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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
1 Kann, Robert A., “Emperor William II and Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Their Correspondence,” American Historical Review 57 (1951–1952)Google Scholar and “Kaiser Wilhelm II und der Thronfolger Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand in ihrer Korrespondenz,” Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien (Vienna, 1976), 48 n. 2.
2 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [hereafter AA], Bonn, Asservat 7.
3 Similar sentiments pervaded the archduke's conversation with the German chancellor, von Bülow, Bernhard, on 29 March. Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 (Berlin, 1922–1927) [hereafter GP], vol. 25ii: 8775Google Scholar, Bülow to Wilhelm II, 30 March 1908.
4 Kann, Studien, 52. See also Wilhelm's annotations (“under no circumstances will I participate in the judicial reform!”) to a report from the German ambassador in Constantinople. GP 22: 7726, Marschall to Bülow, 13 January 1908. This report may weH have prompted the kaiser's letter to Franz Ferdinand.
5 Bridge, Francis Roy, “Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century,” Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34 (1981): 246Google Scholar; idem, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 1906–1914: A Diplomatic History (London, 1972), 76. On the Macedonian reform, see idem, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866–1914 (London, 1972), 275ff., 292ff, 296–300; on the Sanjak railroad, Wank, Solomon, “Aehrenthal and the Sanjak of Novibazar Railway Project: A Reappraisal,” Slavonic and East European Review 42 (1964): 353–69Google Scholar, passim.
6 Reduced to the rage of the impotent, the archduke subsequently countered that the Sanjak railroad had no military or economic value. von Lützow, Heinrich Graf, Im diplomatischen Dienst der k. und k. Monarchic (Munich, 1971), 137Google Scholar.
7 For Aehrenthal's views, see AA Orientalia generalia 5 secr., Miquel to Auswártiges Amt, 1 September and 3 October 1906; also Aehrenthal to Berchtold, 14 May 1907, in Walters, Eurof, “Unpublished Documents: Aehrenthal's Attempt in 1907 to Re-Group the European Powers,” Slavonic and East European Review 30 (1951): 219Google Scholar.
8 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv PA III (Preussen), carton 163, no. 21B, Szögyény to Goluchowski, 6 August 1906; 165/Varia, Szögyény to Aehrenthal, 16 January 1907 (private); 165/Varia, December 1907 (private). The state secretary in the German foreign ministry summarized German fears in a circular of 15 January 1907. Tschirschky complained that “the goals of English policies are not readily transparent. In any case, the English are conspiring to unsettle the Balkans in order to fish in muddied waters there or in other parts of the Turkish empire.” According to Tschirschky, the British objective was a weakening of German commercial and political influence and also “the Danube monarchy's abandonment of its German ally and our further isolation” (AA England 93).
9 AA Österreich 86 no. 1b, Rampold to Tschirschky, 5 March 1909. On the archduke's attitude to the Hungarian and Czech problems, see Kann, Studien, 100ff. and 88–89,127ff. respectively. An earlier experience in England may well have colored Franz Ferdinand's outlook. After Queen Victoria's funeral, the German chargé saw him departing London “seething with rage.” The archduke apparently took umbrage at the order of precedence established for visiting royalty. Given the circumstances of his morganatic marriage, the Austrian heir could be expected to be particularly testy on matters of protocol. The report elicited a comment from Bülow: “This is likely to drive the vain archduke back into the Russian camp, but the order of precedence was (I believe) essentially correct” (AA Österreich 86 no. 1b, Eckhardstein to Holstein, 4 February 1901).
10 On another aspect of this subject, see Weinzierl, Erika, “Aehrenthal and the Italian University Question,” in Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from Maria Theresa to World War I ed. Winters, Stanley B. and Held, Joseph (Boulder, 1975), 242–46Google Scholar.
11 See Behnen, Michael, Rüstung—Bündnis—Sicherheit. Dreibund und informeller Imperialisms, 1900–1908 (Tübingen, 1985)Google Scholar, chap. 4 passim, but especially 378–81 and 447–48 for Chlumecky's suspicions of Italian designs on the altra sponda. The state secretary in the German foreign ministry suspected British backing for Italian ambitions in the Balkans in his circular of 15 January 1907 (see note 8). The German ambassador in Rome thought that Italy was undermining Ottoman authority, but was as yet too weak to benefit from an outright collapse of Turkish rule; GP 25ii: 8769, Monts to Bülow, 17 March 1908. On concurrent Italian interests in Tripoli, see GP 22: 7728, Marschall to Auswärtiges Amt, 31 January 1908. On Chlumecky, see Kann, Studien, 193 n. 65, and Williamson, Samuel R. Jr, “Influence, Power and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand, 1906–1914,” Historical Journal 17 no. 2 (1974): 425CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 AA Österreich 86 no. 1b secr., Tschirschky to Bethmann, 4 March 1911. The archduke probably meant the murder of the Serbian royal couple in the 1903 palace coup and the subsequent installment of Peter Karageorgevic as king.
13 The Kaiser took some liberties in quoting the ambassador, though the essence of the remark is correctly reproduced. See GP 22: 7720, Marschall to Bülow, 24 December 1907, with marginal comments by Wilhelm.
