² Sambuy to Solaro, Vienna, June 21, 1835, in Alberti, Mario degli (ed.), La politico estera del Piemonte sotlo Carlo Alberto secondo il carteggio diplomatico Vittorio Amadeo Balbo Bertone di Sambuy, ministro di Sardegna a Vienne, 1835–1846 (3 vols., Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1913–1919), Vol. I, p. 57 Google Scholar.

³ Srbik, Heinrich von, Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch (2 vols., Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1925), Vol. 1, p. 465 Google Scholar.

⁴ Ibid. Heinrich Friedjung, Der Kampfum die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859–1866 (2 vols., Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachf., 1912), Vol. I, pp. 7–11; Richard Charmatz, Deutsch-österreichische Politik. Studien über den Liberalismus und über die auswartige politik Ostereichs (Leipzig:Dunker and Humblot,.1907), pp. 350–352; Heinrich von Srbik, Deutsche Einheit. Idee und Wirklichkelt vom Heiligen Reich bis königgrätz (4 Vols., Munich F Bruckmann 1936–42) Vol II p 159, Heinrich Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik (Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Bunchhandlung Nachf., 1907), p.13. This view has been expressed in a number of general studies including Joseph Redlich, Kaiser Franz Joseph von Osterreich (Berlin:verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1928), p. 237, Erich Zöllner; Geschichre Österreichs von den Anfängen biszur Gegenwart (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1961), p. 401, Hugo Hantsch, Die Geschichte Österreichs (3rd ed., 2 vols., Graz: Styria Verlag, 1962), Vol. II, pp. 371–372; and Karl Tschuppik, Franz Josph I. Der Untregang eines Reiches (Dresden: Avalun-Verlag; 1928); p.88.

⁵ These various interpretations:Occur at one time or another in the following works Voktor Bibl, Österreich 1806–1938 (Zürich: Amalthea Verlag 1939), p.186; Friedrich Engel-Janosi Der Freiherr von Hübner 1811–1892. Eine Gestalt aus dem Österretch Kaiser Franz Josephs (Innsbruck: Universitäts-Verlag Wagner, 1933), p.106; Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik, pp. 101–108 and 146–151; Charles W. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852–1864 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1955), pp. 25, 31–32 and 74–75; Redlich, Kaiser Franz Joseph von Osterreich, pp. 123, 154, and 237; and Srbik, Metternich, Vol. II, pp. 465 and 536. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for some of the confusion among historians is the fact that many of Buol's contemporaries also did not agree in their opinions of him. Metternich at one point thought he was being dominated-by Alexander Bach. Metternich to Kübeck, December 9, 1854, in Max von Kübeck (ed.), Metternich und Kübeck Ein Briefwechsel (Vienna: Verlag von Carl Gerold 1910), p. 190. Staatsrat von Klindworth, in Württemberg, thought he was merely a tool of, Metternich Klindworth to Manteuffel, Oberrheinsberg, June 20, 1852, in Heinrich von Poschinger, “Geheimblatter uber die osterreicheische Politik,” Osterreichische Rundschau, Vol IX (November-December, 1906), p. 4. The list of contradictory statements about Buol could be far longer; sufficient it to say that given the date and the political point of view of the individual commentator, many of them are predictable.

⁶ Except for a few scattered references in monographs and memoirs, all of the attention given to Buol is centered upon his years as foreign minister. Two recent doctoral dissertations help to fill this gap, I believe. They are Waltraud Heindl, “Carl Ferdinand Graf Buol-Schauenstein. Die Grundzüge seiner Politik am Vorabend des Krimkrieges” (University of Vienna, 1968); and my own “The Early Career of Count Buol, 1837–1852” (University of Illinois, 1969). Dr. Heindl's dissertation has been published under the title Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London 1848–1852; In Studien zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie, Vol. Ix (Vienna: Böhlau, 1970): A third recent dissertation Kenneth W. Rock's Reaction Triumphant: The Diplomacy of Felix Schwarzenberg and Nicholas I in Mastering the Hungarian Insurrection, 1848–1850. A Study in Dynastio Power, Principles, and Polities in Revolutionary Times (Stanford University, 1969), while it is concerned primarily with Schwarzenberg, also contains useful information on Buol's work in St. Petersburg.

⁷ Most of the unfavorable interpretations of Buol in the literature can be traced to the trail-blazing works of Heinrich Friedjung and Heinrich von Srbik, both of whom had only very limited access to relevant diplomatic collections in the Viennese archives Friedjung, for example, in his Der Krimkrieg und die osterreiohische Politik and Der Kampfium die Vorherrschaft in Deutshland, relied almost exclusively on Kriegsarchiv materials. Consequently, both Friediung and Srbik based their views of Buol upon the memoirs of some of his contemporaries and on their own prejudices concerning his German policy. For a thorough discussion of this point see Heindt, , Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London. pp. 18–23.Google Scholar The recent upsurge of interest in the Habsburg monarchy on both sides of the Atlantic will und oubtedly fill this void. On Buol's Crimeandiplomacy, forexample, there are two important new studies: Unckel's, Bernhard Österreich und der Krimkrieg In Historische Studien, Vol. CDX (Lubeck Matthiesen 1969)Google Scholar; and a more comprehensive work dealing with all aspects of the diplomacy of the Crimean War by ProfessorSchroeder, Paul W. of the University of Illinois: Austria Great Britain and the Crimean War The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca N. Y. Cornell University Press, 1972).Google Scholar

⁸ Heindl, , Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London, p. 80.Google Scholar

⁹ Bednar, Hertha, “Buol-Schauenstein und die Anfange des deutschen Bundes”. (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Vienna, 1940)Google Scholar; von Arneth, Alfred, Johann Freiherr van Wessenberg, Ein österreichischer Staatsmannedes neunzehnten Jahr hunderts (2 vols; Vienna; W. Braumuller, 1898), Vol. II; pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren, published under the Auspices of the Son of the State Chancellor, Prince Richard Metternich, edited by von Klinkowström, Alfons (8 vols., Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1880–1884), Vol. V, pp. 554 and 555Google Scholar; Vol. VI, pp. 497, 498, and 624; and Vol. VII, p. 9. Buol confirms this in his own diary with numerous references to his social contacts with the Metternichs. Buol diary, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as “Staatsarchiv [Vienna]”), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol. I, pp. 65, 69, 102, 134–135, and 141. When he was foreign minister, he was accused of spending more time on the Rennweg (Metternich's villa) than in the chancellery. Bibl, Viktor, Der Zerfall Österreichs (2 vols., Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1924), Vol. II, p. 238.Google Scholar

¹¹ Burckhardt, Carl J. (ed.), Briefe des Staatskanzlers Fürsten Metternich-Winneburg an den österreichischen Minister des Allerhöchsten Houses und des Äussern, Grafen Buol-Schauenstein 1852–1859 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1934), p. v Google Scholar; von Wurzbach, Constant, “Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein,” Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Oesterreich (60 vols., Vienna: Verlag der typographisch-literarisch-artistischen Anstalt, 1856–1891), Vol. II, pp. 204–207 Google Scholar; Rössler, Helmut, “Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein,” Historisch-Biographisches Lexikon der Schweiz (7 vols. and 2 supplements, Neuenburg: Administration des Historisch-Biographischen Lexikons der Schweiz, 1924), Vol. II, pp. 434–435 Google Scholar; “Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein,” Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950 (Graz: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1954-), Vol. I, p. 127.Google Scholar

¹² Austensen, , “The Early Career of Count Buol, 1837–1852,” pp. 1–183.Google Scholar Buol's dispatches during his first year as minister to Württemberg indicate very clearly his commitment to Austria's position in Germany and to Metternich's generally repressive means for preserving it. For example, see Buol to Metternich, Stuttgart, April 8, June 13, and October 23, 1838, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Württemberg, Karton XLVI1I, Nos. 9A, 17B, and 31A.

¹³ Metternich was quite pleased with Buol's relations with Count Solaro. Metternich to Buol, Vienna, June 13, 1845, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Sardinien, Karton LXXX: Weisungen, no number given. Buol was also on excellent terms with Count Johann Beroldingen, the foreign minister of Württemberg (though not with King William), and the Grand Duke of Baden. Buol to Metternich, Vienna, January 16,1842, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Württemberg, Karton L (unnumbered report); Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol. I, pp. 88–89; Buol to Metternich, Stuttgart, May 2, 1840, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Württemberg, Karton XLIX, No. 11.

¹⁴ There were a number of German questions during Buol's years in Stuttgart which he thought Metternich could have handled more effectively with a few conciliatory gestures toward the Swabian king. For example, he believed that Metternich could have avoided some of the bitterness aroused by Vienna's handling of the constitutional crisis in Hanover. Buol to Metternich, Stuttgart, April 26, 1838, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Württemberg, Karton XLVIII, No. 10A.

¹⁵ Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol I, p. 15, Buol to Metternich, Stuttgart, October 2, 15, 20, and 23, 1840, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Württemberg, Karton XLIX, Nos. 21A, 22, 23, and 24A.

¹⁶ Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol. I, pp. 250–251; Buol to Metternich, Turin, June 15, 1846 (private), March 18, 22, and 29, 1847, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlai, Sardinien, Karton LXXXI, Nos. 11B, 11C, 12A, 12C, and 14A, Meysenbug to Buol (private), Vienna, May 29 and June 26, 1846, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Gesandtschaftsarchiv, Turin, Karton XXVIII, no number given, Metternich to Buol, Vienna, June 26, 1846, ibid., Nos. 2, 3, and secret.

¹⁷ Buol to Metternich, Turin, January 4, and August 20 and 29, 1847, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, Sardinien, Karton XC, Nos. 1A, 30B, and 31D.

¹⁸ Buol to Metternich, Turin, February 18, 1848, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlai, Sardinien, Karton LXXXIII, No. 19A. Metternich's comments on Buol's proposal to be found in the margin of his dispatch. The pressure of events in Vienna apparently prevented him from responding, and he left Buol without instructions. Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol. II, p. 185.

¹⁹ Taylor, A. J. P. The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy, 1847–1849 (Manchester University Press, 1934), pp. 58–67.Google Scholar

²⁰ As early as the previous October Schwarzenberg had called on Metternich to send ten thousand Austrian soldiers to “stiffen” the government of King Ferdinand. Berkeley, G. F. H., Italy in the Making (3 vols, Cambridge, England: University press, 1932–1940), Vol. III, p. 63.Google Scholar

²¹ As had been the case in other crises, Metterich's Italian policy at the end of 1847 and at the beginning of 1848 wavered between the extremes of action and inaction Buol's request for intervention came at a time when Metternich had declded that nothing could de done. After the fall of Gulfzoffe was again interested in action but it was already too late. See Obermann, Karl, “Unveroffentlichte Materialien zur Diplomatie Metternichs 1821–1848,” Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs, Vol. XIX (1966) pp. 246–262.Google Scholar

²² Metternich's mood at the time of Buol's request for intervention is well illustrated in a letter of February 4 to the Prussian Foreign Minister von Canitz in which he wrote “Since the general peace we have rescued Italy from the revolution four times [Metternich's emphasis]. We will not be able to do it a fifth time” Metternich to Von Canitz, Vienna, February 4, 1848, Obermann, Unveroffentlichte Materalien, p. 258.

²³ In the middle of March, 1848, Buol learned from his sister, Baroness Meyendorff, that Metternich frad obtainde Tsar Nicholas approval of his appointment to the Russlan post. Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL Karton CCLXXVIIB; Vol: II, p. 206. Another proff of Metternich's high regard for Buol and his approval of Buol's conduct in Turih was contained in a letter to Baron Meyendorff. “If Count 8 is still in Berlin when this letter arrives please tell him for me everything he is entilled to expect from the feelings I have for him and which in every sense he deserves. The role he had to play in T[urin] was very painful and difficult. He has come through a man of conscience and honor, and it is not he who will have the judgment of history against him! That man is Charles Albert!” Quoted in Buol diary, ibid., p. 213.

²⁴ Friedrich Walter, Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung. Pt. 3: Von der Märzrevolution 1848 bis zur Dezemberverfassung 1867, Vol. I: Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat, Ficquelmont, Pillersdorf, Wessenberg-Doblhoff und Schwarzenberg. In Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. XLIX (Vienna: Adolf Holzhausens Nachf., 1964), pp. 71–72.Google Scholar

²⁵ Buol wrote to Schwarzenberg on November 24, 1848, offering his services in whatever capacity they might be needed. Schwarzenberg had already thought of him, however, because on the following day he received the prince's summons to meet him at Olmütz. Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol. II, pp. 238–243.

²⁶ The entries in Buol's diary for October and November of 1848 contain nothing but praise for Prince Schwarzenberg and the men he chose to serve in the new ministry. He was particularly pleased with the inclusion of Count Franz Stadion, the former governor of Galicia, whose administrative experience he thought would be important in bringing about much-needed reforms. Characteristic of Buol's attitude is the following brief entry written in October “Thank God that energetic measures will now be taken.” Buol diary, ibid., pp. 234–237.

²⁷ Schwarzenberg to Buol, Olmütz, December 31, 1848, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv X, Russland, Karton XXVII, No. 1 and secret. Waltraud Heindlargues that the connection between Schwarzenberg's Russian and German policies was not based merely on the need for Russian support in Germany but also on his plans for a reorganization which were basically anti-Russian and thus had to be articulated to St. Petersburg with extreme caution. She believes that this may have been Schwarzenberg's principal reason for using Buol for several missions in Germany, even though his most recent experience was in Russian affairs. Heindl, , Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London, p. 73.Google Scholar

²⁸ Rock, , “Reaction Triumphant,” pp. 104–200 Google Scholar; Austensen, , “The Early Career of Count Buol,” pp. 190–263.Google Scholar

²⁹ Buol to Schwarzenberg, St. Petersburg, Februay 14, 1849, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv X, Russland, Karton XXVI, No. 9C; Buol to Schwarzenberg (private), St. Petersburg, December 19, 1849, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Red Carton No. CDLI (Acta Secreta), No. 579; Buol to Schwarzenberg, St. Petersburg, February 24 and May 18, 1850, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv X, Russland, Karton XXX, Nos. 7A, 7B, and 19C.

³⁰ Buol was clearly very concerned about the possibility of a future conflict with Russia over the latter's expansive policies in the Near East. “Without a doubt this may someday bring about grave complications between the two Imperial courts, [he wrote to Schwarzenberg in April, 1849]. Let us hope that we will be able to turn all our forces and energy to the defense of our political and commercial interests against the expansionist views of this powerful neighbor.” Buol to Schwarzenberg, St. Petersburg, April 9, 1849, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Poliiisches Archiv X, Russland, Karton XXVI, No. 20D. See also Buol to Schwarzenberg, Teplitz, September 20, 1850, and Vienna, September 26, 1850, Ibid., Karton XXXII, no number given.

³¹ Buol to Schwarzenberg, St. Petersburg, November 11, 1850, Ibid., Karton XXX, No. 52A; Buol to Schwarzenberg (private), St. Petersburg, November 15, 1850, Ibid., Karton XXXII, no number given. On learning of the terms of the Olmiitz agreement, Buol wrote Schwarzenberg: “I must frankly admit that my first sentiment on reading the Olmiitz protocol was that of surprise. It was only after a more mature reflection of the grave considerations which our Cabinet had to take into consideration that I have perhaps appreciated with more accuracy the motives which guided Your Highness. There can be no doubt that the concessions accorded to Prussia deviate from the program we had established, and they are also at least a temporary blow to the authority of the Federal Diet. However, if these concessions ensure for us the peace of which we have such a great need, if we have obtained through them Prussia's disavowal of her revolutionary past, and if she will now associate herself with us in reestablishing order and sovereign authority, we can only be pleased with the price with which we have obtained these great results.” Buol to Schwarzenberg (private), St. Petersburg, December 11, 1850, Ibid., no number given.

³² Buol to Schwarzenberg, Dresden, March 19,1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Poliiisches Archiv II, Deulscher Bund, Karton XC, No. 22A.

³³ Buol maintained that while Prussia had the negotiating advantage at Dresden, Austria would have it at Frankfurt. “For now the task of the German governments will be to give strength and authority to the Bundestag, and this seems to provide the presiding court [Austria] with the opportunity to secure a decisive influence there.” Buol to Schwarzenberg, Dresden, April 15, 1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), ibid., Karton XC1, No. 29A.

³⁴ In a letter to Prokesch von Osten, the Austrian minister in Berlin, Schwarzenberg referred to the federal diet as a threadbare and torn coat. “I am going to give myself the harmless pleasure of collecting all of the correspondence between Vienna and Berlin during the past two years; that will be very instructive and will show people that it is not our fault if Germany has not made one step forward. Lord knows that I am not a devoted admirer of the existing federal constitution. We strove honestly to achieve a strong and practical organization. If nothing should come to pass, then things will have to go on as they are, because a coat that is threadbare and torn is still better than none at all.” Schwarzenberg to Prokesch, Vienna, March 29, 1851, Anton Prokesch von Osten, Aus den Briefen des Grafen Prokesch von Osten 1849–1855 (Vienna: Verlag von Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1896), pp. 208–209.Google Scholar

³⁵ General, special and secret instructions for the imperial-royal plenipotentiaries at the ministerial conference at Dresden, Vienna, December 20, 1850, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv II, Deutscher Bund, Karton XCII, no number given. It is also interesting to note that Schwarzenberg, supposedly a Machtpolitiker, emphasized Austria's long tradition as the defender of legality as her principal advantage vis-à-vis Prussia in the Confederation.

³⁶ Heindl, , Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London, p. 17.Google Scholar

³⁷ Buol saw an obvious community of Austrian and British interests in preventing Russian expansion in the Near East, but he despaired of cooperating with Palmerston, who seemed determined to weaken Austria rather than support her. Buol to Schwarzenberg, St. Petersburg, April 9, 1849, Staatsarchiv(Vienna), Politisches Archiv X, Russland, Karton XXVI, No. 20D.

³⁸ Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, June 30, 1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Gesandischaftsarchiv London, Karton LXXIX, no number given.

³⁹ Buol had been very critical of Russian appeasement of Great Britain both while he was in St. Petersburg and later during his first few months in London. Baron Philip Brunnow, the Russian minister in London, was the principal recipient of his complaints about Russia's lack of firmness toward the antics of Lord Palmerston. The change in Buol's thinking is striking if one compares his dispatches of November, 1851, with those of March, 1852. Buol to Schwarzenberg (private), Paris, November 25, 1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv VIII, Grossbritannien, Karton XXXIII, no number given; Buol to Schwarzenberg, London, March 18, 1852, Ibid., Karton XXXIV, No. 26A.

⁴⁰ In his instructions of March 15, 1852, Schwarzenberg told Buol that Vienna was willing to forget the sins of former English cabinets and “had no intention to add to the difficulties of the task which their successors have undertaken with courage and devotion.” Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, March 15,1852, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Gesandtschaftsarchiv, London, Karton LXXXI: Weisungen, no number given. The English ambassador in Vienna, Lord Westmorland, also thought he saw a thaw in Anglo-Austrian relations. Westmorland to Malmesbury, Vienna, March 23 and 27, 1852, Public Record Office (London), Foreign Office VII, Austria, Fasc. 401, Nos. 23 and 25. Nevertheless, it does not appear that Schwarzenberg was quite as anxious as Buol to bury the hatchet with London. The prince's very last dispatch to London before his death ruffled a few feathers, which Buol had to smooth over. Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, March 30, 1852, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Gesandischaftsarchiv, London, Karton LXXXI, ostensible and reserved; Buol to Schwarzenberg, London, April 6, 1852, Staatsarchiv(Vienna), Politisches Archiv VIII, Grossbritannien. Karton XXXIV, No. 31B.

⁴¹ Hoetzsch, Otto (ed.), Peter von Meyendorff, ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien. Politische und Private Briefwechsel 1826–1863(3 vols.,Berlin: W.de Gruyter, 1923), Vol. II, pp. 444–446.Google Scholar

⁴² There are numerous examples of Schwarzenberg's expressions of his confidence in Buol. The following, written while Buol was ambassador to Great Britain, is typical: “Your report of November 25 [1851] furnishes proof that while you have no illusions about the arduous task which has devolved on you, you are aware of its great significance and have decided to fill it with no less energy than firmness. The Emperor,… who has approved completely the attitude you have taken since your debut in London, expects no less of your zeal. As for me, you may be assured that you will never lack my sincere support.” Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, December 5, 1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Gesandtschaftsarchiv, London, Karton LXXX: Weisungen, no number given. When one considers the other possible choices for Schwarzenberg's successor open to Francis Joseph (Hübner, Prokesch, Friedrich Thun, Rechberg, Lebzeltern, Franz Colloredo, etc.), it should be obvious that none of them possessed the same degree of recent experience in high policy as Buol.

⁴³ Buol later complained that the absence of ministerial solidarity, indeed, of any regular or meaningful communication between the heads of various departments, was the principal handicap for anyone who wanted to be an effective foreign minister. See Buol's memorandum of July, 1859, in Joseph Redlich, Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem (2 vols., Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1920), Vol. I, Pt. 2, pp. 234–240.

⁴⁴ One has only to read the diaries of Baron Carl Friedrich Kiibeck von Kübau, president of the Reichsrat, and Field Marshal Johann Kempen von Fichtenstamm, the head of the police, to note that Buol was in fact the target of some of the most powerful factions in the court. Walter, Friedrich (ed.), Aus dem Nachlaß des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kübeck von Kübau. Tagebücher, Briefe, Aktenstücke (1841–1855) (Grar. Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1960)Google Scholar; Mayr, Josef K.(ed.), Das Tagebuch des Polizeiministers Kempen von 1848 bis 1859 (vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1931).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Good evidence for this are the numerous unfavorable references to Schwarzenberg and Austrian policy in Count Karl Robert Nesselrode's correspondence with Baron Peter von Meyendorff at the end of 1851 and the beginning of 1852. Nesselrode, Anatole (ed.), Lettres el papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850 (11 vols., Paris: A. Lahure, 1904–1912), Vol. X, pp. 73,76,140, and 156–158 Google Scholar. Theodor Schiemann suggests that Schwarzenberg's rapprochement with Paris was an important element in this, since the Russians wanted to construct a coalition against Louis Napoleon. See his Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I(4 vols., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1919), Vol. IV, pp. 253–254.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Prokesch was reporting from Berlin that things were not as good as they seemed. He was convinced that the Prussians wanted to push Austria out of Germany and make it a Prussian sphere. Prokesch, , Aus den Briefen des Grafen Prokesch von Osien, pp. 216–217 and 225.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ No one was more aware of the difficulties of establishing an entente with England than Buol. “An attempt to exert any influence whatever on [Palmerston's] revolutionary propensities would be a wasted effort, but I have also had great difficulty in struggling against the prejudices felt toward us even among those people who are openly critical of the Foreign Secretary. The party which has the evil intentions of wanting to maintain a state of fervor and unrest on the continent is undoubtedly formidable, but that is not what we have to fear the most. It is rather this great mass of men of the upper classes who are in the habit of judging with boastfulness and without considering interests and positions which they do not understand, and who believe that they are charged with the mission of working for the good of mankind and of combatting the reaction which they think is menacing Europe. It is these people whom I envisage as the greatest and perhaps insurmountable obstacle for ever reestablishing an entente in the interest of order and based on reciprocity and mutual courtesy—not to mention ever restoring our former rapport of friendship.” Buol to Schwarzenberg, London, August 6, 1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv VIII, Grossbritannien, Karton XXXI, No. 6A.

⁴⁸ Viewing Louis Napoleon as a bulwark against republicanism, Schwarzenberg had even gone so far as to assure the “sphinx” in Paris that he had no objection to the imperial title. Friedjung, Heinrich, Österreich 1848–1860 (2 vols., Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1908–1912), Vol. II, pp. 143–146 Google Scholar. This courtship, however, did not produce much in the way of positive results. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 45.

⁴⁹ Austrian historians who deeply regretted the eventual outcome of the German question have criticized Buol mercilessly for his alleged role in allowing things to go wrong. Heinrich von Srbik accused him of many errors but criticized him especially for lacking “German feeling.” “In particular,” Srbik wrote, “the uncertainties of German affairs were a mystery to him.” Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, p. 158. Likewise, Heinrich Friedjung wrote that in general Buol had “little knowledge of things, and especially the complicated relationships in Germany … were quite unclear to him.” Friedjung, , Österreich 1848–1860, Vol. II, p. 211 Google Scholar. Joseph Redlich even went so far as to write that “Count Buol had never been used in German affairs and had no experience in this area.” Redlich, Franz Joseph, p. III Redlich's statement is particularly surprising, since Buol spent seventeen years representing Austria at German courts and was very closely involved with Schwarzenberg's German policy while at St. Petersburg. For a good discussion of Buol, Austrian historians, and the German question, see Heindl, Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London, pp. 18–23.

⁵⁰ Heindl, , Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London, pp. 25–27 Google Scholar; Austensen, “The Early Career of Count Buol,” pp. 323–328. Buol held the view that a non-national Austria was a “mediating agency” between East and West and a very significant force for the preservation of the strength of Germany and for the spread of German culture. Buol diary, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Karton CCLXXVIIB, Vol. II, pp. 235–236.

⁵¹ Probably the most widespread accusation of aggressiveness made against Buol concerns the Austrian occupation of the Danubian Principalities in 1854. Supposedly, Buol wanted Austria to keep them. Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 66 Google Scholar; Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, pp. 226 and 229–231 Google Scholar. That this was not the case is demonstrated very clearly in Schroeder's, Paul W. “Austria and the Danubian Principalities, 1853–1856,” Central European History, Vol. II (September, 1969), pp. 216–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵² It has been suggested that Buol had a personal antipathy towards Russia and toward Tsar Nicholas in particular, as a result of some unfavorable experiences in St. Petersburg. For example, see Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg unddie österreichische Politik, p. 37; Redlich, Franz Joseph, p. III; and Egon Caesar Corti, Mensch und Herrscher. Wege und Schicksale Kaiser Franz Josephs I. zwischen Thronbesteigung und Berliner Kongress (Graz: Styria Verlag, 1952), pp. 92–93. There is no evidence for this in his correspondence. On the contrary, his dispatches and private letters consistently refer to the Russian emperor in kind terms—even when he had good cause for bitterness. Buol to Schwarzenberg (private), St. Petersburg, January 18, 1850, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Polilisches Archiv, Red Carton No. CDL1 (Ada Secreta), No. 579.

