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Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Bryce Huebner  and
Robert D. Rupert
Bryce Huebner
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20067. lbh24@georgetown.eduhttp://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/lbh24/
Robert D. Rupert
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309-0232. robert.rupert@colorado.eduhttp://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/fac_rupert.shtml
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Abstract

The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to inhibit progress in cognitive science. Severing the commitment to this taxonomy would allow Huang & Bargh (H&B) to consider a wider variety of representational forms with motivational force and to entertain the intriguing possibility that variations in the number of active-but-redundant representations account for variance in social behavior.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 145 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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