^1. France-Press, Agence, “Malaysia a ‘Fundamentalist' Islamic State: Mahathir” Agence France-Press (17 June 2002)Google Scholar.

^2. WHITING, Amanda, “Secularism, the Islamic State and the Malaysian Legal Profession” (2010) 5 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 115 at 121–130Google Scholar.

^3. See e.g. ALLY, Sahr Muhammed, “Convicted Before Trial: Indefinite Detention Under Malaysia’s Emergency Ordinance” (2006) Human Rights Watch Report No. 18:9Google Scholar.

^4. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia, UNHRCOR, 5 October 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11/30 at 9, para. 34 (quoting Australia’s response).

^5. FITZPATRICK, Peter, The Mythology of Modern Law (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) at 3–5Google Scholar. HLA Hart, of course, does not assert law’s complete autonomy. The issue, as Fitzpatrick identifies, is the delineation of a legal sphere that can be discussed in relative autonomy from social and political life.

^6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3^rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 at Preamble.

^7. FANON, Frantz, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. by Charles Lam MARKMANN (New York: Grove, 1967) at 8Google Scholar.

^8. DEMBOUR, Marie-Bénédicte, “Critiques” in Daniel MOECKLI, Sangeeta SHAH, and Sandesh SIVAKUMARAM, eds., International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 64 at 84Google Scholar (quoting Kapur, Ratna, “Human Rights in the 21^st Century: Take a Walk on the Dark Side” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 665 at 682Google Scholar).

^9. LANGLOIS, Anthony, “Human Rights in Crisis? A Critical Polemic Against Polemical Critics” (2012) 11:4Journal of Human Rights 558 at 561–564Google Scholar [Langlois, “Human Rights in Crisis?”] (quoting in part Douzinas, Costas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, New ed (Abingdon, UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) at 82Google Scholar).

^10. The way that rights discourse has infiltrated the development agenda is an example of its evangelical self-belief. See e.g. UVIN, Peter, “From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How ‘Human Rights’ Entered Development’ (2007) 17 Development in Practice 597CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^11. This sort of recourse is seen even in the “antifoundationalist” position as articulated in CHASE, Anthony Tirado, “Legitimizing Human Rights: Beyond Mythical Foundations and Into Everyday Resonances” (2012) 11:4Journal of Human Rights 505CrossRefGoogle Scholar. While I applaud his critique of modernist myths about law and rights, he erroneously maintains the typical progressive trend towards a transcendent plural future evinced by so many postmodernists. Herein Chase diagnoses the error of the “savior vision of human rights”, wherein rights are effectively meaningless as “abstract [shells]”. Ibid. at 515. Indeed. However, Chase’s suggested remedy proffers that this problem might be transcended through a circular “chemical reaction” of different groundings. Ibid. at 516. Part Two of this paper explains my essential concern with this approach.

^12. I am obviously influenced by scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre, Talal Asad, Armando Salvatore, and Stanley Hauerwas in this essay. However my use of such terms as ‘crisis’ and ‘tradition’ is not precise to that tradition. Nevertheless, on crisis and tradition see generally MACINTYRE, Alasdair, The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) vol. 1 at 9–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar; MACINTYRE, Alasdair, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988) at 355Google Scholar [MacIntyre, Whose Justice?].

^13. Lina Joy lwn v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, [2007] 4 Malayan Law Journal 585 [Lina Joy]. Subsequent citations from Malanjum’s judgement are taken from the Malaysian Bar Association’s translation, online: <http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/selected_judgements/lina_joy_case_dissenting_judgment_of_justice_richard_malanjum.html> [Lina Joy (Malanjum)].

^14. BOUCHER, David, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Rights in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 246CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for the presumption of equivalence between virtue and human rights in the media, see for example Peter Osborne, “CHOGM Backs Human Rights Action Plan” Sydney Morning Herald (28 October 2011), online: Sydney Morning Herald <http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/chogm-backs-human-rights-action-plan-20111028-1mmy9.html>.

^15. As Allan Bloom describes it, this is the recurring Enlightenment tension straddling the work of Rousseau, Locke, Kant, etc.: “[h]ere again we live with two contradictory understandings of what counts for man…. One is cosmopolitan, the other is particularistic.” See BLOOM, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon And Schuster, 1987) at 191–192Google Scholar.

