² See his Die deutsche Frage und der Krimkrieg (Berlin: Osteuropa Verlag, 1931), pp. 48–54Google Scholar.

³ Vortrag, Buol to Francis Joseph, Vienna, January 16, 1854, and protocol of the ministerial conference of January 23, 1854, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as “Staatsarchiv [Vienna]”), Politisches Archiv XL, Interiora: Vorträge, Karton XLVIII.

⁴ Protocol of the conference of January 31, 1854, ibid.; entry of January 31,1854, in Walter, Friedrich (ed.), Aus dem Nachlasse des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kübeck von Kübau: Tagebücher, Briefe, Aktenstücke (1841–1855) (Graz: Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1960), p. 135Google Scholar.

⁵ There is a considerable volume of correspondence bearing on Buol' attempt unofficially and secretly to inspire Russia to make still another peace proposal to the Vienna Conference, based upon the terms which the Conference had laid down on January 13 and which Russia had refused to accept as they stood. Some of the more important letters on this move, for which Count Orlov served as intermediary, are Buol to Count Valentin Esterházy, ambassador at St. Petersburg, Vienna, February 5 and 11, 1854, with the attached letter of Orlov to the Russian Chancellor Count Nesselrode, February 7, 1854, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv X, Karton XXXVII, Nos. 1–3; and Buol to Count Hübner, ambassador at Paris, Vienna, February 7 (reserved) and 10, and a private letter, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv IX, Frankreich, Karton XLVIII, Nos. 1–3. The scheme, by which Buol tried, sincerely but without much hope, to avert a crisis, was given the coup de grâce both by Tsar Nicholas, who refused to make any more peace proposals, and English Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, who refused to listen to any. Eugéne Tarlé, V., Krymskaia Voina (2nd ed., 2 vols., Moscow: Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1950), Vol. I, p. 429Google Scholar; Count Colloredo, ambassador at London, to Buol (private), London, February 15, 1854, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv VIII, Grossbritannien, Karton XL. This effort of Buol's has been largely overlooked by historians. On the Austro-Prussian negotiations over a four-power convention, see Eckhart, Die Deutsche Frage und der Krimkrieg, pp. 31–44.

⁶ Eckhart, Die Deutsche Frage und der Krimkrieg, pp. 49 and 53–54, and also p. 214. Here perhaps is the place to stress that my disagreement with Eckhart on this point in no way involves a depreciation of his very scholarly and valuable book.

⁷ Kurt, Borries, “Zur Politik der deutschen Mächte in der Zeit des Krimkrieges und der italienischen Einigung,” Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. CLI (1935), p. 295Google Scholar. Borries', book, Preussen im Krimkrieg, 1853–1856 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1930)Google Scholar, takes the same general view of Austrian policy as aggressive and expansionist.

⁸ Heinrich, Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachf., 1907), pp. 42–43Google Scholar and 101–109. Friedjung includes Buol in the “war party” and speaks of the “great conquests” which he anticipated in the East.

⁹ Eduard, Heller, “Aus den ersten zwei Jahrzehnten der Regierung Franz Josephs,” in von Steinitz, Eduard Ritter (ed.), Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1931), p. 38Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Hallberg, Charles W., Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852–1864 (New York: Bookman, 1955), is in general the soundest study on Austrian foreign policy in this period. On this question, see pp. 57–62Google Scholar. Also very valuable is Henderson, Gavin B., Crimean War Diplomacy (Glasgow: Jackson, 1947)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Friedrich, Engel-Janosi, Der Freiherr von Hübner, 1811–1892 (Innsbruck: Universitäts-Verlag Wagner, 1933), pp. 118–119Google Scholar.

¹² von Srbik, Heinrich, Deutsche Einheit: Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz (4 vols., Munich: P. Bruckmann, 1936–1942), Vol. II, pp. 231Google Scholar and 238–239.

¹³ See, for instance, Count Corti, Egon C., Mensch und Herrscher. Wege und Schicksale Kaiser Franz Josephs I zwischen Thronbesteigung und Berliner Kongress (Graz: Styria Verlag, 1952), pp. 133–135Google Scholar and 137; Franco, Valsecchi, L'Alleanza di Crimea; il Risorgimento e I'Europa (Milan: Mondadori, 1948), pp. 298–300Google Scholar; Joseph, Eedlich, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 147–148Google Scholar; and Tarlé, Krymskaia Voina, Vol. I, pp. 503 and passim The views I am criticizing here have also been expressed in my own article, “Austria as an Obstacle to Italian Unification and Freedom, 1814–1861,” Austrian History News Letter, No. 3 (1962), pp. 20–22.

¹⁴ Hübner's private letter to Buol of March 15, 1854, cited by Engel-Janosi as influential in Buol's decision (see ante, p. 160, n. 11), seems indeed to call for outright Austrian entrance into the war. For the original copy of the letter, see Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv IX, Frankreich, Karton XLIX. While Prokesch was at this time not yet convinced of the wisdom and necessity of a complete break with Russia, by September he was arguing that only Austrian participation in the war could bring the “positive guarantees” vital for Austrian interests.Prokesch to Buol, Frankfurt, September 6, 1854, in von Osten, Anton Prokesch (ed.), Aus den Brief en des Graf en Prokesch von Osten, 1849–1855 (Vienna: C. Gerold, 1896), p. 392Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Eckhart, Die Deutsche Frage und der Krimkrieg, pp. 100–102 and 104–109. Corti (Mensch und Herrscher, p. 139) believes that the emperor's marriage, along with the influence of the military men and of Metternich, helped deter him from war.

¹⁶ Eckhart, Die Deutsche Frage und der Krimkrieg, pp. 88 and 109–110; Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische Politik, pp. 108–109 and passim. Kübeck read a “warlike view” out of Buol's arguments of March 22. Walter, Aus dem Nachlasse des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kübeck von Kübau, p. 138.

¹⁷ The Austrian ambassador at Berlin, Count Friedrich Thun, by no means as Prussophobe as either his predecessor Prokesch von Osten or his successor Count Georg Esterházy, repeatedly stressed the perfidy and bad faith of the Prussians. See his private letters to Buol, Berlin, February 2 and 11, 1854, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv III, Preussen, Karton LIII. In the latter communication Thun expressed his conviction that ultimately Prussia would be forced for her own preservation to unite herself with Austria, but he continued: “Indessen bleibt das Ego autem censeo stehen: Der Willen ist positiv schlecht und findet sich eine Gelegenheit, so spielen uns unsere treuen Alliirten einen perfiden Streich!”

¹⁸ Buol had good reason for all these fears. France, as is well known, had more than once made veiled threats about unleashing revolution in Italy—threats which Buol, on Francis Joseph's orders, had firmly repulsed. Less well known than these menaces are French proposals at this time to use the war to bring about a general revision of all Russian treaties with the Ottoman empire and a change in the Moldavian frontier at Russia's expense—ideas which Buol discouraged as both premature and illegal. Buol to Hübner, Vienna, March 11, 1854, with attached copy of a letter from French Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys to Baron Bourqueney, ambassador at Vienna, [March, 1854], Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv IX, Frankreich, Karton XLVIII, No. 3. At this same time Clarendon discussed with the Austrian ambassador Count Colloredo an idea then current in England, “un projet d'organiser toutes les Provinces grecques [i. e., Orthodox Christian] en principautés vassales,” with the Porte retaining only the most nominal suzerainty and Europe jointly guaranteeing the new principalities. Colloredo to Buol (private), London, March 20, 1854, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv VIII, Karton XL. See also Morrow, Ian F., The Black Sea Question during the Crimean War (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cambridge University, 1927), pp. 8–10Google Scholar and 25–27.

¹⁹ Eckhart, Die Deutsche Frage und der Krimkrieg, p. 49.

²⁰ In the conference of January 23 the emperor laid particular stress on the supreme importance of securing Prussian and German support for Austria in advance.

²¹ See Appendix IV.

²² Feelings such as these were certainly widespread among conservative aristocrats and military men in Vienna, such as Metternich, Windischgrätz, Clam-Gallas, Wimpffen, Hess, Archduke Albert, Kübeck, and many others. However, most of those advocating a Western orientation—Hübner, Prokesch von Osten, even Buol himself—were also deep-dyed conservatives, with an abhorrence for democratic or liberal ideas. At this time Buol and his colleagues advocated going with France because France's policy was conservative and Russia's revolutionary. Tarlé, , Krymskaia Voina, Vol. I, p. 430Google Scholar.

²³ The account of the conference of March 25 in Kübeck's diary (Walter, Aus dem Nachlasse des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kubeck von Kübau, p. 139) gives some idea of the political intrigue and infighting that was going on.

