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The Failure of the Austrian and Yugoslav Police to Repress the Croatian Ustaša in Austria, 1929–1934

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2014

Mark Lewis
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Since the 1970s, historiography about the pre-World War II phase of the Croatian Ustaša concentrated on Italian and Hungarian state support for Ante Pavelić's national-separatist/terrorist organization from approximately 1929–1934, and identified Nazi support when it became more significant in the late 1930s and put the group in charge of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941. More recent scholarship has investigated the support of Croatian exiles in the United States and Argentina for the Ustaša movement, as well as how the Ustaša regime, once in power, tried to legitimate its policies of racial “cleansing” and social revolution against capitalism and secularism. The first aim of this article is to return to the early period of the Ustaša, when it was a terrorist organization, and to show that it had an important base in Austria that senior Austrian police officials tolerated. The article, therefore, takes a somewhat different position from that of historian Arnold Suppan, who argued that the Austrian police could find no evidence that the Ustaša in Austria had been involved in terrorism, and that the Austrian government had made a good faith effort to expel Ustaša members. The fact that elements of the Austrian police indeed knew about the Ustaša network and protected certain senior members supports historian Gerhard Jagschitz's argument that the Vienna police had not turned over a new leaf in the postwar period and had not shed all political activities. However, Jagschitz concentrated on the problems surrounding the establishment of a domestic intelligence agency in the 1920s, showing how it ultimately was not effective. This article concentrates on 1929–1934, demonstrating that while the Austrian political police was not all-knowing, certain decisions not to share what it knew about ultra-nationalist Croatian terrorism damaged the Austrian police's international reputation. Second, this article argues that the Yugoslav police possibly turned to shadowy extra-judicial groups to carry out assassinations against Ustaša figures, in part because the Austrian police were not aggressive enough in repressing the organization. This adds an additional factor to the interpretations of historians James Sadkovich and Mario Jareb, who contend that Yugoslav police violence was an extension of the Serbian dictatorship's attempt to repress Croatian nationalism by any means necessary.

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Austrian History Yearbook , Volume 45 , April 2014 , pp. 186 - 212
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Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 2014 

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References

2 Historian Bogdan Krizman focused on the Ustaša network abroad and recognized that Vienna was a center of operations and propaganda; however, it appears he did not have access to Austrian documents. See Krizman, Bogdan, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše [Ante Pavelić and the Ustaša] (Zagreb, 1978), 68–83Google Scholar. On Italian intentions to destabilize Yugoslavia, see Sadkovich, James J., Italian Support for Croatian Separatism, 1927–1937 (New York, 1987), 125–29Google Scholar. For a summary of the conditions in the Serb-Croat-Slovene state in the 1920s, the emergence of the Ustaša, and its reemergence in 1941 as a puppet state with Nazi and Italian Fascist support, see Tomasevich, Jozo, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford, 2001), 17–33, 49–61Google Scholar.

3 Jareb, Mario, Ustaško-domobranski pokret: od nastanku do travnja 1941. godine [The Ustaša-Home Guard Movement: From Its Founding to April 1941] (Zagreb, 2006)Google Scholar. Jareb's extensive work also argues that the organization did not have a Fascist ideology from 1930–1935, but was solely devoted to creating an independent Croatian state by “revolutionary means.” Elements of Fascism and totalitarianism, Jareb maintains, were only added later; see 145–63, 634–37.

4 Yeomans, Rory, Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941–1945 (Pittsburgh, 2013), 1–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Suppan's work on Austrian-Yugoslav relations in the interwar period is fundamental. On the Ustaša issue, see Suppan, Arnold, Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918–1938. Bilaterale Aussenpolitik im Europäischen Umfeld (Vienna, 1996), 395–414CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 On myth of the nonpolitical police in Austria in the first Republic, see Jagschitz, Gerhard, “Die politische Zentralevidenzstelle der Bundespolizeidirektion Wien. Ein Beitrag zur Rolle der politischen Polizei in der ersten Republik,” Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte (1978): 49–95 at 58–64, 85–87Google Scholar.

7 Further, Jagschitz examined the domestic intelligence bureau (the politische Zentralevidenzstelle) from an organizational point of view, rather than examining specific cases, because few of the bureau's files (which were massive) still exist.

8 Sadkovich, James J., “The Use of Political Trials to Repress Croatian Dissent, 1929–1934,” The Journal of Croatian Studies 28–29 (1987–1988): 103–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar, seems to suggest that the Yugoslav dictatorship was the cause of Ustaša terror. Jareb, in Ustaško-domobranski pokret, seems to move between two positions, stating on the one hand that the question of who first used terrorist methods (the Yugoslav police or the Ustaša) “is not simple,” (Jareb, 230), then stating that all the Ustaša terrorist attacks from 1931–1934 were designed to create fear and confusion “and also destroy the undertakings of the [Yugoslav] police.” (Jareb, 237).

9 The Nazis took over the ICPC between 1938 and 1940, and Western European states and the United States reformed it as Interpol after World War II. See Deflem, Mathieu, “The Logic of Nazification: The Case of the International Criminal Police Commission (‘Interpol’),” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43, no. 1 (2002): 21–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 33–36. On the problems of Interpol in the 1970s and the formation of the TREVI working group to combat terrorism, see Fijnaut, Cyrille, “The Internationalization of Criminal Investigation in Western Europe,” in Police Cooperation in Europe. Lectures at the International Symposium on Surveillance. Rechercheschool Zutphen, March 2–5, 1987, ed. Fijnaut, Cyrille and Hermans, R.H., 32–56, (Lochem, 1987), at 40–42Google Scholar.

10 Dressler, Material für die Skizze eines Verträges, 16 April 1925, Pr.Z.II-286/1/2/a, Arhiv des Bundes-Polizeidirektion (Vienna): Interpol/1925. (Hereafter BPD-W, Interpol/1925).

11 Lewis, Mark, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919–1950 (Oxford, UK, 2014), 117–20, 140–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Liang, Hsi-huey, The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War (Cambridge, UK, 1992), 8–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fijnaut, Cyrille, “The International Criminal Police Commission and the Fight against Communism,” in The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives, ed. Mazower, Mark, 105–28, (Providence, RI, 1997)Google Scholar.

13 Deflem, Mathieu, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation (New York, 2002), 17–26, 123, 148–51, 215, 225–30Google Scholar.

14 Schober to Enright, 9 August 1925, BPD-W, Interpol/1925.

15 Edmondson, C. Earl, The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918–1936 (Athens, GA, 1978), 19–25, 33, 40–48Google Scholar.

16 Winfried R. Garscha and Barry McLoughlin argue that Schober bore significant responsibility for the massacre of civilians, since he communicated false reports about the number of policemen wounded and killed during the early part of the demonstrations and also used his own police inspectors to obtain weapons from the military's armory. These historians also dispute that police started shooting to clear the Justizpalast area so that fire trucks could get through, since the Republican Schutzbund was prepared to clear the area itself, a fact that chairman of the Schutzbund, Julius Deutsch, communicated to Schober before the shooting began. In their view, Schober intentionally wanted to set off a “bloodbath” in order to defeat the forces of Social Democracy. See Garscha, Winfried R. and McLoughlin, Barry, Wien 1927. Menetekel für die Republik (Berlin [German Democratic Republic], 1987), 125, 132–34Google Scholar.

17 Edmondson, Heimwehr, 52–53, 119–49.

18 Steinwender, Engelbert, Von der Stadtguardia zur Sicherheitswache. Wiener Polizeiwache und ihre Zeit. Ständestaat, Großdeutsches Reich, Besatzungszeit, vol. 2 (Graz, 1992), 88–101, 144–45Google Scholar. Because Steinwender expresses certain sympathies with the Austrian Nazis (such as those who participated in the Dollfuß putsch), I have used his information extremely carefully, and I do not share his political views.

19 Promitzer, Christian, “The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination: Serbs and Slovenes in the Changing View from German Nationalism to National Socialism,” in Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. Wingfield, Nancy M., 183–215 (New York, 2003), at 191–94, 209–10Google Scholar.

20 Bogdanović, Branko, Dva veka policije u Srbiji [Two Centuries of the Police in Serbia], 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2002), 110–13Google Scholar.

21 Tomasevich, War and Revolution, 16.

22 See the seized Macedonian correspondence and reports on people allegedly with connections to the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee in Arhiv Jugoslavije (Belgrade), Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova KJ, Br. fonda 14, Br. Fascikle 28, folder 75. (Hereafter AJ/MUP KJ/14/28/75).

