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Post hoc rationalism in science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 August 2011
Abstract
In advocating Bayesian Enlightenment as a solution to Bayesian Fundamentalism, Jones & Love (J&L) rule out a broader critique of rationalist approaches to cognition. However, Bayesian Fundamentalism is merely one example of the more general phenomenon of Rationalist Fundamentalism: the tendency to characterize human judgments as rational and optimal in a post hoc manner, after the empirical data are already known.
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Post hoc rationalism in science
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Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition