1 A thorough treatment of this period is lacking in Finnish, also. For survey treatments of the subject in English see Mazour, Anatole G., Finland between East and West (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956)Google Scholar; and Valros, Fredrik, Finland 1946-1952 (Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kirjapaino, 1953)Google Scholar.

2 Paasikiven linja, (Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtiö, 1956), II, 92-93. In the future this work will be referred to as Paasikivi speeches, II.

3 The details of this subject can be found in my unpublished paper Finland's Position m the Russian Empire, 1905-1910.

4 Quoted in Kare, Kauko (ed.), J. K. Paasikivi. Valtakunnallinen elämantyö (Forssa: i Kustannusosakeyhtiö Kivi, 1956), p. 38.Google Scholar

5 Ibid., p. 77; Paasikiven linja, (Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtio, 1956), I, 185- 86. In the future this work will be referred to as Paasikivi speeches, I.

6 Paasikivi speeches, II, 28.

7 Ibid., pp. 44-45, 47-48.

8 For an enumeration of the President's powers see articles 23-36 of the Form of Government Act in Ministry for Affairs, Foreign, Form of Government Act and Diet Act of Finland : (Helsinki: OY. Tilgmann AB., 1947), pp. 7–10 Google Scholar. See also Arvid Enckell, “Rôle et prérogatives du Président de la République en Finlande,” Le Nord, No. 5, 1942, pp. 230-42.

9 Paasikivi speeches, II, 115.

10 Ibid., p. 26.

11 Kekkonen, Urho, J. K. Paasikivi. Rauhantekijä-Presidentti, in Kuusi, Matti (ed.), Suomen Tasavallan Presidentit (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1952), p. 187.Google Scholar

12 The details concerning this period can be found in my unpublished paper, op. cit.

13 Paasikivi speeches, II, 22.

14 Kare, op. cit., p. 42; see also Tanner, Vaino, Tarton Rauha. Sen syntyvaiheet ja -vaikeudtt (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1949)Google Scholar, passim.

15 Kare, op. cit., p. 78. In the postwar period Paasikivi stated that the Tartto Peace went too well and that the Finns should not have demanded the old boundaries. They should have agreed to setting the boundary farther north of St. Petersburg. Paasikivi speeches, I, 46, 196.

16 In the same vein Paasikivi in 1925 stated, “If Finland should lose a war, in all probability it would mean the end of her independence.” Paasikivi speeches, II, 35. (See also ibid., p. 125.)

17 Ibid., p. 23.

18 Ibid.

19 In a speech delivered in January, 1936, Paasikivi attacked the head of the Social Democratic Party for his unwillingness to spend enough money for defense. Paasikivi speeches, II, 88.

20 Ibid., p. 23.

21 This point is reiterated eleven years later (see ibid., p. 88). It is not quite clear from whom Paasikivi expected to receive aid, but he probably had in mind the Scandinavian countries, and perhaps England and France due to their known hostility towards the Bolshevik regime.

22 Puntila, L. A., J. K. Paasikiven linja (Lahti: Esan kirjapaino OY, 1957), pp. 11–12 Google Scholar; Kekkonen, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

23 Kare, op. cit., p. 51.

24 Kekkonen, op. cit., p. 190. This statement is also quoted in part in Pravda, December 15, 1956, p. 4.

25 According to Leonard Lundin, C., Finland in the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 50 Google Scholar, new sources have recently been made available that indicate that if the counsel of Paasikivi and Mannerheim had been followed, the War might have been avoided.

26 Puntila, op. cit., p. 13.

27 Ambarcumov, E. A., Sovetsko-finljandskie otnoshenija (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956), p. 89 Google Scholar; Kekkonen, op. cit., p. 191; see a 1942 speech in Paasikivi speeches, II, 252-53.