23 Hügel to Bundeskanzler (Abschrift), 14 July 1926, Zl.53/Pol.; Hügel to Bundeskanzler (Abschrift), 8 August 1926, Zl.57/Pol.; Strautz to Bundeskanzler (Abschrift), 25 September 1926, 7/Pol., Österreichisches Staatsarchiv-Arhiv der Republik (Vienna), Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Neues Politisches Arhiv, Liasse Südslawien 19/3. (Hereafter AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 19/3).

24 Sadkovich, “The Use of Political Trials,” 106–09.

25 Milićević published a 1959 memoir about tracking the Ustaša, but his chronology is not reliable and he does not acknowledge the use of repressive measures. See Milicevic, Vladeta, A King Dies in Marseilles. The Crime and Its Background (Bad Godesberg, 1959)Google Scholar.

26 Bruno Schulz, “Bericht über die Tätigkeit der ‘Internationalen Kriminalpolizeilichen Kommission,’” in Internationaler Polizeikongress, Berlin 1926. Sammlung der Referate und Beschlüsse, BPD-W, Interpol/1926.

27 Dressler, Material für die Skizze eines Verträges.

28 The country was renamed Yugoslavia under the Aleksandar dictatorship in 1929.

29 Referat des Sektionschefs im Ministerium des Innern in Belgrad Vasa Lazarevic über die Tätigkeit zur Verwicklung der Beschlüsse des ersten Internationalen Polizei-Kongresses im Königreiche SHS, 19–22 May 1924, BPD-W, Interpol/1924.

30 Schober, 3 March 1926, Pr.Z.IV–1266–26 (Abschrift); BPD-W, Schober Archiv Schachtel 28 I. 1926, Verschiedene Abschriften aus dem Jahre 1926. See also Schober, 27 January 1926, Pr.Zl.IV-37/26/3 (Abschrift), BPD-W, Schober Archiv Schachtel 28 II. 1926.

31 Schober, 19 February 1921, Pr.IV–181/2 (Abschrift), BPD-W, Schober Archiv Schachtel 48, Gruppe III. 1921.

32 Pamer, 25 July 1928, Pr.Zl.IV–3331/28 (Abschrift), BPD-W, Schober Archiv Schachtel 30, 1928.

33 On Sarkotić's circle in the 1920s, which had both pro-monarchist and pro-republican elements, see Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret, 41–46.

34 Bundespolizeidirektion in Wien to Bundeskanzleramt, Abteilung 13, 25 January 1929, Pr.Z.IV–396/29 in Bundeskanzleramt, Geschäftszahl 20432–13/1929, and Bundespolizeidirektion in Wien to Bundeskanzleramt, Abteilung 13, 29 March 1929, Pr.Z.IV–1421/29, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1928–1929. All documents come from AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1928–1929 until otherwise noted. Future references will be abbreviated as follows: Bundespolizeidirektion in Wien (BPolDion in Wien); Bundeskanzleramt (BKA); Bundeskanzleramt, Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BKA-AA).

35 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 29 March 1929.

36 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 19 April 1929, Pr.Zl. IV–257/4.

37 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 22 April 1929, Pr.Zl. IV–396/29/3.

38 BKA-AA to Oesterreichische Konsularamt, 24 April 1929, Z. 117.502–15.

39 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 23 July 1929, Pr.Z.IV–396/29.

40 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 28 October 1929, Pr.Zl. IV–4955/29.

41 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 18 November 1929, Pr.Zl. IV–5326.

42 Ploennies to Bundeskanzler, 3 December 1929 (Abschrift), BKA G.Zl. 25325–13/29.

43 Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 70–83; Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918–1938, 400–01, 403.

44 Die Delegation der kroatischen Nationalvertretung (Ing. August Kosutić and Dr. Juraj Krnjević) to the Ministerium für äussere Angelegenheiten, 25 January 1930, BKA G.Zl. 25.427–13.30, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1930.

45 Sadkovich, “The Use of Political Trials,” 106–21.

46 For examples in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931, see the case of suspected agent provocateur Mladen Neralić: BPolDion to BKA-AA, 7 April 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–1842/31; BPolDion to BKA-AA, 20 April 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–1642/1/31, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931; and police reliance on information from Ivan Perčević when evaluating whether Petar Gruber, a Croatian Serb and associate of Croatian and Macedonian nationalists, lured Pavelić to Munich and attempted to kill him on 15 October 1931: BPolDion to BKA, Abt. 13, 7 November 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–3541/31.

47 Sadkovich, “The Use of Political Trials,” 119.

48 BPolDion to BKA-AA, 18 February 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–944/31, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931. All documents come from AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931 until otherwise noted.

49 Pleinert to Schober, 7 March 1931, BKA G.Zl. 21317/13/pol/1931.

50 Grič. Hrvatska Korespondencija, 17 March 1931, in Bundeskanzleramt G.Zl. 21374-13/pol.

51 Brandl, “Artikel der ‘Freiheit’ vom 19. März 1931 und der ‘Reichspost’ vom 20. März 1931. Information,” 20 March 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–1448/31.

52 BKA, “Branko Cverger, Aufenthalt in Wien,” 23 March 1931, BKA G.Zl. 21747–13/1931.

53 Amstvermerk, 6 July 1931, in BKA G.Zl. 23829 Pr. 7.VII.1931.

54 Jugoslawisches Memorandum über die Tätigkeit der kroatischen Emigranten in Oesterreich, 20 October 1931, Bundeskanzleramt G.Zl. 25.556–13/31.

55 BKA, 21 August 1931, G.Zl. 24594- pr.21.VIII.1931; BPolDion to BKA-AA, 4 September 1931, Pr.Z.IV–129/31/13.

56 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 24 November 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–3491/31/53, in BKA G.Zl. 26260–13/pol.

57 Ibid., and BKA, Aide-memoire, December 1931, in BKA G.Zl. 26260–13/pol.

58 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Generaldirektion für öffentliche Sicherheit, Staatspolizeiliche Büro (Abschrift pro actis), 31 October 1934, Pr.Zl. IV–4891/1934, in BKA G.Zl. 46.773-13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November-December.

59 See the two-paged typed report attached to Min.Adj.Zl.139/30, addressed to the Bundeskanzler, 25 January 1930, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13 1930.

60 Ibid.

61 The Burgenland government told the BPolDion that it knew nothing about a “Croatian cadre” attached to the Burgenland Heimwehr, but the Steiermark Heimwehr was a separate organization. BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 18 February 1930, Pr.Zl.IV–1404/2/29, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13 1930.

62 Edmondson, Heimwehr, 100–04.

63 Jugoslawisches Memorandum über die Tätigkeit der kroastischen Emigranten in Oesterreich, 20 October 1931.

64 “Uebersetzung aus dem ‘Obzor’ vom 4. Dezember 1931,” Zl. 301/Res. Filed in Bundezkanzleramt ad 26.408/13/31, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931.

65 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 29 May 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–2536/31, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931; BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 24 October 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–4756–31, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931. According to a 1946 interrogation protocol, Perčević stated that he and the other editors of Grič were in touch with “one of their own old buddies” on the Vienna police bureau that handled confiscated newspapers, and this person provided news to Grič's editors. See Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret, 192.

66 On Gruber's background and the question of whether he actually worked for Milićević, see Sadkovich, “The Use of Political Trials,” 121–25.

67 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 7 November 1931, Pr.Zl.IV–3541/31, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931.

68 See “Fortsetzung der Belgrader Mord-Methoden. Ein serbischer Mordanschlag gegen den Führer der Kroatischen Freiheitsbewegung Dr. Ante Pavelić missglückt,” Grič. Hrvatska Korespondencija [Grič. Croatian Correspondence], 25 October 1931, Annex to 25803/13, following police report Pr.Zl.IV-3541/3/31; “Die Belgrader Methoden des Mordes und der Lüge: Der Missglückte Mordversuch gegen Dr. Pavelić und die daraufhin einsetzende Belgrader Verleumdungsoffensive,” Grič. Hrvatska Korespondencija, 4 November 1931, BKA G.Zl. 26070–13/31, both in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1931; and “Dr. Ante Pavelić, kroatischer Abgeordneter, berichtet über seinen Aufenthalt in München am 14. und 15. Oktober 1931,” in BKA G.Zl. 20234/13/pol. 32, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1932.

69 “Die Belgrader Methoden des Mordes…”

70 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit, 25 June 1932, Pr.Zl.IV–3541/20/31 in Bundeskanzleramt 22392/13.pr.23 V 1932, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1932.

71 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Abt. 13, 2 May 1932, Pr.Zl.IV–2699/32, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1932.

72 Polizeidirektion Salzburg, 9 May 1932, Zl.75/31-res, in BKA G.Zl. 22.219–13/32, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1932.

73 See the deposition of Vinco Mihalus in League of Nations, Official Journal, Eighty-third (Extraordinary) Session of the Council, December 1934, 1800–07.

