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Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2011
Abstract
Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.
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Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning
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