⁵³ Hallberg and Taylor suggest that Buol's policy was to prevent any sort of rapprochement between Russia and France. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 40; Taylor, , The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918, pp. 47–49 Google Scholar. Schroeder, it seems to me, makes a good case for the idea that Buol was concerned with saving the conservative alliance and reconciling Louis Napoleon to it by somehow finding a formula that would satisfy everyone. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War, pp. 5–7.

⁵⁴ Buol used this argument himself in his report to Francis Joseph on March 21,1854. He maintained that Austria could no longer follow a policy of expectant neutrality because of the dangers for her in any of the likely outcomes. The text of Buol's report of March 21, as well as the protocols of the important ministerial conferences of March 22 and 25,1854, have been published by Paul Schroeder in “A Turning Point in Austrian Policy in the Crimean War: The Conference of March, 1854,” Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. 1V-V (1968–1969), pp. 159–202.

⁵⁵ Austria's lack of influence in St. Petersburg was made perfectly plain during the initial stages of the Near Eastern crisis. Buol received no satisfaction whatever in response to his complaints that Russia was formulating her policies without any reference to Austria's interests while at the same time expecting Vienna to support whatever St. Petersburg wanted to do. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War, pp. 41–45. Similarly, in the following year, when Nicholas sent Count A. F. Orlov to Vienna to get a pledge of neutrality from Austria, he was still unwilling to give Vienna any meaningful guarantees, especially on the lower Danube. Paul W. Schroeder, “Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853–1855,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XL (June, 1968), p. 204.

⁵⁶ The English, for example, were very much interested in encouraging Prussia in her rivalry with Austria. The Earl of Clarendon wrote to Augustus Loftus in Berlin in November, 1853: “Prussia, with reference to her interests in Germany cannot too often assert her independence, and the moment is peculiarly favorable for this when the policy of Russia is more than ever hateful, and Austria is supposed to be her servile instrument.” As quoted in Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War, p. 109.

⁵⁷ Many Austrian officials urged cooperation with Prussia as the next best alternative to siding with Russia. Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 62–63 Google Scholar; Schroeder, “Bruck versus Buol,” pp. 207–215. At one point, even Metternich added his support to this alternative. Srbik, , Metternich, Vol. 11, pp. 480–481 Google Scholar. The Prussians, however, viewed armed neutrality with Austria chiefly as a means of weakening her and advancing their own position in Germany. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War, p. 230.

⁵⁸ Several entries in Buol's diary indicate that he was conscious of the parallels between his situation and those which had confronted Metternich in 1815, 1828–1829, and 1840–1841. Even after the disappointments of the war and the Paris Conference he cherished the hope that the secret treaty of April 15, 1856, would provide a reliable European guarantee of Turkey's territory and independence—something which Metternich had not been able to achieve. Schroeder, , Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War, pp. 381–382.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Buol tried in vain to gain English and French support in Italy by taking a defensive and conciliatory attitude toward Sardinia. His reward was the humiliation of having to seek an interview with Cavour at Paris in 1856 and then to listen to him denounce Austria in the Congress. At least he was able to frustrate Cavour's hope for a war pitting the Western Powers against Austria and Russia. Ibid., pp. 368–380.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 196–197, 225–226, and 381–382. It is noteworthy, I think, that despite all of the disappointments and failures of his pro-western policies, Buol continued to maintain that England and Austria were natural allies. He was convinced that their differences were not significant enough to prevent them from cooperating. At the beginning of 1859 he told Lord Loftus, the English ambassador: “You have your ideas of liberty, of constitutional government, of religion, allin opposition to ours. But in the ‘categorie politique’ you are with us. We were your great allies against Napoleon I; we have the same political interests; we have mutual friends and mutual enemies. On that terrain we meet.” Lord Augustus Loftus, The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1837–1862(2vok., London: Cassell and Co., 1892), Vol. I, pp. 377–378.

⁶¹ Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War, pp. 34,41–43,91–92,95–96, and 134. To the extent that they wished to have Austria's support for their policies, the great powers acted as though they could get it through intimidation. Ibid., pp. 113–114. Thus, the only clear idea the British foreign secretary had on what to do with the Crimea was that it could be used to intimidate Austria. “Nothing would alarm her more,” Clarendon wrote to Lord John Russell, “than England and France taking up their permanent abode on the shores of the Black Sea, having the command of Constantinople and of the mouths of the Danube and being ready to revolutionize the Slaves[sic] and Hungarians if necessary.” Clarendon to Russell, September 27, 1854, as quoted in ibid., p. 205.