28 Paasikivi speeches, I, 69.

29 For the text see Mazour, op. cit., pp. 249-59.

30 It has been pointed out by Rintala, Marvin, “The Problem of Generations in Finnish Communism,” The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (April, 1958), p. 201 Google Scholar, that both Mannerheim and Paasikivi matured intellectually during the 1880's and early 1890's, which was a period of harmonious relations between Russia and Finland. The period of russification in Finland had not yet begun, and consequently, as Rintala notes, “These eminent conservatives thus had an appropriate Weltanschauung, acquired a half-century before, to put into effect this new policy of moderation and accommodation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union after 1944.” One might add, however, that while Finland was at war with the Soviet Union Mannerheim's attitude towards the Soviet Union seems to have been somewhat ambiguous, and more investigation is required to determine exactly what Mannerheim's position was.

31 V. J. Sukselainen, “A Statesman's Life,” Finlandia Review, 1957, p. 35.

32 At first this Society consisted of members of all political parties, the common bond being a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The Society has since become a fellow-traveling organization.

33 Paasikivi speeches, I, 9-10.

34 Ibid., p. 10.

35 Although the terms of the Armistice have been considered excessive by a number of observers, Paasikivi in a speech celebrating the first anniversary of the signing of the - agreement stated that “the fate of our country was not more severe than what a conquered state, as history bears witness, usually experiences in war.” Ibid., p. 23.

36 For a more detailed treatment of the reparations question see Suviranta, Bruno, Suomen sotakorvaus ja maksukyky (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Otava, 1948)Google Scholar; and Pipping, Hugo E., Suomen talouselama toisen maailmansodan jalkeen (Kaarlo Lama, trans.) (Helsinki: Soderstrom & Co.), pp. 113-17Google Scholar.

37 Wuorinen, John H., “Democracy Gains in Finland, II , “ Current History, Vol. XXI, No. 124 (December, 1951), p. 328 Google Scholar.

38 Mazour, op. cit., p. 170.

39 Some authorities have taken an unduly negative attitude towards the initial postwar developments in Finland. In the foreword to Wuorinen, John H. (ed.), Finland and World War II1939-1944 (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 21 Google Scholar, it is stated: “Democracy in general … should be spoken of, if mentioned at all, with a sneer or condescension.” For a more objective picture see J. Hampden Jackson, “Finland since the Armistice,” International Affairs, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1948), pp. 505-14.

40 Even today there are responsible Finns who have not learned from the past and who continue to reproach Paasikivi and followers of the “Paasikivi Line.” See Soini, Yrjo, Kuin Pietari hiilivalkealla (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Otava, 1956), pp. 32, 55, 65, 129, 335-36, 377Google Scholar. For the Soviet reaction to this book see Pravda, February 13, 1956, p. 4.

41 Paasikivi speeches, I, 15-16.

42 Many people, in Finland and abroad, who sought the key to Finnish problems in the tradition of old Finnish diplomacy have misinterpreted the motives behind the initial postwar action of such leaders as Paasikivi. Wuorinen in his foreword, op. cit., p. 21, asserts that “the powers-that-be” (i.e. Paasikivi) assume that if the Finns are exposed for a long enough period of time to “the ‘new freedom’ which Russia represents” the Finns will change, and they will reject “the old gods of democracy and liberty and will meekly and unquestioningly worship the new idols of Moscow.“

43 Valros, op. cit., p. 62. The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) was formed in 1918, outlawed in 1930, and legalized again on October 19, 1944. It forms the hard core of the SKDL, which was organized on November 2, 1944, by the Finnish communists and leftwing socialists who had broken with the Social Democratic Party. Today the SKDL is comprised of communists, fellow travelers, and such red organizations as the Democratic League of Women, the Academic Socialist Society, and the League of Associations of Finland. (Sojuz tovarishchestv Finljandii). At election time the number of voters that cast ballots for the SKDL always considerably exceeds the number of members, which accounts for the large representation of the SKDL in Parliament.

44 Matti Janhunen became Minister for Social Affairs, and Yrjö Murto was given the post of Minister of Supply.

45 Ordinarily presidential elections in Finland are held every six years, and the president is chosen by an electoral college of 300. But due to the unusual situation in 1944 when Mannerheim became President, Parliament acted as the electoral college, and it did so again in 1946 when Paasikivi was elected head of the Finnish Republic for the remaining four years of Mannerheim's term.

46 Pekkala joined the SKDL in January, 1945, and when the Socialist Unity Party (SYP) was formed on March 22, 1946, he became a member of it. The SYP consisted of left-wing socialists and was an integral part of the SKDL. The New York Times reported on March 14, 1955, p. 5, that the SYP has officially broken off cooperation with the communist party.

47 Reinhold Svento in Kare, op. cit., p. 10.

48 For the text see Mazour, op. cit., pp. 260-79.

49 Paasikivi speeches, I, 89.

50 Bess, Demaree, “Finland Hasn't Surrendered to Russia,” The Saturday Evening Post Vol. 220, No. 52 (June 26, 1948), p. 118 Google Scholar; Kuusinen, Hertta in Valtiopäivat 1947 Pöytäkirjat, Vol. IV (Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kirjapaino, 1948) p. 3889 Google Scholar; Goran von Bonsdorff, “Patterns for Peaceful Coexistence,” New Times, August 23, 1956, p. 10. See Mazour, op. cit., pp. 280-82 for the text of the treaty.

51 Valtiopäivät 1947 Pöytäkirjat, IV, 3906. In addition thirty delegates were absent from the vote, and from an examination of the party affiliations of those who cast ballots against ratification and who were absent from the open vote it is clear that the most marked anti- Soviet sentiment was to be found in the National Progressive Party and to a somewhat lesser degree in the large right-wing party, the National Coalition Party.

52 Valktiopäivät 1947 Pöytäkirjat, V, 4019.

53 In the discussion that took place in the Finnish Parliament in May, 1948, Urho Kekkonen, who was Minister of Justice at the time the twenty were handed over, stated on behalf of President Paasikivi that after Leino had reported his action to Paasikivi the latter conferred with Foreign Minister Enckell and both came to the conclusion that the order would have had to be complied with. Kekkonen added that after the situation had been explained to the foreign affairs committee of Parliament and to the Cabinet in private conference both bodies agreed with the Paasikivi-Enckell stand. Valtiopdivdt 1947 Poytakirjat, V, 4011.

54 Paasivuori in ibid., p. 4007.

55 Ibid., p. 4016.

56 Ibid., pp. 4053-54.

57 Article 36 of Finland's Form of Government Act, in Ministry for Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 10.

58 Quoted in East Europe, Vol. IV, No. 184 (June 3, 1948), p. 6.

59 According to Izvestia, May 30, 1948, p. 4, these new appointments were just compnsation for the dismissal of Leino, and the Soviet conclusion was that the Right elements in Finland had failed in their designs. Hertta Kuusinen is the daughter of Otto Kuusinen, who is weil-known for his Comintern activities and who is at present a full member of the Soviet Party Presidium. Hertta Kuusinen's first marriage was to the leading Finnish communist Tuure Lehén, and then she married Yrjö Leino.

60 Valros, op. cit., p. 18.

61 Ibid., p. 62. Percentage wise the biggest loser in the elections was the party of extreme anti-Soviet sentiment, the National Progressive Party, whose représentation decreased from nine to five.

62 Eric G. Bellquist, “Finland: Democracy in Travail,“ The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 2 (June, 1949), p. 222; J. Hampden Jackson, op. cit., p. 513.

63 The rétention of Enckell was a clear indication that the policles advocated by Paasi-kivi were to be continued. It would be interesting to ascertain whether Enckell arrived independently at a position in ail essential respects similar to that of Paasikivi \ policy towards the Soviet Union, or whether Paasikivi exerted influence on the develop-ment of Enckell's ideas. A speech delivered by Enckell in 1926 is certainly reminiscent of addresses made by Paasikivi: “Our way of action must be such that public opinion in both Russia and other countries trusts that we want to establish our independence in i peaceful cooperation with our eastern neighbor to the mutual benefit of both countries, ‘ but at the same time we must let the Russians and the whole world know to what an immense degree our existence differs in ail respects from Russian conditions.” Quoted in Puntila, L. A., “Suomen idän-politiikka muistelmien ja puheiden valossa,” Historiallinen aikakauskirja, No. 2, 1957, p. 163 Google Scholar. Enckell remained Foreign Minister from 1944 to 1950, and there is no doubt that his role in postwar Finland was exceedingly important and