74 Wagner to Egger, 6 February 1933, Zl. 350/Res. in in BKA G.Zl. 20.699–13/33, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1933.

75 Delegat Ministarstva Unustrašnjih Poslova u Beću to Ministarstvu Unutrašnjih Poslova [(Yugoslav) Delegate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, based in Vienna, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs], 30 May 1933, AJ/MUP KJ/14/27/72.

76 BKA (Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit [Ferraris]) to Abt. 13, 27 March 1933, Zl. 124.033-GD 1, in BKA G.Zl. 21611–13/33, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1933.

77 Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 82–83.

78 BKA (Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit [d'Elvert]) to Abt. 13, 21 March 1932, Zl. 136.637-GD 1, in BKA G.Zl. 21494/13/32, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1932.

79 Sadkovich, “The Use of Political Trials,” 130–31. How the Yugoslav police uncovered the location of the house where Oreb and the others were staying is not clear. Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 145, states the police only found out about the plot a few hours before Oreb intended to carry it out. Milićević, A King Dies, 47–48, claims he obtained the information from Jelka Pogorelec, Perčec's secretary, who became Milićević's informant.

80 Nastassijevitsch (German spelling of Nastasijević) to Dollfuß, 31 January 1934, P.146; BKA-AA, 10 March 1934, Zl. 51989-pr.12.III.1934; Nastasijevitch (French spelling) to Dollfuß, 13 March 1934, P.No.466 in BKA G.Zl. 52.050–13/34; Hornbostel to Nastasiyevitch, 23 March 1934, BKA G.Zl. 52.091–13/34, all in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

81 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 25 March 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

82 Feuchtinger (gerichtlicher beeideter Sachverständiger für Bohr- und Sprengtechnik, Sprengtechnisches Büro) to BPolDion in Wien (Abschrift), 28 March 1934, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

83 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 25 March 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/34, and BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 27 March 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891–1934/1 in BKA G.Zl. 52.549–13/34, both in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

84 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 11 April 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/34/7, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

85 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 18 November 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/34/24, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

86 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 29 March 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/2/34 in BKA G.Zl. 52.638–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May. “P.IV” was the code used for all Ustaša correspondence coming from Austria. After Oreb's failed attack, the main Ustaša command (Glavni Ustaški Stan) issued a set of secret codes used for all correspondence. Clearly the group's elaborate measures for how correspondence was to be handled did not work. See Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 145–46.

87 BKA-AA to Ploennies (Kopie), 23 May 1934, Z.172.308–15 in BKA G.Zl. 54087/13 ex 1934, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

88 Bundeskanzleramt, 9 April 1934, G.Zl. 52.638–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

89 BKA instructions to Ploennies, in Bundeskanzleramt, 14 July 1934, G.Zl. 55.664–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, June–August.

90 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 29 March 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/2/34 in BKA G.Zl. 52.638–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, January–May.

91 Steinwender, Von der Stadtguardia, vol. 2, 88–90, 151Google Scholar.

92 See the original Serbian death sentence in Bundeskanzleramt, 4 August 1934, G.Zl. 56.441–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, June–August.

93 Several different spellings appear in the Austrian documents. Jagarčec is probably the correct one, so I have used that in the rest of the paragraph.

94 Bundespolizeidirektion, Staatspolizeiliches Büro, Graz to Staatsanwaltschaft, Graz (Abschrift), 22 June 1934, Zl.St.B. 13458/1-Pers.; and BKA to Pflügl, Aide-mémoire, 10 December 1934, both in BKA G.Zl. ad 47.569–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December. Jagarčec was a Roman Catholic born in Zagreb. He was introduced to Lukatella by his Serbian boss in Zagreb and claimed he only went along with the plot so that the Legion would help him get a better job. Because he did not carry out the murder (and went to the police) Jagarčec got two weeks detention as punishment, while Kolar, found to be the instigator, got six years in prison.

95 Steinwender, Von der Stadtguardia, vol. 2, 124Google Scholar.

96 Simonović to Ministru Unutrašnjih Poslova, 25 September 1934, AJ/MUP KJ/14/27/17. See also Krizman's summary of this report (Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 155–56), which covers other details about Austrian activities but does not mention Simonović's hope of achieving an Austrian Nazi-Ustaša balance.

97 Bundespolizeikommissariat Villach to Bundeskanzleramt (Staatspolizeiliches Büro), 15 October 1934, Z.I 224/1/34 in BKA G.Zl. 46.567–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

98 See the documents on Novak in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December; Liasse Südslavien 2/13, 1935; and Liasse Südslavien 2/13, 1936–38.