^16. STRAUSS, Leo, “Progress or Return?” in Leo STRAUSS, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought, ed. by Kenneth Hart GREEN (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997), 87 at 100Google Scholar.

^17. Ibid, at 99 (recalling Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’).

^18. MACINTYRE, Alasdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2^nd ed (London: Duckworth, 1985)Google Scholar cs. 1–2 [MacIntyre, After Virtue]; see also MacIntyre, , Whose Justice?, supra note 12 at 5–6Google Scholar.

^19. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra note 18 at 33.

^20. Ibid. at 33.

^21. LANGLOIS, Anthony, The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and Universalist Theory (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) at 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Langlois, “Human Rights in Crisis?”, supra note 9 at 561.

^22. MOUFFE, Chantal, The Return of the Political (New York: Verso, 1993) at 135Google Scholar (quoting Galston, William, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 92CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

^23. Ibid. at 138.

^24. RAWLS, John, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 177Google Scholar.

^25. HABERMAS, Jürgen, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years” in Jürgen HABERMAS, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. by Ciaran CRONIN and Pablo DE GREIFF (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 165 at 191Google Scholar [Habermas, “Kant’s Perpetual Peace”]; for a full explanation of Habermas’ dynamic approach to rights, see FLYNN, Jeffrey, “Habermas on Human Rights: Law, Morality, and Intercultural Dialogue” (2003) 29 Social Theory and Practice 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^26. Habermas, “Kant’s Perpetual Peace”, supra note 15 at 192.

^27. MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, supra note 12 at 344.

^28. Less systematic liberalisms, like that of Isaiah Berlin, are less easily subject to this criticism.

^29. Mouffe, , supra note 22 at 138–139Google Scholar.

^30. Habermas, Jürgen, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006) 14 European Journal of Philosophy 1 at 4Google Scholar [Habermas, “Religion”].

^31. Rawls, supra note 24 at 178.

^32. Habermas, “Religion”, supra note 30 at 19. Note that this is not necessarily to endorse static clash of civilisation theses.

^33. PHILPOTT’s, DanielJust and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar is one such particularly nuanced example.

^34. AN-NA’IM, Abdullahi Ahmed, “The Cultural Mediation of Human Rights: The Al-Arqam Case in Malaysia” in Joanne R. BAUER and Daniel A. BELL, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 147 at 153Google Scholar [An-Na’im, “Cultural Mediation”].

^35. Charles TAYLOR, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in Bauer and Bell, eds., supra note 34, 124 at 135–141.

^36. AN-NA’IM, Abdullahi Ahmed, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^37. Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (Bangkok, 29 March–2 April 1993), 7 April 1993, A/Conf.1 57/ASRM/ 8 - A/Conf.1 57/PC/59.

^38. Ibid.

^39. Langlois, The Politics of Justice, supra note 21 at 27–28.

^40. Ibid. at 29–32.

^41. Ibid. at 43–44 (“One of the problems with anti-Asian values arguments is that they do not take seriously that a significant proportion of the non-state elite professes to hold to these distinctive values”).

^42. Ibid. at 44.

^43. PAREKH, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 324Google Scholar. See also ibid. at 128

^44. Daniel PHILPOTT, “Arguing with An-Na`im” The Immanent Frame (14 July 2008), online: The Immanent Frame <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/07/14/arguing-with-an-naim/>.

^45. I owe this observation to Chantal Mouffe, supra note 22 at 140 and SCHMITT, Carl, The Concept of the Political, trans. by George SCHWAB (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) at 72–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^46. See, for example, Moeckli, Shah, and Sivakumaram, eds., supra note 8, which devotes 25 pages to the “philosophy” of human rights, and 23 pages to “critiques”, which amounts to just over seven percent of its total substantive content.

^47. RORTY, Richard, “Solidarity or Objectivity?” in K. Brad WRAY, ed., Knowledge and Inquiry: Readings in Epistemology (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 422 at 424Google Scholar.

^48. Mouffe, supra note 22 at 9.

^49. DONNELLY, Jack, “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of ‘Western’ Universalism” in Bauer and Bell, eds., supra note 34, 60 at 60–62Google Scholar.

