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II. The Low Countries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
Extract
The contest between monarchy and representative institutions had a unique outcome in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century as a result of several factors. The most obvious of these is the fact that their rulers had inherited a royal title in Castile and Aragon. The financial and administrative institutions of the modern state which the monarchs attempted to introduce into their possessions in the Low Countries were therefore bound to be regarded as foreign importations. They conflicted with the representative institutions which had grown up in the Netherlands as elsewhere in Europe during the Middle Ages. The chief of these, the Estates-General, continued to flourish in the Low Countries long after they had entered upon hopeless decline in France and Spain. Moreover, the wealth of the Low Countries, industrially, commercially, and financially the most advanced region of sixteenth-century Europe, made them an attractive target for the Hapsburg bureaucracy, harried as it was by the gargantuan task of financing the wars of Charles V and Philip II.
- Type
- Representative Institutions in the Spanish Empire in the Sixteenth Century
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1956
References
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