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The Marquis of Pombal and the American Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

Dauril Alden*
Affiliation:
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington

Extract

During the imperial crisis of the 1770's the Pennsylvania conservative, Joseph Galloway, offered a plan to close the everwidening breach that was dividing England and her colonies. Galloway's Plan of Union, a revision of the Albany Plan proposed by Franklin twenty years before, called for the establishment of a subordinate colonial parliament “for regulating the administration of the general affairs of America.” Though rejected by the Continental Congress, the plan continued to draw support from some statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic. Among them, curiously enough, was the Marquis of Pombal, Portugal's prime minister, a man who by no stretch of the imagination could be regarded as a friend of popular government.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1961

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References

1 For the Galloway Plan of 1774 and reaction to it see Boyd, Julian P., Anglo-American Union. Joseph Galloway ’s Plans to Preserve the British Empire, 1774–1788 (Philadelphia, 1941), chap. III,Google Scholar and Brown, Weldon A., Empire or Independence. A Study in the Failure of Reconciliation, 1774–1783 (Baton Rouge, 1941), pp. 1417.Google ScholarPubMed

2 The best and most dispassionate biography of Pombal (1699–1782) remains de Azevedo, João Lucio, O Marquês de Pombal e a sua época (2d ed.; Rio de Janeiro [1922]).Google Scholar For an introduction to the extensive literature concerning the controversial minister see Rodrigues, Alfredo Duarte, O Marquês de Pombal e os seus biógrafos (Lisbon, 1947).Google Scholar

3 See Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (2d ed.; Bloomington, Ind., 1957), chaps. II and IV and sources cited there.Google Scholar

4 There is a brief discussion of the document in Azevedo, pp. 273-274. It was first published by Luz Soriano, José da, História do reinado de el-rei d. José e da administração do marquêz de Pombal …, 2 (Lisbon, 1867), 639645,Google Scholar and subsequently, apparently from Pombal’s own copy, by Judice Biker, Julio Firmino, O Marquêz de Pombal: alguns documentos inéditos (Lisbon, 1882), pp. 3545.Google Scholar The National Union Catalog lists Luz Soriano as available in the libraries of the Catholic University of America, the University of California (Berkeley), Harvard, and the Newberry Library; copies of Judice Biker are in the Library of Congress, the library of Yale University, the New York Public Library, the Peabody Institute, and the Library Company of Philadelphia.

5 This and the following paragraph are based upon Alden, D., “The Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy of Brazil (1769–1779), and the Climax of Luso-Spanish Platine Rivalry,” unpublished dissertation (Berkeley, 1959), chaps. IV–VI.Google Scholar For a brief summary of Luso-Spanish Platine rivalry in the eighteenth century see Alden, D., “The Undeclared War of 1773–1777: Climax of Luso-Spanish Platine Rivalry,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XLI (Feb., 1961), 5574.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 The Algiers’ expedition (40,000 men and nearly 400 ships) was intended partly to punish the Dey of Algiers for encouraging the king of Morocco to rebel against Spain, but mainly to remind Europe that Spain was still a leading power. See Ballesteros, Antonio y Beretta, , Historia de España y su influencia en el mundo, 5 (Barcelona, 1929), 188 Google Scholar; Casado, Vicente Rodríguez, Política marroqui de Carlos 3 (Madrid, 1946), pp. 235244 Google Scholar; and Coxe, William, Memoires of the Kinges of Spain of the House of Bourbon … 1700 … to … 1788, 5 (2d ed.; London, 1815), 17.Google Scholar

7 Vértiz, to Fray Julián Arriaga (Minister of Marine), March 14 and May 9, 1775, Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires, Documentos referentes a la guerra de la independencia … Campaña del Brasil, Antecedentes coloniales, 3 (Buenos Aires, 1941), 326330 Google Scholar; Munilla, Octavio Gil, El Río de la Plata en la política internacional. Génesis del virreinato (Seville, 1949), pp. 255258, 262–263Google Scholar; Pombal to Marquis of Lavradio (viceroy of Brazil), Aug. 26, 1775, Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1-2, 4, 7, n. 15 (hereafter cited BNRJ).

8 From intelligence reports from Madrid gathered by the Portuguese ambassador, Dom Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho. Sousa Coutinho to Ayres de Sá e Melo (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), Madrid, July 17, 1775, BNRJ, 1-2, 4, 7, n. 11.

9 Pombal to Lavradio, July 27, 1775, private manuscript collection of Marcos Carneiro de Mendonça, Rio de Janeiro, cód. 14 (49/10) (orig.); idem to idem, same date, ibid., (49/7) (orig.).

10 Pombal to Luis Pinto de Sousa (Portuguese minister plenipotentiary to London), Aug. 26, 1775, Luz Soriano, II, 606–610; idem, “Pro-memoria confidencial para se comunicar ao Sr. Roberto Walpole (British ambassador to Lisbon), n. d. but after July 23, 1775, ibid., pp. 610–619; idem to Pinto de Sousa, Sept. 8 and Nov. 25, 1775, ibid., pp. 619–623, 627–639.

11 For the Spanish suspension order see Arriaga, to Vértiz, , Aug. 12, 1775, Campaña del Brasil, 3, 337338.Google Scholar

12 Gil Munilla, op. cit., p. 271.

13 Ibid., pp. 277–278.

14 Pombal (at Pancas) to Melo e Castro (with the king at the royal palace of Ajuda), Dec. 2, 3 and 4 (with replies for each date), 1775, BNRJ, 1-33, 9, 135.