64 Quoted in Bellquist, op. cit., p. 217; referred to in East Europe, Vol. IV, No. 176 (April 8, 1948), p. 8.

65 Bellquist, op. cit., p. 218; East Europe, Vol. IV, No. 180 (May 6, 1948), p. 7; Jackson, Bt op. cit., p. 511.

66 Jackson, op. cit., p. 511; East Europe, Vol. IV, No. 180 (May 6, 1948), p. 7; article in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, April 25, 1948, entitled “The Revolution Which Never Happened.“

67 Procopé, Hjalmar J., Stalin over Finland (New York: News Background, 1948), pp. 4–5 Google Scholar; Spencer, Arthur, “Finland Maintains Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (January, 1953), p. 304 Google Scholar; Bellquist, op. cit., p. 218. In late 1948 Fagerholm's SD Government abolished Valpo.

68 It would appear that the army in Czechoslovakia was loyal to President Benes and could have been used effectively in the maintenance of Czech democracy. Kertesz, Stephen D. (ed.), The Fate of East Central Europe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 210-11Google Scholar.

69 Hjalmar Procopé in a letter to The New York Times, June 27, 1948, section 4, p. 8; Bess, op. cit., p. 28; East Europe, Vol. IV, No. 177 (April 15, 1948), p. 8; East Europe, Vol. IV, No. 180 (May 6, 1948), p. 7.

70 Speaking of the Leino affair and other events of 1948, one Finnish writer states: “In the year 1948 the communists obviously also buried their plans for revolution. The President's personal tackling of the problems settled the matters.” Iisakki Laati in Kare, op. cit., p. 55. One should keep in mind, however, that regardless of how important a role Paasikivi played he could not have succeeded in his actions without the existence of certain preconditions and factors beyond his control.

71 Pekkala received 67 votes and Kekkonen 62. Kuusi, Matti (ed.), Suomen Tasavallan Presidentit (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1952), p. 209 Google Scholar.

72 The percentage of eligible voters who cast ballots in 1951 dropped in comparison with the 1948 vote—from 78.2% to 74.6%—and in his speech opening the Diet session Paasikivi criticized the apparent lack of interest in matters that were of such vital concern to the whole country. Paasikivi has been consistent in his warning that the future of Finland depends on the Finns themselves, and this apparent show of indifference could not but worry him.

73 Paasikivi speeches, I, 170.

74 Ibid., p. 192.

75 For the Protocol on the extension of the Treaty see Pravda, September 20, 1955, p. 1, and for the Agreement on Porkkala see ibid., p. 2.

76 Quoted in Pravda, September 19, 1955, p. 1. The leasing of Porkkala and the granting of travel rights to it had caused Mannerheim to remark to Paasikivi in a moment of dejection that the capital of Finland should be moved to Turku. Paasikivi speeches, I, pp. 192-93.

77 This point is brought out in an editorial that appeared in Uusi Suomi, September 20, 1955, p. 4.

78 In a radio speech delivered on September 22, 1955, President Paasikivi stated that the Soviets considered the extension of the 1948 Treaty a precondition for the return of Porkkala. Paasikivi speeches, I, 193. S.-K. Kilpi, head of the Finnish-Soviet Society and member of the SKDL, herself intimated that the renewal of the treaty and the return of Porkkala was an exchange of “gifts.” Valtiopäivät 1955 Pöytäkirjat (Helsinki; Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino, 1956), II, 1222.

79 Valtiopäivät 1955 Pöytäkirjat, II, 1232.

80 In 1951 the National Progressive Party underwent a reorganization and was renamed the Finnish People's Party. The new party is not so anti-Soviet as was the National Progressive Party, and today the party that the Soviet Union considers the most reactionary is the National Coalition Party.

