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Karl Renner and Austria in 1945
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
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That Austria escaped permanent sovietization and achieved political stability in 1945 was the result of many factors, but none was more important than the political skill of the man whom the Red Army picked to play the role of Trojan horse, Dr. Karl Renner. By a combination of adroit political opportunism and stubborn adherence to a single goal, that of Austrian independence, Renner outmaneuvered his Soviet benefactors and acted as midwife to the birth of a new Austria which was independent, neutral, and politically viable. In order to achieve this goal, Renner had to harmonize the often conflicting interests of the Russians, the Austrian politicians, and the Western Allies.
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1 Soviet intentions were revealed during the negotiation of the Moscow Declaration. It was at the insistence of the U.S.S.R. that the phrase, “Austria … has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the lide of Hitlerite Germany,” was inserted. Mosely, Philip E., “The Treaty with Austria,” International Organization, Vol. IV (May, 1950), p. 227Google Scholar. This stipulation not only left the door open to Soviet demands for reparations but conflicted with the professed aims of the subsequent Yalta Declaration to treat Austria as a liberated country.
2 Milovan, Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 114.Google Scholar
3 When he was informed that the Red Army had discovered Renner Stalin supposedly exclaimed: “The old traitor is still alive? He is just the man we need!” Dallin, David J., “Stalin, Renner und Tito. Österreich zwischen drohender Sowjetisierung und den jugoslawischen Gebietsansprüchen im Frühjahr 1945,” Europa Archiv, Vol. XIII (August-September, 1958), p. 11 030.Google Scholar
4 Renner's interview with the Neues Wiener Tagblatt on April 3, 1938, in which he announced that he would vote affirmatively in the Anschluss plebiscite was supposedly part of a bargain to buy the release of a colleague from prison. See Kann, Robert A., “Karl Renner (December 14, 1870-December 31, 1950),” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXIII (September, 1951), p. 248Google Scholar. In his history of the Austrian Republic, Dr. Renner offers no explanation for the above action beyond making a few general observations on the futility of overt opposition and on the necessity of preparing for a long, patient struggle. See Karl, Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1953), pp. 203–204Google Scholar. Renner apparently took no part in any opposition activity. In describing the work of the right-wing resistance during the war in his Programm Österreich (Vienna: Österreichischer Verlag, 1949), p. 12, Alfred Kasamas remarks that, unlike other Socialist politicians, Renner was never contacted by the resistance groups because he was considered not “trustworthy enough.”
5 When discussing Renner's part in the fighting during February, 1934, in Vienna, Buttinger, Joseph recalls, in his In the Twilight of Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 13Google Scholar, that Renner tended “more and more to inertia” but was occasionally seized by “surprising fits of youthful energy which now and then interrupted long spells of indifference.”
6 Karl, Renner, Denkschrift über die Geschichte der Unabhängigkeitserklārung Österreichs und Bericht über Drei Monate Aufbauarbeit (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1946), pp. 9–21.Google Scholar
7 Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik, p. 233.
8 According to Dallin, Lenin had actually regarded Renner as a traitor to the working class. As late as 1943 Renner had been attacked as such over Radio Moscow. See his “Stalin, Renner und Tito,” p. 11 030.
9 Ibid., pp. 11 031–11 032. Dallin thinks that Stalin repaid this gesture by ordering Tito to withdraw his troops from Carinthia. See also Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, Tito and Goliath (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 76.Google Scholar
10 The most complete account of the formation of the Vienna city government is in Adolf, Schärf, April 1945 in Wien (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1948), pp. 53–67 and 75–85.Google Scholar
11 Renner, Denkschrift über die Geschichte der Unabhängigkeitserklärung Österreichs, pp. 30–34.
12 In the last free elections, which were held in 1930, the Communists had polled less than one per cent of the vote and had failed to elect a single representative to parliament.
13 Renner, , Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republlk, p. 234Google Scholar; Adolf, Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, 1945–55 (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1955), p. 36Google Scholar. On April 21 Renner had written Schärf: “After I name one Communist as liaison man and one to the cabinet, I believe I will have done enough in this direction.” Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, p. 33.
14 Franz Honner, a combat veteran of Tito's partisan brigades, was made minister of interior. He was responsible for public security and had at his disposal his own battalion of the Österreichische Freiheitsfront, which he brought with him from Yugoslavia. Ernst Fischer, a regular broadcaster for Radio Moscow during the war, was chosen minister of public enlightenment, education, and religious affairs. On April 23 Fischer became editor of the first postwar Austrian newspaper, Neues Österreich, the non-party organ of the coalition.
15 It was composed of Adolf Schärf, of the Socialist Party; Leopold Figl, of the People's Party; and Johann Koplenig, of the Communist Party.
16 Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, p. 32.
17 Schärf, April 1945, p. 105.
18 Ibid., pp. 113–121.
19 Renner to Kollmann, April 17, 1945, Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, p. 32.
20 The city of Vienna, the provinces of Lower Austria and the Burgenland, and parts of Upper Austria and Styria.
21 Adolf, Schärf, Zwischen Demokratie. und Volksdemokratie (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1950), pp. 46–56Google Scholar; Richard, Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 25–36.Google Scholar
22 An excellent description of the disintegration of the party organization after February, 1934, is presented in Buttinger, In the Twilight of Socialism, passim. The disillusionment of one of the few survivors of the left wing can be seen in Erwin, Scharf, Ich darf nicht schweigen (Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1948).Google Scholar
23 For the “guiding principles” of the People's Party, which were formulated during the summer of 1945, see Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, pp. 81–83. For the fully developed party program, see Kasamas, Programm Österrcich, pp. 77–231.
21 Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, pp. 98–108.
25 See his letter of October 1, 1945, in which he rebuked Erwin Scharf for writing an editcvial asserting that the bourgeoisie were, under the cloak of “Burgfrieden,” preparing an attack on the Socialists. Renner wrote: “In the daily practice of political life it is important, and on occasion, decisive, if one wishes to be successful, never to forget that one must act according to the dictates of the place, time, and the circumstances. … The eternal truth of the ‘class struggle’ is the unalterable basis of proletarian politics under all circumstances. Now we are, however, fighting against a spiritual tendency which has seized all classes, including a great part of the working class.” Scharf, Ich darf nicht schweigen, p. 16.
26 Hiscocks describes Renner's methods as follows: “The unanimity rule made the legislative process more difficult. But the Chancellor declared on a number of occasions that he would assume a resolution had been approved, unless its opponents within the Cabinet were prepared to back their opinions by resignation. Being accustomed to night-work himself, Dr. Renner would often call Cabinet meetings for nine o'clock in the evening. The less controversial measures would be taken first, and by about midnight … the more difficult matters would come up for discussion. In those days lack of food was a serious consideration, … and it was customary for wine and sandwiches to be served at the end of Cabinet meetings. Critical faculties were damped, therefore, and the democratic process considerably eased by Dr. Renner's arrangement.” Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria, p. 32.
27 He wrote: “Our great composer Schubert has bequeathed to us his ever beautiful unfinished symphony; … we hear more clearly than ever before the urgent, admonishing notes of the unfinished symphony—Austria. We shall finish it!” Neucs Österreich, April 23, 1945. On another occasion he declared: “The Austrian tragedy [during the First Republic] … stemmed from the fact that the democrats did not have enough patriotism while the patriots did not have enough democracy.” Ibid., July 25, 1945. The same line was echoed by Koplenig, though somewhat less flamboyantly: “The creation of a true popular democracy is a further pre-condition for the prevention of a repetition of the events of the last few years. The only possible form of democratic government is by the collaboration of the three great democratic parties.” Speech to the Austrian Communist Party Conference on May 29, 1945, as quoted in Erhardt to Secretary of State, Florence, June 10, 1945, U. S. State Department Files, Washington, No. 863.00B/6–1045.
28 The most celebrated statement in this regard was made by Fischer in a speech to the Vienna Chamber of Commerce on June 5 in which he declared that he was “convinced of the need for private initiative, for the talent, the resourcefulness of the Austrian businessman who … will find ways and means which even the most gifted bureaucracy would be incapable of devising.” Neues Österreich, June 6, 1945. However, he insisted, “it is equally imperative that the community decide about the direction of the economy and that every individual interest be subordinated to the common interest.” Ibid., July 5, 1945.