15 Confirmation of Pombal’s suspicion is furnished by The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature from the Year 1776 (4th ed.; London, 1788), p. 186. After surveying the borderlands’ conflict, it concluded: “However the matter of right may have been between the two countries, it is certain that the conduct of the Court of Lisbon was charged by their adversaries to have been, in every part of their proceeding, full of artifice, fallacy, and breach of faith.”

16 I. e., a dispatch from Pinto de Sousa dated Nov. 7, 1775, cited in par. 1 of the document that follows.

17 Pombal to Melo e Castro, Dec. 3, 1775, cited in note 14, above.

18 In 1765 the English minister in Lisbon complained that Pombal “seemed to lay it down for a maxim, that it is the undoubted interest of Great Britain to assist Portugal upon every emergency. …” Hay to Conway, Oct. 9, 1765, as quoted in Christelow, Allen, “Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 1759–1783,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 27 (Feb., 1947), 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 For Hamilton’s famous prediction concerning Washington’s strategy see “The Farmer Refuted: Or, a More Impartial and Comprehensive View of the Dispute between Great Britain and the Colonies. … (Feb. 5, 1775)” in Morris, Richard B.; ed., The Basic Ideas of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1957), pp. 1011.Google Scholar Cf.Miller, John C. M, Origins of the American Revolution (Boston, 1943), pp. 430433.Google Scholar

It is possible that Pombal, who had no known agents in the English colonies, obtained a copy of Hamilton’s remarks through his minister to London or from a passing Yankee ship captain; but in absence of proof that he was familiar with Hamilton’s prophesy and in view of the very limited sources of information that Pombal evidently had of developments in the English colonies, his prediction seems quite remarkable.

20 It is evident that Pombal was misled as to the strength of the advocates of the Galloway Plan in the colonies (see sources cited in note 1). Certainly there was little support for its main proposal in Parliament, where a “Bill for Settling the Troubles in America” by extending formal recognition to the Continental Congress was introduced by the Earl of Chatham on February 1, 1775, and was defeated sixty-one votes to thirty-two. Beloff, Max, ed., The Debate on the American Revolution 1761–1783 (London, 1949), pp. 195202.Google Scholar

21 This was precisely Patrick Henry’s reason for opposing the Galloway Plan. See Boyd, op. cit., p. 38.

22 Pombal to Melo e Castro, Dec. 3, 1775, cited in note 14. Melo e Castro replied that it would nevertheless be a good idea for minister Pinto de Sousa to keep in touch with Portugal's influential friends in the British government, including Lord George German, Lord Gower, President of the Cabinet, and the Earl of Mansfield. Melo e Castro to Pombal, Dec. 4, 1775, loc. cit. For an excellent description of the operations of the Secret Office see Ellis, Kenneth, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century: a Study in Administrative History (London, 1958), pp. 6077.Google Scholar

23 Professor Ellis informs me that if the dispatch was sent en clair, as it was, “it was … certainly opened and copied, and read by the King, the Secretaries of State and the First Lord of the Treasury.” Letter to writer, Aug. 29, 1959. There is, however, no mention of the dispatch in the published correspondence of George III or of the principal members of the cabinet, nor in Turner’s, E. R. The Cabinet Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1622–1784, 2 (Baltimore, 1932).Google Scholar

24 Alden, John Richard, The American Revolution, 1775–1783 (New York, 1954), chap. V.Google Scholar

25 In October, 1776 Lord George Germain congratulated General William Howe on his victory in the battle of Long Island, adding that "the attention of every power in Europe was fixed upon this event, and I trust that your success will so increase the weight and influence of [t]his kingdom, that the peace of Europe may be preserved, which at present is in great danger from the disputes between Spain and Portugal.” Germain to Howe, Oct. 18, 1776, Historical Manuscripts Commission. Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville of Drayton House, Northamptonshire, II (London, 1910), 42.

26 See Weymouth (secretary of state for the northern department) to Stormont (English ambassador to France), St. James’, Sept. 27 and Oct. 25, 1776, Legg, L. G. Wickham, ed., British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689–1789, 7, France, Pt. IV, Royal Historical Society. Camden 3rd ser., XLIX (London, 1934), 153155.Google Scholar

27 Edict of July 5 [?], 1776, da Silva, Antonio Delgado, comp., Coleção da legislação portuguesa [1750–1820], 3 (Lisbon, 1830), 99.Google Scholar A translation of this decree under the date of June 4, 1776 appeared in The Annual Register … for … 1776, pp. 260–261, where it was compared with a Spanish order which, in effect, recognized the belligerency status of the rebel colonies. Weymouth sent a copy of the Portuguese edict to Stormont, adding that “it is unnecessary to apprize you that it would be very desirable that something similar should be done at the court where you reside …,” but the Comte de Vergennes (Foreign Minister of France) replied that France “can not do as Portugal has done, cannot forbid the Americans our Ports, and expose ourselves to a War with them [!]” Weymouth to Stormont, July 26, 1776, Stevens, Benjamin Franklin, ed., Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America 1773–1783, 13 (London, 1892), n. 1341,Google Scholar and Stormont to Weymouth, July 9, 1777, ibid., XVI (London, 1893), n. 1567.

28 The writer is preparing a note on this little known phase of the Revolution from scattered manuscript and printed sources.

29 See Alden, , “The Undeclared War,” p. 74.Google Scholar