⁶² Friedrich Engel-Janosi, “L'ultimatum austriaco del 1859,” Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, Vol. XXIV (1937), pp. 1393–1425 and 1565–1600; Josef von Paić, “Zur politischen Vorgeschichte des Feldzuges 1859,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Institutes für Geschichtsforschung, Vol. XLIII (1929), pp. 376–390; Paul W. Schroeder, “Austria as an Obstacle to I talian Unification and Freedom, 1814–1861,” Austrian History News Letter, No. 3 (1962), pp. 20–30; Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, Graf Rechberg. Vier Kapitel zu Seiner und Österreichs Geschichte (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1927), pp. 37–39 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 187–192 Google Scholar; Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, pp. 353–354 Google Scholar; Redlich, , Franz Joseph, pp. 236–241 Google Scholar.

⁶³ Engel-Janosi, “L'ultimatum austriaco del 1859,” pp. 1424–1425 and 1567–1569. In the ministerial conferences of January 5, January 28, and February 19, 1859, Buol supported the proposal to strengthen Austria's military position in Italy but stoutly resisted total mobilization for a war on the Rhine against France. Paić, “Zur politisches Vorgeschichte des Feldzuges 1859,” pp. 377–378. That a tremendous amount of pressure was put on both Buol and Francis Joseph from within the Austrian government is obvious from Kempen's diary. Buol was being denounced for indecision, weakness, and pro-French sympathies. By the end of February the military and conservative factions had pulled out all the stops in their attempts to persuade Francis Joseph to dismiss him. See Mayr, Das Tagebuch des Polizeiministers Kempen, pp. 498–501, especially the entry for February 25. Buol later told Count Beust that he had been against the war but was unable to dissuade the generals. Friedrich Ferdinand Graf von Beust, Aus Drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten. Erinnerungen und Aufzeichnungen (2 vols., Stuttgart: Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Verlag, 1887), Vol. II, p. 356.

⁶⁴ Buol may have had the last word in opposing those who advocated cooperation with Prussia, since he is supposed to have said: “Im Jahre 1859 hat Österreich nach zwei verlorenen Schlachten eine Provinz verloren; im Jahre 1864 hat es nach zwei gewonnenen Schlachten ganz Deutschland verloren.” Quoted in Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, Vol. IV, p. 182. He died seven months before the Battle of Königgrätz.

⁶⁵ Metternich approved the western orientation of Buol's foreign policies prior to and during the Crimean War and later encouraged him to take a firm stand against Cavour's provocations. But, although he may have contributed indirectly to the alliance of December, 1854, and the ultimatum of April, 1859, Metternich was strongly opposed to Buol's actions in both instances. The old chancellor's role in the 1859 crisis is especially interesting, since he was supplying Buol with confidential information alleging that the English were sympathetic to Austria's cause and that Napoleon III would lose his throne if he went to war with Austria over Italy. See Burckhardt, Briefe Metternichs an Buol, pp. 64–65, 81–82, 85, 91, 92–94, 112–116, 120, 145, 156–157,169, 196, 204, 217–219, 222–223, and 225–228; and Schroeder, “Bruck versus Buol,” pp. 214–215.

⁶⁶ It is true, I think, that the spirit of friendship between the two men was more pronounced prior to the December alliance. Thus, in September, 1853, Metternich informed his “old friend” Buol of his youngest daughter's engagement before he told anyone else. Burckhardt, Briefe Meiternichs an Buol, p. 130. Subsequently, the tone of the old chancellor's letters was somewhat cooler, although they still contained assurances of his personal friendship. For his part, Buol appears to have repaid Metternich for his earlier patronage by furthering the career of his son, Prince Richard. Ibid., pp. 106,131,168, and 204.

⁶⁷ Among them were Baron Karl Friedrich KUbeck von Kübau, the president of the Reichsrat; Field Marshal Johann Kempen von Fichtenstamm, the minister of police; Generals Heinrich von Hess and Karl von Grünne; the Saxon and Bavarian ministers Friedrich von Beust and Ludwig von der Pfordten; and some of his own diplomats, including Alexander Hübner at Paris, Friedrich Thun at Berlin, and Karl Ludwig Bruck at Constantinople.

⁶⁸ Nesselrode, . Lettres et papiers. Vol. X, pp. 19–20 Google Scholar; Loftus, . Reminiscences, Vol. 1, pp. 319–320 Google Scholar; Heindl, , Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London, p. 124.Google Scholar