Scholar.