²⁴ Kriegsarchiv, (Vienna), Feldakten 1854/13, No. 181Google Scholar.

²⁵ Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 57–58 and 60–62; Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, pp. 157–158, 161–162, and passim.

²⁶ See, for example, Buol to Hübner (with copy to Colloredo), Vienna, March 11, 1854, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv IX, Frankreich, Karton XLVIII, No. 1.

²⁷ Buol to Hübner (private), Vienna, April 1, 1854, ibid.

²⁸ I deal with this question in an article entitled “Austria and the Danubian Principalities, 1853–1856,” Central European History, Vol. II, No. 3 (September, 1969), pp. 216–236Google Scholar. For an example of Hess' annexationist proclivities, see his memoir, “Punctationen über unsere Politik vis à vis der Turkei,” Vienna, March 15, 1854, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Feldakten, III und IV Armee-Oberkommando, 1854/3, No. 7 1/3.

²⁹ One can, to be sure, make a good case for Metternich's argument that the time to intervene was at the end of the campaign, after the belligerent powers had exhausted themselves, and not at the beginning. Entry of May 12, 1854, Walter, Aus dem Nachlasse des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kübeek von Kübau, p. 143; Metternich, to Buol, , Vienna, May 27, 1854, Burckhardt, Carl J. (ed.), Briefe des Staatskanzlers Fürsten Metternieh an Graf Buol-Schauenstein, 1852–1859 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1934), p. 157Google Scholar. However, in the spring of 1854 no one could foresee the outcome of the war or confidently predict that it would lead to a stalemate. Moreover, when it did, and when Austria intervened to try to end the conflict in both late 1854 and late 1855, the results were not happy for her in either case.

³⁰ In the ministerial conference of January 31 Hess described the dangers of a Russian presence in Turkey's northern provinces in terms even stronger than Buol's, insisting that there were only two permissible alternatives: either Turkey must continue to live on in her present condition or else the greater part of her European domains must come under Austrian rule. In addition, Hess, Grünne, and Francis Joseph advocated an immediate occupation of Serbia before Russia crossed the Danube. Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Interiora: Vortätige, Karton XLVIII.

³¹ Hess believed (and also apparently gave this as his own personal view in Berlin while negotiating the alliance) that a Russian evacuation could be secured without humiliating Russia by having Austria and Prussia arrange to halt the Russian armies and to bring about a Russo-Turkish truce. Negotiations could then begin immediately in Vienna or Berlin and the Principalities could be evacuated by Russia and the Black Sea simultaneously by the Anglo-French fleets. Hess to Buol, Berlin, April 6, 1854 (with four annexes), Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv III, Preussen, Karton LIII. For ten months England and France had indignantly rejected any parallel between Russia's occupation of the Principalities and the actions of their fleets in support of Turkey. The chances for Austria to carry out such a plan were simply nil.

³² For examples of how Hess diverged from Buol's instructions in the negotiations at Berlin, see Hess to Buol, Berlin, March 30 and April 3, 6, 7, 13, 18, and 19, 1854, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv III, Karton LIII; and Hess to Francis Joseph, April 9, 1854, ibid.

³³ Memorandum by Hess, entitled “Considérations politiques,” early May, 1855Google Scholar, Kriegsarchiv, (Vienna), Feldakten, III und IV Armee-Oberkommando, 1855/322/5Google Scholar.

³⁴ “Das ritterliche, aber unrealistische Denken des noch immer jungen Kaisers,” Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, p. 362Google Scholar.

³⁵ Hess, , “Considerations politiques,” early May, 1855Google Scholar, Kriegsarchiv, (Vienna), Feldakten, III und IV Armee-Oberkommando, 1855/322/5Google Scholar.

³⁶ Kübeck believed that Buol's remarks on the failure of his colleagues to support him now as they had in January were directed particularly at Bach. Walter, Aus dem Nachlasse des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kübeck von Kiibau, p. 139.

³⁷ Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv XL, Interiora: Vorträge, Karton XLVIII.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ General Ivan Feoderovich Paskevich, the Russian commander-in-chief.

⁴¹ Staatsarchiv, (Vienna), Politischea Archiv XL, Interiora: VorträgeGoogle Scholar, Karton XLVIII.

⁴² Count Harry Karl Kurt Eduard von Arnim, Prussian ambassador at Vienna.