81 Karvikko in Valtiopäivät 1955 Pöytäkirjat, II, 1229.

82 Paasikivi speeches, I, 188.

83 On the first ballot in Finnish presidential elections the electors customarily cast ballots for the men upon whom their candidacy was based, and, if no presidential candidate receives a majority on the first vote, a second round of voting takes place. If a third vote is necessary, it is a contest between the two contenders who had the most number of votes on the second count,in this case Fagerholm and Kekkonen. In the 1956 election the “dark horse” was clearly Vaino Tanner, a key figure in the Social Democratic Party, whom the Soviet leaders consider the center of reaction and anti-Soviet elements in Finland. It would appear that Tanner hoped to get the support of the right-wing parties, especially the National Coalition Party, on the second ballot and thus meet Kekkonen on the final vote.

84 An editorial that appeared in the leading liberal Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, on December 30, 1956, p. 6, acknowledges that in many respects Kekkonen has gone through the Paasikivi school.

85 Quoted in E. A. Ambarcumov, op. cit., p. 95; also quoted in Mauri Riuemia (M. Röymä), “Ob otnoshenijakh mezhdu Finljandiej i Sovetskom Sojuzom,” Mezhdunarodnqja zhizn', April, 1956, p. 32.

86 Izvestia, August 21, 1956, p. 1. This “consistency” may be challenged by many (see article by C. L. Sulzberger in The New York Times, January 17, 1950, p. 10), but at least since 1943, when Kekkonen became a leading member of an opposition group working for Finland's withdrawal from the war (Lundin, op. cit., pp. 6, 180; C. O. Frietsch, Suomen kohtalonvuodet [Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Tammi], 1945, pp. 496-97), there seems no reason to doubt Kekkonen's consistency in dealing with questions involving the Soviet Union.

87 Quoted in Helsingin Sanomat, December 16, 1956, p. 24.

88 Dagens Nyheter, quoted in Helsingin Sanomat, December 16, 1956, p. 24.

89 Helsingin Sanomat, December 16, 1956, p. 8.

90 Helsingin Sanomat, June 9, 1957, p. 12; Pravda, June 9, 1957, p. 2.

91 Izvestia, September 19, 1954, p. 3.

92 See the speech by Khrushchev quoted in Helsingin Sanomat, June 9, 1957, p. 12. Statements made in Izvestia, April 6, 1956, p. 3, lead one to speculate that the change of attitude with respect to Finnish participation in the Nordic Council is tied up with the desire and hope that Finland will be able to sway the Scandinavian countries to a position more favorable to the Soviet Union.

93 Uusi Suorni, quoted in Pravda, June 10, 1957, p. 3.

94 Kekkonen's speech is quoted in Pravda, January 27, 1952, p. 4. In effect Kekkonen was calling upon the Scandinavian countries to adopt a neutral position similar to that of i Sweden and Finland, and this speech apparently evoked criticism at home from such leading politicians as K.-A. Fagerholm. See Spencer, op. cit., pp. 306-07.

95 Quoted in Pravda, April 26, 1955, p. 3.

96 Paasikivi speeches, I, 210.

97 Ibid., p. 214.

98 The results of the elections, however, do not indicate an end to the unstable political situation in Finland. Although the SKDL received only slightly more votes than in the 1954 elections, this organization nevertheless has emerged from the recent July elections as the largest political party represented in the Finnish Parliament. The SKDL has increased its representation by seven, now having fifty delegates in Parliament, and the extreme right-wing party, the National Coalition Party, also has gained a significant triumph in the elections. The moderate center party suffered a resounding defeat, and so the election has resulted in a pronounced polarization between the extreme left and the extreme right. All political parties except the small group of Independent Socialists have announced that they will not enter a Government with members of the SKDL, and it seems doubtful that the new Cabinet, which is to be formed at the end of July, will include representatives of the National Coalition Party. Therefore, it would seem that the only chance of a stable Government being formed is for the Agrarian League and the Social Democratic Party to reach some sort of agreement on the economic issues dividing them and to resume cooperation that has not existed for some time. Many problems must be solved before such an agreement is possible, but perhaps the recent victory of the extreme left and right will prod the Agrarians and Social Democrats into closer cooperation.