^50. On myths, and on critical theory in law see in summary: Fitzpatrick, supra note 5.

^51. DOUZINAS, Costas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) at 189Google Scholar.

^52. Ibid. at 100 and 189.

^53. SAID, Edward, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) at 14Google Scholar.

^54. MUTUA, Makau wa, “The Ideology of Human Rights” (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 589Google Scholar.

^55. MERRY, Sally Engle, “Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World” (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 247 at 268Google Scholar [Merry, “Global Human Rights”].

^56. HAUERWAS, Stanley, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World Without Foundations” (1992–1993) 44 Mercer Law Review 743 at 747–748Google Scholar [Hauerwas, “Christian Practice”].

^57. KELSEN, Hans, Pure Theory of Law, trans. By Max KNIGHT (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1967) at 1Google Scholar.

^58. Mutua, supra note 54 at 653.

^59. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, supra note 45 at 66.

^60. SIMPSON, Gerry, Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)Google Scholar.

^61. O’DONOVAN, Oliver, Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community (Cambridge and Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002) at 13Google Scholar [O’Donovan, Common Objects]. In my use of O’Donovan I take some liberties in the application of his ethical-political discussion to the concrete example of human rights law, but I believe that his broad argument regarding moral reasoning is quite consistent with my point.

^62. I am reminded of Stanley Hauerwas’ frequent description of the liberal dogma, that “you should have no story except the story you choose when you had no story”. Of key interest to me, of course, are those who have not adopted this particular ‘storytelling’ convention.

^63. Lina Joy (Malanjum), supra note 13.

^64. Ibid. at paras. 30–37.

^65. HARDING, Andrew, “Sharia and National Law in Malaysia” in Jan Michiel Otto, ed., Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), 491 at 514Google Scholar.

^66. Lina Joy (Malanjum), supra note 13 at para. 83; in the Australian context, see for example: FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342 at 368 (Mason J): ‘the court will not ordinarily regard a statutory discretion the exercise of which will affect the rights of a citizen as absolute and unfettered’.

^67. Lina Joy (Malanjum), supra note 13 at para. 65.

^68. Lina Joy, supra note 13 at 594 (Fairuz).

^69. Ibid. at 594 (Fairuz).

^70. Federal Constitution of Malaysia, arts. 3 and 141 [Federal Constitution].

^71. THIO, Li-ann, “Apostasy and Religious Freedom: Constitutional Issues Arising from the Lina Joy Litigation” (2006) 2 Malayan Law Journal i at viiiGoogle Scholar [Thio, “Apostasy and Religious Freedom”].

^72. SHAMRAHAYU, A Aziz, “Apostasy and Religious Freedom: A Response to Thio Li-Ann” (2007) 2 Malayan Law Journal 1Google Scholar; [2007] 2 Malayan Law Journal Articles i at iv.

^73. For example, in Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] 280 ALR 18 at 44, paras. 65–66 (French CJ), the reasoning is strictly based on the dogmatics of statutory interpretation: “They are statutory criteria, albeit informed by the core obligation of non-refoulement which is a key protection assumed by Australia under the Refugee Convention. Attention must be directed to the statutory language”.

^74. FERNANDO, Joseph M, “The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia” (2006) 37 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 249 at 266Google Scholar. Compare ADIL, Muhamed, “Law of Apostasy and Freedom of Religion in Malaysia” (2007) 2 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 134 at 142–144Google Scholar.

^75. See Federal Constitution, supra note 70, Art 121A and 9^th sched., list II.

^76. Whiting, supra note 2 at 118-19.

^77. OTTO, Jan Michiel, “Introduction: Investigating the Role of Sharia in National Law” in Otto, ed., supra note 65, 17 at 24–26Google Scholar; VIKOR, Knut S., Between God and the Sultan (London: Hurst, 2005)Google Scholar.

^78. Whiting, supra note 2 at 118-19.

^79. Ibid. at 4.

^80. Lina Joy, supra note 13 at 596 (Fairuz).

^81. Adil, supra note 74 at 147; Choy, CHOONG Yeow, “Contra Bonos Mores: Religious Tenets and National Philosophy as the Yardstick for Determining Public Policy in Malaysia” (2007) 9 Australian Journal of Asian Law 176 at 178Google Scholar.