14 AA Türkei 156, Marschall to Bülow, 27 December 1907; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nachlass Bülow 183, Bülow to Stemrich, 2 September 1908. As minister of the interior in the Tirard and Freycinet cabinets between 1889 and 1892, Constans had established a reputation as a firm opponent of Boulangism and could already be regarded as an advocate of reconciliation with Germany.
15 Ferencz Lajos Kossuth, son of the revolutionary leader of 1848–49 and a vocal opponent of the army bill of 1902, served as Hungarian minister of commerce from April 1906 to January 1910. Indeed, the archduke's remarks on this occasion were small beer in comparison to his confidences to successive German ambassadors. On 28 January 1907, Wedel reported to Bülow the comment, “he [Franz Ferdinand] also kept pigs out of his house and therefore, since the inception of the present Hungarian cabinet and despite all attempts in this direction, had not allowed any of its ministers over the threshold” (AA Österreich 86 no. 1b, secr.). Both Wedel and Bülow concurred that Berlin should beware of taking sides in the dispute between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy. Wedel's successor in Vienna reported on 9 March 1908 that the archduke “aired his misgivings against the Hungarians in a very drastic fashion” and on 22 October 1908 “nothing has changed in what is already known about the attitude of the archduke towards Hungary” (ibid.).
16 See Matsch, Erwin, ed., November 1918 auf dem Ballhausplatz. Erinnerungen Ludwigs Freiherm von Flotow, des letzten Chefs des österreichisch-ungarischen Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1895–1920 (Vienna, 1982), 113Google Scholar.
17 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Merseburg [hereafter GStA], H.A. Rep. 53J Lit. F no. 3, Fürstenberg to Wilhelm II, 8 December 1906.
18 AA Österreich 86 no. 1b secr., Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, 17 May 1897; AA Österreich 86 no. 1b, same to same, 10 February 1900.
19 Ferdinand, Franz to von Beck, Max Wladimir, 28 08 1900, in Kann, Studien, 50Google Scholar.
20 AA Österreich 86 no. 1b, secr., Wedel to Bülow, 25 January 1907.
21 AA Österreich 86 no. 1b, Eulenburg to Hohenlohe, 10 February 1900; AA Österreich 86 no. 1b secr., Wedel to Biilow, 28 January 1907.
22 GStA H.A. Rep. 53J Lit. B no. 16a, Bülow to Wilhelm II, 25 October 1908. Bülow responded to one of the archduke's letters to the Kaiser. This letter is still missing.
23 AA England 78 secr., Tschirschky to Bülow, 9 March 1908. The archduke had visited the kaiser in March 1907 to inquire whether Germany would remain loyal to the alliance “even though we could not but have noticed the great deficiencies in the Austrian army” (AA Österreich 86 no. 1b secr., note by Tschirschky, 14 March 1907).
24 “Ich verehre ja den Kaiser so ganz besonders und halte in Allem so fest zu ihm,” GStA H.A. Rep. 53J Lit. F no. 3, Franz Ferdinand to Fürstenberg, 12 February 1910. It is likely that the remark was prompted by the Kaiser's letter of 9 February. See Kann, Studien, 72–73.
25 GStA H.A. Rep. 53J Lit. F no. 3, Fürstenberg to Wilhelm II, 20 February 1910. At the same time, Fürstenberg recommended that Aehrenthal too should be cosseted: “For our purposes it is of inestimable value that Your Majesty treat Aehrenthal with warmth. Given the conceited and suspicious character of this statesman, the feeling that he enjoys Your Majesty's personal trust will leave a deep impression on him and will contribute to dispelling any notion that he is deliberately being bypassed while the archduke is kept informed by Your Majesty.” Fürstenberg's excellent connections in Vienna allowed him to remain a close observer of the tug-of-war between the heir and the monarchy's foreign minister. On 16 December 1911, he wrote the German kaiser: “I had the opportunity to see a letter from General Hötzendorff in his own hand in which he writes with great bitterness: ‘I have not resigned, but was dismissed suddenly, a victim of Aehrenthal.’ I heard with certainty that Archduke Franz [Ferdinand] too was surprised by Conrad's dismissal. His Highness supposedly is quite irritated and indignant by all this and blames everything on Aehrenthal. As a consequence of all these events, there really are two governments which wage war with one another at knifepoint. This creates conditions–for the foreign minister, for the general staff, for the two prime ministers in Austria and Hungary–which make harmonious work simply impossible. All these people can be pitied because they no longer know whom they should obey! I view the near future with trepidation because this cannot continue without causing great domestic damage and confusion beyond the borders of the monarchy. For now, Aehrenthal still seems to enjoy the full trust of His Majesty [Franz Joseph]; but it is uncertain for how long he will enjoy this trust because the other side is planting mines everywhere and works to bring about his fall” (ibid.).
26 The letter is published as written, except for the abbreviation “u.,” which is spelled out. Wilhelm's annotations appear in the footnotes. The Kaiser initialed the letter at the top “23/1/08. W.”
27 Donnerwetter! Eine nette Lage.
28 ja!
29 Das lässt tief blicken!
30 bravo!
31 Ist geschehen!
32 Gerne! ja!
