1 Halecki, O., “Imperialism in Slavic and East European History,” American Slavic and East European Review, XI, No. 1 (February, 1952), 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Ibid., p. 2.

3 See Sokol, A. E., “Russian Expansion and Exploration in the Pacific,” American Slavic and East European Review, XI, No. 2 (April, 1952), 85–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Professor Halecki pays a little more attention to that reverse side of the medal in some of his other works. See, e.g., Halecki, O., A History of Poland (New York, 1943), pp. 134–35 and 145–47.Google Scholar

5 To be exact, Professor Halecki speaks of “the absence of any imperialism in Kievan Ruś.” O. Halecki, “Imperialism in Slavic and East European History,” p. 10.

6 The death of Vladimir was followed by a civil war among his heirs. Svjatopolk, Vladimir's son or grandson who reigned in Turov, killed the sons of Vladimir, Boris, Gleb, and Svjatoslav, and occupied Kiev, the seat of the great princedom (1015). One of the remaining sons of Vladimir, Yaroslav, prince of Novgorod, managed, however, to gather an army, defeat Svjatopolk and drive him out of Kiev. Svjatopolk escaped to his father-in-law, the Polish king, Boleslav I, the Brave, and begged his help. The latter invaded the Kievan state with a large army, defeated Yaroslav, and reestablished Svjatopolk in Kiev (1018). In the course of this enterprise Kiev was laid waste by Polish troops, Boleslav obtained a large booty, and, in addition to that, a grateful Svjatopolk agreed to Polish rule in Red Russia. That Red Russia settlement was not approved by the Kievan veče, nor is there any reason to believe that the Kievan Russians considered the entire undertaking as anything but stark aggression on the part of Poland. When Yaroslav succeeded in regaining Kiev and consolidating his own power and that of his State, he demanded from Poland the return of the Kievan lands and, upon refusal, waged a bitter war against the Poles (1031).

7 These other territories included Novgorod, where the same Prince Alexander who defeated the Teutonic knights and the Swedes had to fight several major campaigns against the Lithuanians. The history of Lithuanian aggression against Novgorod would form interesting parallel reading to the history of Moscow aggression against Novgorod, related by Professor Halecki. It is worth noting that Moscow had ancient dynastic and other connections with Novgorod, not to mention the ethnic identity of the peoples of the two principalities, while Lithuania had no such bonds at all with the city state. It appears that at least in the decisive years of the second half of the fifteenth century it was the aristocratic party in Novgorod that was oriented towards Lithuania and the popular party that favored Moscow.

8 There is an enormous literature on this subject because it is at the very heart of the histories of Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and White Russia, not to mention some other lands which it affects less directly. To see just one pair of recent contrasting accounts, read, for instance, the story of Polish-Lithuanian relations as as presented by Professor Halecki in his above-mentioned History of Poland and by T. Chase in his Story of Lithuania (New York, 1946). Perhaps the next contribution to this discussion of aggression in Eastern Europe should be made by a specialist in the history of Lithuania or in that of the Ukraine. One would also like to read a book primarily concerned with the overwhelmingly tragic story of the Jews of Eastern Europe. This group certainly possesses some special qualifications to speak on East European aggression, even though its views might be upsetting to those who have an excessive faith in the historical achievement of Russia, or of Poland, or of other East European countries for that matter.

9 To avoid both the “Great Russian” and the Polish historians, one might read, for instance, the first, background chapters of R. H. Lord's excellent study of the second partition of Poland. Lord, R. H., The Second Partition of Poland (Cambridge, Mass., 1915)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 In 1666 the Ukrainians on the right bank of the Dnieper, an area still held by Poland, even swore allegiance to Turkey to escape their oppressors. This extraordinary occurrence can serve as an additional comment on the nature of the Polish regime in the Ukraine.

11 It was also from Sweden that Russia later acquired Finland—as a result of another successful war and the treaty of Friedrichsham of 1809. Finland was brought into the Russian state as a separate Grand Duchy, and the Finns were given a political autonomy which they had not enjoyed under the Swedes. This arrangement lasted until the very end of the nineteenth century, when it was superseded by a policy of violent Russianization. The Baltic territories acquired by Peter the Great were not given a separate constitution, but their dominant Baltic-German minority profited from vast privileges in its own area and numerous positions of great power and prestige in the empire at large.

12 For Professor Halecki's original view of what is and what is not European, see his recent work, The Limits and Divisions of European History (New York, 1950).

13 The fact that this impression is so striking is in itself a confession that one tends to be influenced by the politics of one's own day as one approaches history. Otherwise why should it be striking that before Communism gave Russia a radically new system and ideology, the Russian Government and society held similar beliefs and acted like similar governments and societies elsewhere in Europe?

14 That is notably true of Alexander III, who ruled Russia from 1881 to 1894. Professor Bernadotte Schmitt, for instance, calls him “a staunch supporter of peace and an opponent of adventures.” Schmitt, B., Triple Alliance and Triple Entente (New York, 1934), p. 46.Google Scholar

15 It was over the Near East that Russia fought its one war against European powers in the years between Vienna and Sarajevo, namely, the Crimean War of 1853–1856, in which Russia was opposed by Great Britain, France, and Piedmont, as well as by Turkey. The only other Russian campaigns in Europe during that century were waged as parts of two wars against Turkey (1828–1829 and 1877–1878), or to suppress the Polish revolutions in 1830–1831 and 1863–1864, as well as the Hungarian revolution against Austria in 1849.

16 Professor Hayes has discussed nationalism in general, and integral nationalism in particular, in several of his well-known works. See: Essays on Nationalism, (New York, 1926); The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931); and A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900 (New York, 1941).

17 Neither Lord Curzon, who is responsible for the famous line, nor the Allied governments which upheld it, were at all pro-Soviet. The line, however, had the simple virtue of being an approximate ethnic boundary between the Poles and the Eastern Slavs, which was not true of the eastern boundary which the Polish republic managed to win for itself by force of arms. In addition to the obvious differences of language and background, there was the fact that the Ukrainians and the White Russians were Orthodox or Uniate, whereas the Poles were Roman Catholic, and religion has proved to be an extremely important force in determining nationality and allegiance throughout the history of Eastern Europe.

18 Today one is often reminded of the way some people would not seriously consider the statements of Nazi leaders or their programs, with the difference that the Communist spokesmen are very much more articulate. But the more the Soviet leaders emphasize Marx and Engels, the more certain critics become convinced that these leaders are really inspired by the so-called Testament of Peter the Great or the legacy of Genghiz Khan.

19 As, to pick out one example, does Mr.Dallin, D. in The New Soviet Empire (New Haven, 1951).Google Scholar I commented on Mr. Dallin's thesis in my review of his book in The American Historical Review, LVII, No. 2, 450–52.

20 Of course, good as well as bad national traits have been ascribed to the Russians in profusion, and deserve as much or as little consideration. I discussed the problem briefly in my article on “Some Ways to Misunderstand Russian History,” The American Oxonian, XXXVII, No. 3 (July, 1950), pp. 117–21.