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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
In August, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson made one of his numerous attempts to remold Mexico in the image of the United States by sending a special executive agent, John Lind, to hasten the political demise of Provisional President Victoriano Huerta. Having refused Huerta diplomatic recognition because he achieved power by military coup d'etat, Wilson instructed Lind to insist that Huerta arrange an armistice with the Constitutionalists, the revolutionaries who had risen in rebellion rather than accept the usurper's rule. Free elections, in which Huerta was not to be a candidate for President, were to follow the armistice. Following his Anglo-Saxon instincts, Wilson assumed that, if all parties abided by the results of the elections, a constitutionally legitimate government would be installed and the source of Mexico's revolutionary strife would thereby be eliminated.
1 Letter, To Whom It May Concern, August 4, 1913, and Instructions (Mexico), John Lind Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, Box 3; drafts of both in Woodrow Wilson Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Series II, Box 95. Actually there was little new in these instructions, insomuch as two months earlier Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson had been instructed to follow similar guidelines in his relations with the Huerta government. Suspecting with good reason that Ambassador Wilson had been at least indirectly involved in the coup that elevated Huerta to power, President Wilson feared that his official representative had not been vigorously pressing Huerta to accept the proposals. Henry Lane Wilson, therefore, was recalled and President Wilson determined to send a special agent to press the matter more firmly. See State Department to American Embassy, June 15, 1913, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, RG 59, 812.00/7743; hereinafter documents from the State Department 812.00 (Internal Affairs of Mexico) file will be cited only by slash number; draft in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 94; State Department to American Embassy, August 4, 1913, U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), pp. 817–18.
2 New York Times, March 12, 1913; Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson: Lije and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, N.Y., 1931), 4, 64–65.Google Scholar
3 Testimony of William F. Buckley, December 6, 1919, and Lind, John, April 27, 1920, U. S. Senate, Investigation of Mexican Affairs,Google Scholar 66 Cong., 2 Sess., Doc. 285, 767–814, 2318; hereinafter cited as Investigation of Mexican Affairs; Interview with Lind, November 12, 1919, William F. Buckley Manuscripts, Latin American Collection. University of Texas Library, File No. 233; “John Lind as a Strong Personality,” American Review of Reviews, XLVIII (September, 1913), 281. Buckley, a lawyer and speculator in Mexican real estate and oil leases, served as counsel for the Huerta delegation at the Niagara Falls Conference, arranged by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to settle disputes growing out of the American military intervention at Veta Cruz in April, 1914. He was openly hostile to Wilson’s Mexican policy, and he acknowledged that Lind was chosen as the President's agent because of his complete lack of association with any interests in Mexico. He believed that an appointment based on such considerations was naive and ill-considered. Buckley’s testimony was largely a re-statement of the information contained in his private papers.
4 Stephenson, George M., John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935), pp. 3–27, 191.Google Scholar Basic studies of the Progressive Era characterize “progressives” as being well-educated urban middle-class businessmen and professionals from the nation’s older families of Anglo-Saxon stock. For basic statements of this stereotype, see Mowry, George E., The California Progressives (Berkeley, 1952), pp. 86–104 Google Scholar; Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Refont: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), pp. 133–73Google Scholar; Mowry, George E., The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1958), pp. 85–105.Google Scholar More recently historians have suggested that the base of the progressive stereotype needed broadening. Two recent articles indicate that the WASP background of progressive reformers may be overdrawn and that the role of the immigrant in the Progressive Movement has been largely overlooked. See Huthmacher, J. Joseph, “Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform,” Misissippi Valley Historical Review, 49 (September, 1962), 231–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Buenker, John D., “Edward F. Dunne: The Urban New Stock Democrat as Progressive,” Mid-America, 50 (January, 1968), 3–21.Google Scholar Another recent article suggests that earlier studies failed to note the importance of the rural background of progressive reformers, especially those of the Midwest. It argues that a majority of progressives came from the farms and small towns of rural America and moved to the city after reaching adulthood. See Fuller, Wayne E., “The Rural Roots of the Progressive Leaders,” Agricultural History, 42 (January, 1968), 1–13.Google Scholar
5 Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 15–117 Google Scholar; Hicks, John D., “The People’s Party in Minnesota,” Minnesota History, 5 (November, 1924), 555–59Google Scholar; Chrislock, Carl H., “A Cycle of the History of Minnesota Republicanism.” Minnesota History, 39 (Fall, 1964), 102–103.Google Scholar
6 Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 133–78Google Scholar; Nye, Russell B., Midwestern Progressive Politics (East Lansing, Mich., 1959), pp. 214–15.Google Scholar
7 Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 180–206, 348–50.Google Scholar
8 Wilson to Lind, June 11, 1913, and Lind to Wilson, June 12, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 285.
9 Baker, , Wilson, 4, pp. 264–313 Google Scholar; Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 208–62Google Scholar; Rippy, J. Fred, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p. 334 Google Scholar; Callahan, James Morton, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), pp. 539–45Google Scholar; Stuart Alexander MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico [Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LI, No. 3] (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 88–89; Carreño, Alberto, La Diplomacia Extraordinaria entre México y Estados Unidos, 1189–1941 (2 vols.; México, 1951), 2, 275–77Google Scholar; Cline, Howard F., The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 145–48Google Scholar; Link, Arthur S., Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York, 1954), pp. 113–16Google Scholar; Link, Author S., Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, 1956), pp. 356–92Google Scholar; Fabela, Isidro, Historia Diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana (2 vols.; México, 1958–1959), 1, 207–17Google Scholar; Teitelbaum, Louis M., Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1916: A History of United States-Mexican Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 103–106, 143–47Google Scholar; Calvert, Peter, The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict [Cambridge Latin American Studies, No. 3] (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 201–84.Google Scholar The above is an incomplete list of words dealing, at least in part, with the Lind Mission. Most textbooks dealing with United States-Latin American relations mention the mission. The works cited above deal more specifically with the United States and Mexico or Wilson and Mexico.
10 Lind to Bryan, August 28, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 120.
11 Lind to State Department, November 13, 1913/9704.
12 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, RG 19; hereinafter cited as Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; copy in William Jennings Bryan Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 43; Harrison, John P., “Un Análisis Norteamericano de la Revolución Mexicana,” Historia Mexicana, 5 (April-June, 1956), 598–618.Google Scholar The latter citation is a Spanish translation of the first, with an introduction and notes. Harrison contends that, despite being an amateur diplomatist, Lind understood Mexico’s needs better than did the professionals in the State Department.
13 Lind’s contacts and interviews too numerous to cite individually, but the Lind Papers, Boxes 14, 15, and 16 and the State Department’s 812.00 (Internal Affairs of Mexico) file reveal that Lind did solicit information from numerous sources. Some of his many conferences with well-known visitors drew considerable publicity. For example, in November, 1913, the Ministers of Germany, Norway, and Russia, disturbed by degenerating economic conditions in the Mexican capital, came to Lind and hinted at the advisability of American intervention. Although they were ostensibly on a hunting trip, the Mexico City press reported the true purpose of the trip to Vera Cruz. See Mexican Herald (Mexico City), November 1–3, 1913; El Imparcial (Mexico City), November 1–3, 1913; Lind to State Department, November 3, 1913/ 9513. The Mexico City press was particularly intrigued by Lind’s conversations with Jesús Flores Magón, whose revolutionary reputation predated the Madero upheaval of 1910–1911. Actually, Flores Magón came to Vera Cruz to plead for the recognition of the Huerta regime as a means of ending Mexico’s fraticidal strife. See Mexican Herald, January 20, 1914; El País (Mexico City), January 20, 1914; Lind to State Department, January 19, 1914/10600.
14 Lind to State Department, November 20, 1913 (two), January 23, 27, 1914/9841, 9850, 10652, 10703; Admiral F. F. Fletcher to Navy Department, November 21, 1913, January 31, 1914/9889, 10907. The New York Times, November 1, 1913, reported that Mrs. Lind, who was returning to the United States after being with her husband in Vera Cruz since August, hid two refugees in her stateroon aboard the steamer Morro Castle until it reached Havana.
15 Lind to State Department, December 12, 13, 1913/10152, 10170; Testimony of Lind, , Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 2350–55Google Scholar; Teitelbaum, , Wilson and the Mexican Revolution (New York, 1969), p. 184.Google Scholar
16 Carreño, , La Diplomacia Extraordinaria entre México y Estados Unidos, 2, 276.Google Scholar
17 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
18 Ibid.; Lind, John, “The Mexican People,” The Bellman, 17 (December 5, 12, 1914), 715–18, 749–54.Google Scholar This article was originally delivered as an address to the Chicago Traffic Club in the fall of 1914. With some misgivings, Lind allowed the speech to be published in the Bellman without significant revision. It was immediately branded as being anti-Catholic by Father C. Kelley, an outspoken critic of the Wilson Administration’s Mexican policy. Claiming that Lind encouraged the revolutionaries in Mexico, hence the persecution of the Catholic Church, Father Kelley used the article to drum up hostility to the Administration’s policy. Father Kelly also charged that Lind plagiarized most of his historical data from the Encyclopedia Britannica, which may explain Lind’s superficial knowledge of Mexican history. See Testimony of Buckley, and Lind, , Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 774–79Google Scholar; Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 279–80.Google Scholar
19 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; Lind to State Department, October 11, 1913/14966; Lind, , “The Mexican People,” The Bellman, 17, 718–19, 749, 752Google Scholar; Testimony of Lind, , Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 2327–30, 2355.Google Scholar
20 Ibid.
21 Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101.
22 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
23 Rodríguez, Juan Barragán, Historia del Ejército y de la Revolución Constitucionalista (2 vols.; México, 1946), 1, 263–67Google Scholar; Ramírez, Manuel Gonzalez, La Revolución de México, Vol. 1: Las Ideas—La Violencia (Mexico, 1960), pp. 396–98Google Scholar; Sherman, William L. and Greenleaf, Richard E., Victoriano Huerta: A Reappraisal (Mexico, 1960), pp. 105–107.Google Scholar
24 Mexican Herald, October 12, 1913; Calvert, , The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, p. 233.Google Scholar
25 Lind to State Department, October 15, 1913/9218.
26 Lind to State Department, October 8, 1913/9127; Calvert, , Diplomacy Anglo-American Conflict, pp. 225–26.Google Scholar Actually the British Chargé d’Affaires had gone to Vera Cruz to meet the new Ambassador, but Carden disembarked aboard the pilot boat. Before the Chargé could locate him, Carden had been greeted by Cowdray’s agent, Fred Adams, and had had a conference with Lind.
27 Navy Department (transmitting radiogram from Lind, September 13, 1913) to State Department, September 15, 1913/10502. In this dispatch, Lind refers to the “largest interest in Mexico not American.” which was British.
28 Lind to State Department, October 15, 25, 1913/9218, 9401; New York World, October 21, 1913. The World offered an analysis of British policy very similar to Lind’s, charging that Cowdray, as a large financial contributor to the British Liberal Party, wielded enough influence over the Cabinet to dictate the appointment of Carden as the man best qualified to protect and expand British oil interests.
29 Mexican Herald, October 27, 1913; New York Times, October 27, 1913. On December 9, 1913, the Congress elected in the October 26 elections did declare the results null and void and extended Huerta’s Provisional Presidency until new elections could be held in July, 1914. See New York Times, December 10, 1913.
30 Lind to State Department, October 20, 25, 26, and 27 (two), 1913/9285, 9392, 9401, 9406, 9415. When President Madero was ousted in February, 1913, Felix Diaz and Huerta made an agreement known as the Pact of the Embassy. Arranged under the sponsorship of U. S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, the pact called for Huerta to become Provisional President and Diaz to be a candidate for the elective Presidency at the time of the next elections. After solidifying his power, Huerta intimidated Diaz into leaving the country, ostensibly on a good-will tour to Japan. Diaz returned to Vera Cruz just before the October elections in order to establish his legality as a presidential candidate. Immediately after the elections he sought asylum in the American Consulate at Vera Cruz, where Lind was staying, then fled the country aboard a U.S. Navy warship. See New York Times, October 28–31, November 1, 1913; Cumberland, Charles Curtis, The Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin, 1952), pp. 233–38Google Scholar; Taracena, Alfonso, La Verdadera Revolución Mexicana (12 vols.; México, 1960–1963), 2, 63, 92, 108–110.Google Scholar
31 Link, , New Freedom, pp. 369–77Google Scholar; Calvert, , Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, pp. 216–84.Google Scholar Using recently available British Foreign records, Calvert argues convincingly that Lind and American newspapers, especially the New York World, greatly overestimated British determination to dominate the Mexican oil industry. Although Cowdray did have influence in the British Liberal Party, he did not exert pressure on the Cabinet in behalf of Carden’s appointment, nor did he take advantage of Huerta’s diplomatic difficulties with the United States to press for increased concessions. The opposite seems to have been the case. The British historian suggests that Huerta was exerting pressure on Cowdray by “using his interests in Mexico as a hostage to secure active support” in the form of a loan. Calvert also indicates that Cowdray was disturbed when Huerta dissolved the Congress and assumed dictatorial power, because this move insured continued revolution. Calvert, nevertheless, leaves no doubt that Cowdray, Carden, and the British Cabinet disapproved of Wilson’s non-recognition policy and looked upon Huerta as the man most likely to restore order in Mexico.
32 Link, , New Freedom, pp. 373–81Google Scholar; Cline, , The United States and Mexico, pp. 148–51.Google Scholar
33 State Department to American Embassy, November 1, 1913/11443a.
34 O’Shaughnessy to State Department, October 30, November 3, 1913/9469, 9510; O’Shaughnessy, Edith, A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico (New York, 1916), p. 32.Google Scholar
35 Lind to State Department, November 2, 1913/9507; State Department to Lind, November 5, 1913/9568; O'Shaughnessy to State Department, November 6, 1913/9598; Mexican Herald, November 4–6, 1913; New York Times, November 6, 1913; O’Shaughnessy, , A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico, pp. 33–34, 39.Google Scholar
36 Mexican Herald, August 10–13, 1913; New York Times, August 7–13, 16, 1913. Besides the meetings at official receptions, the documents in the Lind Papers, Boxes 3 and 14, reveal that the special agent solicited and received advice from several members of the foreign colony and diplomatic corps.
37 Lind to State Department, August 13, 1913/8334.
38 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.
39 New York Times, November 9–11, 1913; Testimony of O’Shaughnessy, Nelson, May 3, 1920, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, p. 2710 Google Scholar; O’Shaughnessy, , A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico, pp. 40–46.Google Scholar
40 Lind to State Department, November 7, 8, 9, 1913/9619, 11440, 9523; New York Times, November 9, 10, 13, 1913; Mexican Herald, November 9, 1913; Testimony of O’Shaughnessy, , Investigation of Mexican Affairs, p. 2709 Google Scholar; O’Shaughnessy, , A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico, p. 41.Google Scholar
41 Lind to State Department, November 11, 12, 1913/9675, 9677; New York Times, November 13, 1913; El País, November 15, 1913; O’Shaughnessy, , A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico, pp. 47–48.Google Scholar