^82. Part II of the Federal Constitution, supra note 70, is entitled “Fundamental Liberties”. The function of the part is not explained in the Constitution nor in the drafting materials in the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act 597). Section 2, however, provides that “human rights refer to fundamental liberties in Part II of the Constitution”, and Section 4(4) provides that “[for] the purpose of this Act, regard shall be had to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution”. See also BARI, Abdul Aziz and SHUAIB, Farid Sufian, Constitution of Malaysia: Text and Commentary (Petaling Jaya: Prentice Hall, 2004)Google Scholar.

^83. Thio, “Apostasy and Religious Freedom”, supra note 71 at v.

^84. Shamrahayu, supra note 72 at v.

^85. SHUAIB, Farid Sufian, “Constitutional Restatement of Parallel Jurisdiction between Civil Courts and Syariah Courts in Malaysia: Twenty Years on (1988–2008)” (2008) 5 Malayan Law Journal 33Google Scholar.

^86. Hauerwas, “Christian Practice”, supra note 56 at 747.

^87. DE SOUSA SANTOS, Boaventura, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 2^nd ed (London: Butterworths LexisNexis 2002) at 15–19Google Scholar.

^88. O’Donovan, Common Objects, supra note 61 at 7.

^89. As paraphrased in ibid. at 20.

^90. MERRY, Sally Engle, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869 at 869–873CrossRefGoogle Scholar [Merry, “Legal Pluralism”].

^91. TAMANAHA, Brian, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism” (2000) 27:2Journal of Law and Society 296 at 299Google Scholar.

^92. Compare BENDA-BECKMANN, Franz VON, “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?” (2002) 47 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37 at 52–64Google Scholar; TAMANAHA, Brian, “The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism” (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 192 at 193Google Scholar.

^93. MOORE, Sally Falk, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge, 1978) at 21Google Scholar.

^94. Merry, “Legal Pluralism”, supra note 90 at 878 (quoting Moore, Sally Falk, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719 at 720Google Scholar).

^95. MERRY, Sally Engle, “Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes” (1992) 21 Annual Review of Anthropology 357 at 360–361Google Scholar [Merry, Anthropology”].

^96. BOWEN, John, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^97. TAMANAHA, Brian, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global” (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375 at 401Google Scholar.

^98. Ibid. at 402.

^99. I am obviously indebted to the exceptions from which I draw in this essay.

^100. MELISSARIS, Emmanuel, “The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism” (2004) 13 Social and Legal Studies 57 at 64Google Scholar.

^101. Merry, “Anthropology”, supra note 95 at 358.

^102. Melissaris, supra note 100 at 66–7; see also Merry, “Anthropology”, supra note 95 at 358.

^103. DAVIES, Margaret, “The Ethos of Pluralism” (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 87 at 89–91Google Scholar and 107.

^104. Ibid. at 110; there are echoes of John Milbank’s deconstruction of postmodernity’s “differential ontology” as a more fundamental “ontological” or “transcendental” violence. See John MILBANK, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), especially c 10.

^105. Melissaris, supra note 100 at 58

^106. Davies, supra note 103 at 88–89.

^107. Mouffe, supra note 22 at 137; RAZ, Joseph, The Practice of Value (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003) at 43Google Scholar.

^108. See YOUNG, Robert, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) at 48Google Scholar (Young’s surprising example of this is postcolonial theory’s approach to Ghandi).

^109. Davies, supra note 103 at 94.

^110. Melissaris, supra note 100 at 65.

^111. Davies, supra note 103 at 93.

^112. De Sousa Santos, supra note 87 at 89.

^113. Langlois, “Human Rights in Crisis?”, supra note 9 at 568.

^114. De Sousa Santos, supra note 87 at 89.

^115. ŽIŽEK, Slavoj, “Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics” in Chantal Mouffe, ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999), 18 at 31Google Scholar.

^116. Mouffe, supra note 22 at 140.

^117. Augustine, , The City of God, trans. by Marcus DODS (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 2000 [1872]) at XIX:24Google Scholar (in my reading of Augustine here I am overwhelmingly indebted to Oliver O’Donovan’s work).

^118. Ibid.

^119. SCHMITT, Carl, Constitutional Theory, trans. by Jeffrey SEITZER (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) at 136CrossRefGoogle Scholar (Schmitt here is actually discussing constitutional legitimacy, but as my broader use of Schmitt should indicate, I suggest that his discussion is strikingly applicable to human rights).

^120. O’Donovan, Common Objects, supra note 61 at 28.

^121. Mouffe, supra note 22 at 127.

^122. Ibid. at 3.

^123. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, supra note 45 at 37.

^124. Mouffe, supra note 22 at 127–128.

^125. Langlois, “Human Rights in Crisis?”, supra note 9 at 560.

^126. O’Donovan, Common Objects, supra note 61 at 11.

^127. Harding, supra note 65 at 502.

^128. BROWN, Graham, “Legible Pluralism: The Politics of Ethnic and Religious Identification in Malaysia” (2010) 9 Ethnopolitics 31 at 32Google Scholar.

^129. Ibid. at 38.

^130. Shamrahayu, supra note 72 at v–vi.

^131. Shuaib, supra note 85.

^132. Brown, supra note 128 at 45.

^133. BARRY, Julia, “Apostasy, Marriage, and Jurisdiction in Lina Joy: Where Was CEDAW?” (2009) 41 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 407Google Scholar [Barry, “Apostacy, Marriage, and Jurisdiction”].

^134. Contra Harding, supra note 65; Vikor, supra note 77 at 139.

^135. Barry, “Apostacy, Marriage, and Jurisdiction”, supra note 133, at 407–408 and 450–452.

^136. Ibid. at 412 and 427; also Ally, supra note 3; THIO, Li-ann, “‘Beyond the ‘Four Walls’ in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations: Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore” (2006) 19 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 428 at 456–461Google Scholar.

^137. Nisha VARIA, “Human Rights: Abdullah’s Greatest Challenge” Human Rights Watch (8 November 2003), online: Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/11/07/human-rights-abdullah-s-greatest-challenge>.

^138. NEOH, Joshua, “Islamic State and the Common Law in Malaysia: A Case Study of Lina Joy” (2008) 8:2Global Jurist, Article 4 at 8Google Scholar, 24.

^139. FRITZ, Nicole and FLAHERTY, Martin, “Unjust Order: Malaysia’s Internal Security Act” (2002–2003) 26 Fordham International Law Journal 1345 at 1368Google Scholar.

^140. Merry, “Global Human Rights”, supra note 55 at 252

^141. Langlois, “Human Rights in Crisis?”, supra note 9 at 563.

^142. Whiting, supra note 2; Zarizana Abd AZIZ, “Conversion Issues and Legal Rights” The Sun (Malaysia) (5 June 2008).

^143. THIO, Li-ann, “Panacea, Placebo, or Pawn? The Teething Problems of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM)” (2009) 40 George Washington International Law Review 1271Google Scholar.

^144. Merry, “Global Human Rights”, supra note 55 at 257–8.

^145. Ibid. at 268.

^146. An-Na’im, “Cultural Mediation”, supra note 34 at 157; DANCHIN, Peter, “Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law” (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 249Google Scholar.

^147. Whiting, supra note 2 at 130; Fritz and Flaherty, supra note 139 at 1347–1350.

^148. By politicisation I mean a qualitative increase in the ‘friend-enemy’ relation. I do not mean the current denotation of politicisation as the absence of neutrality or independent decision-making, a notion which Schmitt himself would certainly have rejected (see Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, supra note 45 at 43). Thus in Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, supra note 119 at 60–61, he points to confusion within discussions of constitutional law, wherein observers confuse ‘constitution’ with ‘constitutional law’. That is, before a state might have a constitution, the state is constitution: “the concrete, collective, condition of political unity and social order of a political state”. Just so, I would suggest, before there might be a substantive human rights law there must already be a substantive political constitution of those rights.

^149. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, supra note 45 at 37.

^150. Ibid. at 30–31.

^151. Ibid. at 72.

^152. Ibid. at 78.

^153. Ibid. at 43.

^154. Ibid. at 452.

^155. Ibid. at 43.

^156. HAUERWAS, Stanley, The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) at 161–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^157. Langlois, The Politics of Justice, supra note 21 at 130.

^158. Parekh, supra note 43 at 310.

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