99 The seeds of the crisis were sown in 1950, but it was not until 1956 that the real crisis broke out and split the party into two wings: the wing led by E. Skog and the wing led by Tanner's protege V. Leskinen. The present struggle between the two wings ostensibly revolves around economic issues, but this controversy has its impact on foreign policy also since the Leskinen-Tanner wing favors cooperation with the extreme Right elements in Finnish politics, the National Coalition Party, whereas Skog and Fagerholm favor collaboration with the Agrarian League. See Kymen Sanomat, March 25, 1958.

100 Izvestia, October 26, 1957, p. 4; also quoted in Uusi Suomi, October 27, 1957.

101 The New York Times, October 25, 1957, p. 7; Izvestia, October 26, 1957, p. 4.

102 M. Rintala has pointed out to me that the extreme anti-Soviet feeling of men of Tanner's generation may be due in part to the fact that they matured intellectually during the worst period of Russification in Finland. All the Finns who were tried as war criminals in the postwar period became university students during that time, 1900-13.

103 Leskinen states that the methods used by Paasikivi to ensure Finnish independence are open to criticism, and he adds that Paasikivi was inclined to exaggerate the extent of foreign and domestic political dangers. Leskinen in Kare, op. cit., pp. 62, 66.

104 From a speech by deputy Tuuli, a member of the National Coalition Party and by birth a Karelian, in Valtiopäivät 1955 Pöytäkirjat, II , 1217-18.

105 From a speech by deputy J. Wirtanen, a member of the National Coalition Party, in Valtiopäivät 1955 Pöytäkirjat, II, 1228. Wirtanen is not a Karelian and his district would not seem to be one where many Karelian refugees reside. Therefore, the stand by Wirtanen would seem to be simply an exhibition of nationalism that is to be found in abundance in , the right-wing National Coalition Party.

106 Izvestia, July 13, 1956, p. 10. The one possible concession that Finland may get from the Soviet Union is the right to use the Saimaa Canal. During President Kekkonen's visit to the Soviet Union, at the end of May, 1958, the question of the Canal was discussed, and it would appear that in the near future arrangements will be made to grant Finland use of the Canal for fifty years. See the Communique issued regarding the results of President Kekkonen's visit, in Izvestia, May 31, 1958, p. 1. See also speeches by Khrushchev and Voroshilov in Izvestia, May 24, 1958, p. 2, and Izvestia, May 31,1958, p. 3.

107 Wuorinen, John H., “Finjand Stands Guard,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (July, 1954), p. 655 Google Scholar.

108 V. Vladimirov, “O politicheskom polozhenii v Finljandii,” Bol’shevik, No. 22, November, 1950, p. 68.

109 In 1954 some 430,000 voters cast their ballots for the SKDL (Wuorinen, “Finland Stands Guard,” op. cit., p. 655), and in the postwar elections the SKDL has usually polled around 20 % of the vote. The percentages in the five postwar parliamentary elections are as follows: 23 . 5% in 1945; 20.0% in 1948; 21 . 5% in 1951; 21.6% in 1954; and 23 . 1% in 1958.

110 Rintala, op. cit., p. 196. The Finnish Civil War took place in January-May, 1918.

111 Ibid., p. 200.

112 Paasikivi often stated that Russia and the Soviet Union were interested in Finland primarily for reasons of military strategy. Paasikivi speeches, I, 36.

113 Paasikivi speeches, I, 101; II , 21. It would seem somewhat superficial to state: “How long the nation will enjoy the hard-earned peaceful anchorage and prosperity will depend largely upon events beyond control of the Finnish people.” Mazour, op. cit., p. 206.

114 Paasikivi stated: “The duty of every people is to hold on to the preconditions for its existence and success and to be ready to use all its strength, even, if necessary, to die for one's freedom. But that is a final means, which must be resorted to only when peaceful efforts and negotiations have proved to be impossible.” J. K. Paasikivi, Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta (Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtion kirjapaino, 1957, I), 77.

115 Puntila, J. K. Paasikiven linja, p. 15.