42 Lind to State Department, November 15, 1913/9760.
43 Memorandum (by Lind), April 30, 1914, and Lind to Bryan, no date, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 108; Lind to Bryan, April 21, 1915, ibid., Box 129; Lind to Wilson, August 2, 1915, ibid., Series IV, Box 125; Lind to Bryan, May 29, 1914, Bryan Paper, Box 30; Lind to Bryan, April 16, 1915, ibid., Box 43; Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 263–310 Google Scholar; Fabela, , Historia Diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana, 1, 367–71.Google Scholar The Constitutionalist agents, Juan F. Urquidi and Rafael Zubarán Capmany, like ,Carranza himself, were lawyers and only moderate revolutionaries. Lind believed their propa-ganda which branded Villa and Zapata as dangerous self-seekers. As Wilson and Bryan began to flirt with Villa and Zapata in the summer and fall of 1914, hoping to back a revolutionary faction that would accept guidance from the United States, Lind’s advice was temporarily ignored. He remained a steadfast supporter of Carranza, so much so that ultimately charges were leveled that he was a paid agent of the Carrancista faction. See New York Sun, July 18, 1914, November 5, 1915, in Buckley Papers, File No. 233; Testimony of Buckley, and Lind, , Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 812, 2364.Google Scholar
44 Link, , New Freedom, pp. 382–86Google Scholar; Cline, , The United States and Mexico, pp. 151–52.Google Scholar
45 Link, , New Freedom, pp. 369–77Google Scholar; Calvert, , Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict, pp. 354–84Google Scholar; Scholes, Walter V. and Scholes, Marie V., “Wilson, Grey and Huerta,” Pacific Historical Review, 37 (May, 1968), 151–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
46 State Department to Lind, December 16, 1913/10185; Lind to State Department, December 17, 1913/10239.
47 Lind to State Department, December 5, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 27, 1913/10077, 10152, 10170, 10185, 10196, 10239, 10269, 10342; Wüson to Moore, December 29, 1913/ 10454; Bryan to Wilson, December 25, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 100; Moore to Wilson, December 29, 1913, ibid., Series IV, Box 285.
48 Mexican Herald, December 31, 1913, January 1–3, 1914; New York Times, December 31, 1913, January 1–4, 1914; Daily Picayune (New Orleans), January 5, 1914.
49 A transcript of Wilson’s shorthand notes taken at the Pass Christian conference only gives hints of the topics of discussion, but suggests that Lind urged vigorous action. See Notes from conversation with Lind (transcription made under direction of Ray Stannard Baker), no date, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101.
50 Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101; Lind to Mrs. Lind, January 22, 1914, Lind Papers, Box 15; Lind to Bryan, January 12, 15, 27, 1914/10517, 10652–1/2, 10688. Lind left no record of the conference at Pass Christian, but from his correspondence to Wilson, Bryan and his wife, it is apparent jhat he expected a lifting of the embargo and closer relations with the Constitutionalists to follow shortly after.
51 State Department to All Diplomatic Missions of the United States, January 31, 1914, and Proclamation revoking the proclamation of March 14, 1912, prohibiting the exportation of arms or munitions of war to Mexico, February 3, 1914, U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 (Washington, 1922), pp. 446–48.
52 Lind to State Department, January 12, 14, 15, 30, 1914, February 5, 6 (two), 1914/10517, 10537, 10652–1/2, 10737, 10792, 10818, 10819; State Department to Lind, February 8, 1914/10818; Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II;, Box 101.
53 Quirk, Robert E., The Mexican Revolution, 1914–1915 (Bloomington, Ind., 1960), pp. 17–19 Google Scholar; Kemmerer, Edwin Walter, Inflation and Revolution: Mexico’s Experience of 1912–1917 (Princeton, 1940), pp. 11–26 Google Scholar; Estañol, Jorge Vera, La Revolución Mexicana (México, 1957), pp. 350–51.Google Scholar
54 Lind to State Department, February 24, 1914/10965.
55 Ibid.; State Department to Lind, March 3, 1914/11000; Lind to State Department, March 8, 12, 23, 1914/11098, 11227, 27482; Captain W. A. Burnside to Lind (conveying summary of military strength and action, February 26-March 4, 1914), no date/16251; Stephenson, , Lind, pp. 259–60.Google Scholar Stephenson, using only the Lind Papers, and not having access to complete State Department records, suggested that the “most charitable” conclusion to be drawn from this scheme is that it was pressed upon Lind by Marine and Navy officers who were “itching for a scrap with the greasers.” State Department records indicate that Lind was the instigator of the plan.
56 State Department to Lind, March 25, 1914/11265.
57 Lind to State Department, March 29, 1914, and State Department to Lind March 31, 1914/11327.
58 Lind to State Department, February 4, 1914, March 12, 1914/10965, 11227.