29 Erhardt to Secretary of State, Verona, August 7, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.00/8–745.
30 To Schärf this seemed to be a transparent device to build up a “unity party” with totalitarian pretensions. See his Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, pp. 77–79. Fischer told an American officer that he blamed the Grossdeutsch sympathies of the older Socialist leaders for the rejection of the Communist program. He added that the Communist Party was willing to remain a minority party if necessary because the first task in averting a catastrophe was to leave the coalition undisturbed. Erhardt to Secretary of State, Salzburg, August 31, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.00/8–3145.
31 Similar attempts were made in all countries occupied by the Red Army. In every case the various Social Democratic parties resisted the Communist efforts. See Denis, Healey (ed.), The Curtain Falls (London: Lincolns-Prager, 1951), passim.Google Scholar
32 Scharf, Ich darf nicht schweigen, pp. 7–18; Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, pp. 63–79; Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, pp. 73–76; Oskar, Helmer, 50 Jahre erlebte Geschichte (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1958), pp. 211–217.Google Scholar
33 Stalin to Renner, May 12, 1945, Dallin, “Stalin, Renner und Tito,” p. 11 033.
34 Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria, p. 39.
35 Hiscocb estimates the loss of installations and equipment at over $200 million. See his Rebirth of Austria, p. 214. An American officer who visited Vienna in mid-July described Soviet policy as “systematic plunder.” Erhardt to Secretary of State, Verona, July 14, 1945, U. S. State Department Files, No. 740.- 00119, Control (Austria)/7–1445.
36 Herbert, Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Fought and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 624–626Google Scholar; Herbert, Feis, Between War and Peace. The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 68;Google ScholarChurchill, Winston S., The Second World War, Vol. VI: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), pp. 518–51.Google Scholar
37 Erickson, Edgar L., “The Zoning of Austria,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. CCLXVII (1950), pp. 106–113;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBalfour, Michael and Mair, John, Four Power Control of Germany and Austria, 1945–1946. Vol. X of Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946, edited by Arnold, Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 302–309.Google Scholar
38 In Carinthia the British had recognized a Socialist administration, and in Styria they had inherited a Communist regime installed by the Red Army, which had occupied the region for several months.
39 A conference of conservative leaders in the western provinces held in Salzburg in the U. S. Zono an August 19–20 adopted a resolution demanding the creation of a central government by a fifty-fifty left-right coalition. Denby to Secretary of State, Salzburg, August 25, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.00/8–2545. For the outspoken viewpoint of the author of this resolution and the leader of the opposition in the provinces, see Karl, Gruber, Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit (2nd ed., Vienna: Ullstein Verlag, 1953), pp. 29–32.Google Scholar
40 Feis, War and Peace, p. 278; Chapter VIII of the Protocol of Proceedings, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1490.
41 Official minutes of the Allied Council meeting of September 11, 1945, Allied Commission for Austria Files, No. ALCO/M(45)1. As early as August 23 the deputies of the four commanders-in-chief began an investigation of the existing Austrian central administrative machinery to determine the extent to which it could be used by the Allies. The entry of Allied troops into Vienna and the convening of the Allied Council were delayed pending agreement on interim food supplies.
42 The first proclamation issued by the British forces in Vienna listed by number those laws of the Renner government which would be respected. In describing this incident later, Renner told a U. S. official: “The Social Democrats came to me in great excitement, but I told them it was nonsense. The English had done this in Carinthia and Styria.… It won't make any difference to the Viennese. Even if they knew what the laws were, they wouldn't know what their numbers were.” U. S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum No. 992 dated November 1, 1945, pp. 16–17. A mimeographed paper for use by the State Department.
43 Briefing Book Paper [Washington] dated June 23, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945. Potsdam Conference, Vol. I, pp. 334–335; extract from an undated political directive to General McCreery, the British Commander-in-Chief in Austria, which was given to the State Department on July 10, 1945, ibid., pp. 341–342.
44 The decision to recognize only the three government parties seems to have been reached without any debate in the Council. See official minutes of the Allied Council meeting of September 11, 1945, Allied Commission for Austria Files, No. ALCO/M(45)1.
