Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-12T04:55:25.807Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Evidence for the rationalisation phenomenon is exaggerated

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Tom Stafford Open the ORCID record for Tom Stafford [Opens in a new window]
Tom Stafford*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, S1 2LTSheffield, United Kingdom. t.stafford@sheffield.ac.ukhttp://tomstafford.staff.shef.ac.uk/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The evidence for rationalisation, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated. Experimental evidence shows that rationalisation effects are small rather than gross and, I argue, largely silent on the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon. At least some examples taken to show rationalisation also have an interpretation compatible with deliberate, knowing reason-responsiveness on the part of participants.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e48
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Brehm, J. W. (1956) Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 52(3):384–89.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Cohen, J. (1992) A power primer. Psychological bulletin 112(1):155–59.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Festinger, L. & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959) Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 58(2):203–10.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Festinger, L. (1962) A theory of cognitive dissonance, vol. 2. Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Nisbett, R. E. & Wilson, T. D. (1977) Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84(3):231–59. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sharot, T., Velasquez, C. M. & Dolan, R. J. (2010) Do decisions shape preference? Evidence from blind choice. Psychological Science 21(9):1231–35. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610379235.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Stafford, T. (2014) The perspectival shift: how experiments on unconscious processing don't justify the claims made for them. Frontiers in Psychology 5: article no. 1067. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01067. Available at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01067/full.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stafford, T. (2015) For argument's sake: Evidence that reason can change minds. (Self-published ebook)Google Scholar
Vinckier, F., Rigoux, L., Kurniawan, I. T., Hu, C., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., Daunizeau, J. & Pessiglione, M. (2019) Sour grapes and sweet victories: How actions shape preferences. PLOS Computational Biology 15(1):e1006499.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wilson, T. D. C. & Nisbett, R. E. (1978) The accuracy of verbal reports about the effects of stimuli on evaluations and behavior. Social Psychology 41(2):118–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar