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A Game Theoretic Look at Life Insurance Underwriting*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2014

Jean Lemaire
Jean Lemaire*
Affiliation:
Université Libre de Bruxelles
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Extract

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The decision problem of acceptance or rejection of life insurance proposals is formulated as a two-person non cooperative game between the insurer and the set of the proposers. Using the minimax criterion or the Bayes criterion, it is shown how the value and the optimal strategies can be computed, and how an optimal set of medical informations can be selected and utilized.

Type
Research Article
Information
ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , June 1980 , pp. 1 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © International Actuarial Association 1980

Footnotes

*

Presented at the 14th ASTIN Colloquium, Taormina, October 1978.

References

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Luce, R. and Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions, J. Wiley, New York.Google Scholar
Owen, G. (1968). Game theory, W. Saunders, Philadelphia.Google Scholar