45 Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, p. 63. There is no published account of Renner's conversations with General Cherrière, and no record of them can be found in the State Department or Allied Commission files. Inasmuch as Renner's plan was subsequently approved by the Allied Council, it can be assumed that the French were agreeable to it.
46 See the extract from an undated political directive to General McCreery, in Foreign Relations, 1945. Potsdam Conference, Vol. I, pp. 341–342.Google Scholar
47 The Times (London), September 12, 1945.
48 Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, September 12, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.01/9–1245.
49 State Department, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis Branch, R & A No. 3400: “The Reorganization of the Austrian Government and the Preparations for National Elections,” dated Washington, October 4, 1945, p. ii; United States Forces in Austria Memorandum, September 25, 1945, U. S. State Department Files, Vienna Legation File, Pt. 24, No. 801 -Länder Conference.
50 Official minutes of the Allied Council meeting of September 20, 1945, Allied Commission for Austria Files, No. ALCO/M(45)3; unofficial U.S. minutes of the Allied Council meeting of September 20, 1945, ibid., No. ALCO/UM(45)3.
51 Each delegation was composed of the chairman of the provincial party organization, the governor of the province, and one councilor from each party. The composition of the delegations represented a compromise between the Right, who desired a conference of governors, and the Left, who wanted the delegations to represent only the party organizations. U.S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, “The Reorganization of the Austrian Government,” p. 1.
52 Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, p. 41.
53 Gruber, Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit, p. 36.
54 Neues Österreich, September 25, 1945.
55 U. S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, “The Reorganization of the Austrian Government,” p. 4. Gruber did not join the People's Party until September 23. He had played a more or less independent role as head of the Tyrolean “State Party.” Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, p. 84.
56 An American officer with intimate political connections reported that Renner had “confidentially” asked members of the political commission to take into account the Russian pressure on him when evaluating the situation in the interior ministry. United States Forces in Austria Memorandum, September 25, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, Vienna Legation File, Pt. 24, No. 801-Länder Conference. A few days later Renner explained to General Clark that he had been unable to remove Honner from his post because such action might embitter the Soviets and open the way for Communist agitation. Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, October 1, 1945, ibid., No. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–145.
57 Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, p. 44.
58 Gruber, Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit, p. 38.
59 Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, October 1, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–145.
60 Ibid.
62 Conversation with Dr. Renner as reported in U. S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum No. 992, dated November 1, 1945, p. 11.
63 ibid., p. 12. See also Renner's, letter to The Times (London), September 12, 1945; and Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik, pp. 245–288.Google Scholar
64 Conversation with Dr. Renner as reported in U. S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum No. 992, dated November 1, 1945, p. 5. That Renner should do so is not surprising in view of his previous ideas on the problems of nation and state. He had long advocated transforming the Habsburg empire into a federation of nationalities, and he had developed the idea of a nation as a legal concept, as contrasted to the prevalent idea of a nation as a power concept. For a brief discussion of his major writings, see Kann, “Karl Renner,” pp. 243–249.
65 Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik, p. 236.
66 See especially Chapter III, Section 9 of the Potsdam Protocol, Foreign Relations, 1945. Potsdam Conference, Vol. II, p. 1486. In his Österreich von der. ersten zur zweiten Republik, p. 236, Renner says of this clause: “A more frivolous proposition than this can scarcely be imagined.”
67 He felt that the war had permanently eliminated the Western countries as markets for Austrian wares. “Our foodstuffs must come from the east, and we must pay for them with the products of our industry. These must go to Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the USSR.” Conversation with Dr. Renner as reported in U. S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum No. 992, dated November 1, 1945, p. 12.
68 U. S. Forces in Austria Memorandum, [Vienna,] October 8, 1945, U. S. State Department Files, No. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–845. These arrangements should be compared with those made by the Soviets in Rumania in July, 1945. See Wolff, Robert Lee, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 345–346.Google Scholar
69 Clark, Mark W., Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 468. It should be pointed out that there is no evidence in the U. S. State Department files that Dr. Renner or any other member of the Austrian government solicited General Clark's intervention in the oil controversy.Google Scholar
70 Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, September 12, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.6363/9–1245. In his reply of September 28, Marshal Koniev denied that the negotiations had infringed on any Austrian rights and insisted that they were merely intended to give effect to existing Soviet rights. Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, October 2, 1945, ibid., No. 863.6363/10–245.
71 Adolph Schärf takes credit for the rejection of the Soviet contract. He says that since he was anxious to orient Austria's trade to the East, Renner felt that he had to sign it. See Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, p. 127. In the discussions in the political cabinet on August 9 and September 4 the opposition to the contract was led by Schärf. When, at Schärf's insistence, the contract was laid before the councils of the various parties for consideration, the Socialist Party Council rejected it by a vote of 11–4. Schärf believes that the acceptance of the contract by the Austrians would have given the Russians central of the Austrlan economy and would have influenced the Western Powers not to recognize the Renner government. Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung, pp. 64–67.
72 Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, September 12, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.01/9.1245.
73 On October 1 Renner thanked General Clark for his help in the oil question and asked for U. S. support in the duel that was being fought on Austrian ground between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, October 1, 1945, ibid., No. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–145. On October 17 the semi-official Wiener Zeitung lauded General Clark as “this great American personality, who obviously combines superior diplomatic powers with his military prowess.” The editorial continued: “We have every reason to face this future with confidence when men like General Clark … so actively sponsor our cause.”
74 U. S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum No. 992, dated November 1, 1945, p. 12.
75 In his Denkschrift über die Ceschichte der Unabhängigkeitserklärung Österrekhs. p. 64. Renner complains that the completed measure lay for many weeks in his desk drawer. For discussions of the controversy, see Hiscocks, Rebirth of Austria, pp. 135–136; Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 469–470; and Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, pp. 130–133.
76 Schärf, Demokratie und Volksdemokratie, p. 55.
77 In both cases the Allied Council took the position that it was not empowered to consider territorial questions.
78 He estimated that it “might even be necessary to have protection of some sort until next fall.” U.S. State Department, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum No. 992, dated November 1, 1945, p. 12.
79 Ibid., p. 17.
80 Enclosure in Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, December 14, 1945, U. S. State Department Files, No. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/12–1445.
81 Annex 1 to Paper No. EXCO/P(45)60, in Papers of the Executive Committee, Allied Commission for Austria Files. Dr. Renner's letter was rejected by the Allied Council on November 30, 1945. See the official minutes of the Allied Council meeting of November 30, 1945, in ibid., No. ALCO/M(45)10. The reply drafted by the executive committee was approved by the Allied Council on December 10. See official minutes of the meeting of December 10, 1945, ibid., No. ALCO/M(45)11.
82 Ernst Fischer admitted to the U.S. political adviser that the electorate had clearly disowned the Communists. He blamed it on the conduct of the Russians during the early stages of the occupation. Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, November 27, 1945, U.S. State Department Files, No. 863.00/11–2745.
83 The Communists had been expected to capture 20 to 30 per cent of the vote, and the Socialists about 40 per cent. It was thought that the People's Party would be handicapped by the stigma of the discredited Christian Social Party, the Heimwehr, and the Fatherland Front.
84 In the last free election held in 1930 the Social Democrats received 40 per cent of the vote, and the rest went to right-wing groups, of which the Christian Socials, with 36 per cent, were the largest. The Communists polled less than one per cent of the vote and received no seats in parliament.
85 Erhardt to Secretary of State, Vienna, December 18, 1945, U. S. State Department Files, No. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/12–1845; Schärf, Österreichs Emeuerung, pp. 83–84. The Russian veto was probably a manifestation of their displeasure over the results of the election. It is assumed by virtually all observers that the elections were a bitter disappointment to the Russians. For example, in his Calculated Risk, p. 470, General Clark recalls that the Russians were both “surprised and angered.” He maintains that the election marked “the real end of anything other than pretended collaboration by the Russians.” Ibid. Renner is supposed to have remarked that Stalin made only two mistakes: he showed Central Europe to the Russians, and he showed the Russians to Central Europe. Hiscocks, Rebirth of Austria, p. 43.
86 Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik, p. 239.