99 Militchevitch (Milićević) to Monsieur le Controleur Generale (Mondanel), 18 October 1934, AJ/MUP KJ/14/27/73.

100 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 24 October 1934, Pr.Z.IV–4891/18, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, September–October.

101 BPolDion in Wien to BKA, Generaldirektion für öffentliche Sicherheit, Staatspolizeiliche Büro (Abschrift pro actis), 31 October 1934, Pr.Zl. IV–4891/1934, in BKA G.Zl. 46.773–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

102 Memo, 8 November 1934, Z. 308.352–15/1934 in BKA G.Zl. 46.837–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

103 Amsterinnerung, 13 November 1934, BKA G.Zl. 47.059–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

104 BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 17 November 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/34, and BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 18 November 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/34/24, in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

105 See the three protocols (Niederschriften) of Perčević from 21, 23, and 25 November 1934, in AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December, and BPolDion in Wien to BKA-AA, 26 November 1934, Pr.Zl.IV–4891/30/34, in the same Liasse.

106 Niederschrift (Ivan Perčević), 21 November 1934, 5–6, 9–10.

107 Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 157; Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret, 307–08, n. 995.

108 For his reasons for each visit, see Niederschrift (Ivan Perčević), 25 November 1934.

109 Niederschrift (Ivan Perčević), 23 November 1934.

110 I have not been able to find any legal records relating to this decision in the 1934–1935 records of extraditions in the archives of the Bundesministerium für Justiz at the ÖStA/AdR. Perčević was no longer in police custody by February 1935, when he asked the BPolDion if he could travel to Hungary. It granted permission, and so did the BKA. See Amsterinnerung, 26 February 1935, BKA G.Zl. 31.707–13/1935, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1935.

111 See Milicevic, A King Dies, 77. I am also highly skeptical of Milićević's claim that the only reason why Perčević joined the Ustaša was that Yugoslav government refused to give him his back pension, and that Milićević and Perčević had secretly negotiated about this.

112 Vollgruber to BKA, Abt. 13, 30 November 1934, BKA G.Zl. 47.520–13/34, and Pflügel to BKA, Abt. 13, December 1934, BKA G.Zl. 47.520–13/34, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

113 Henriette Duić to Staatsanwaltschaft Graz (Petition for the autopsy of Duić's corpse), 29 October 1934, attached to St.12.149/34/1 in BKA G.Zl. 47460/28.XI.1934, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December.

114 See the report by Professor Dr. Fritz Reuter and Dr. Max Lorenzoni, from the Medical-Chemical Institute of the University of Graz, in BKA G.Zl. 31.085–13/1935, AdR/BfAA/NPA, Liasse Südslawien 2/13, 1934, November–December. Chemical tests for chloroform, which assailants might have used to render Duić unconscious, came back positive, but the advanced state of decomposition of his body at the time of the autopsy, plus the possible use of formalin to preserve his body, could have given positive results. Additionally, his lingual bone was broken (which was atypical in suicides by hanging and could indicate foul play, the experts said), and he was found in a semi-kneeling position, rather than hanging symmetrically from a rope, as most suicides do. However, the experts noted there were cases of suicides in kneeling and “semi-reclining” positions.

115 Kovrig, Bennett, “Mediation by Obfuscation: The Resolution of the Marseille Crisis, October 1934 to May 1935,” The Historical Journal 19, no. 1 (March 1976): 191–221CrossRefGoogle Scholar; James Steven Pacy, “Hungary, the League of Nations and the Assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia: A Study of the Resolution of an International Political Crisis” (PhD diss., American University, 1970), 241–53.

116 Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice, 122–31.

117 Skubl to Secretary General of the League of Nations, 3 January 1935, League of Nations Archives (LNA, Geneva) 3758/15584/15085.

118 McKinnon Wood to Secretary General, 1 February 1935, LNA/3758/15584/15085.

119 Articles 15 and 16, League of Nations, “Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism,” (Geneva, 1938), C.94.M.47.1938.V., 11.

120 Tomasevich, War and Revolution, 336, 425–26. Some of these figures went to Berlin in the late 1930s, were arrested by the Gestapo in 1937, then released, while after the Anschluss, Vienna figures such as Sarkotić and Perčević were arrested by the Gestapo, then released. For the details, see Krizman, Ante Pavelić i Ustaše, 292, 310.